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DUTCH SUMMARY 
 
 Attitudes of houdingen die consumenten hebben tegenover bepaalde producten worden 
vaak gebruikt als basis voor marketing- en reclamecampagnes in de wetenschap dat zij een 
indicatie zijn voor effectief aankoopgedrag. Attitudes worden doorgaans gemeten aan de hand 
van een unidimensionele schaal gaande van helemaal negatief tot helemaal positief. Echter, vele 
attitudes zijn niet zo eenduidig. Dagelijks krijgen consumenten een massa aan productinformatie 
te verwerken die hen bereikt via verschillende kanalen zoals reclame, mond-tot-mond 
communicatie, sociale media, blogs, online reviews en dergelijke. Deze diversiteit aan informatie 
beïnvloedt consumenten bij het vormen van attitudes ten opzichte van producten en is bovendien 
niet steeds consistent. Niet zelden vindt men zowel positieve als negatieve informative over 
verscheidene producten. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer een consument op zoek is naar een tablet pc en 
hij/zij een gespecialiseerde website raadpleegt, is de kans groot dat hij/zij zowel positieve als 
negatieve recensies zal lezen van andere gebruikers. Dit leidt ertoe dat consumenten dikwijls 
simultaan zowel positieve als negatieve gedachten en gevoelens hebben ten opzichte van 
producten. Dit wordt in marketing- en consumentenpsychologieliteratuur aangeduid met de term 
attitude ambivalentie. Een ander gevolg van deze informatieinconsistentie is dat consumenten 
steeds meer op hun hoede zijn en voorzien op conflicterende informatie over deze producten, 
ook al zijn zij daar nog niet van op de hoogte, met de idee dat geen enkel product perfect of 
uitermate slecht is. Analoog aan het vorige voorbeeld over de zoektocht naar een tablet pc, kan 
het zijn dat de consument enkel positieve reviews te lezen krijgt omdat er nog geen andere 
(negatieve) reviews beschikbaar zijn. Ondanks dat hij/zij dus enkel positieve informatie heeft 
gelezen over het product kan het toch zijn dat hij/zij ambivalentie ervaart. Dit is te wijten aan het 
 xvi 
feit dat consumenten in die situatie verwachten/voorzien dat er negatieve aspecten zijn aan het 
product waarvan ze op dat moment evenwel nog niet op de hoogte zijn. Men erkent beide kanten 
van het verhaal, in de veronderstelling dat elk product wel negatieve aspecten herbergt, ondanks 
dat men niet in staat is deze negatieve aspecten verder te definiëren. 
  Dit doctoraat definieert twee types van ambivalentie gebaseerd op het feit of mensen 
weet hebben van conflicterende kenmerken van een product (i.e. manifeste ambivalentie) of er 
net op anticiperen (i.e. geanticipeerde ambivalentie) en heeft als doelstelling te onderzoeken hoe 
deze types ambivalentie enerzijds informatieverspreiding (studie 1) en -verwerking (studie 2) en 
anderzijds gedrag(sintentie) beïnvloeden (studie 3). Het, in dit doctoraat uitgevoerde, onderzoek 
onderscheidt zich van eerder ambivalentieonderzoek doordat men zich in vroeger onderzoek 
enkel concentreerde op de mate van ambivalentie maar nooit rekening hield met hoe deze 
ambivalentie tot stand kwam (via informatie die men kent of via informatie waarop men 
anticipeert). Door na te gaan hoe deze verschillende ambivalente attitudes omgaan met hun 
ambivalentie en gedrag beïnvloeden, kunnen we enerzijds bijdragen tot het beter begrijpen van 
gedragingen gestoeld op verschillende ambivalente attitudes en anderzijds kunnen we bijdragen 
tot de - soms - conflicterende ambivalentieliteratuur inzake de voorspellende kracht van 
ambivalente attitudes op gedrag. 
 Een eerste studie (Hoofdstuk II) focust zich op hoe mensen omgaan met deze types 
ambivalentie door middel van mond-tot-mond communicatie te verspreiden aan derden. 
Resultaten tonen aan dat manifest ambivalente consumenten de (vooral negatieve) informatie die 
ze verspreiden over een product aan anderen gebruiken om hun eigen ambivalentie aangaande dit 
product te reduceren. Ze gaan zichzelf als het ware gaan overtuigen van hun (ietwat negatieve) 
mening door anderen te overtuigen van diezelfde mening. Dit in tegenstelling tot geanticipeerd 
 xvii 
ambivalente consumenten die niet in staat zijn hun ambivalentie te reduceren door de informatie 
die ze verspreiden aan derden. Dit is te wijten aan het feit dat manifest ambivalente attitudes 
gepaard gaan met intensere onaangename gevoelens dan geanticipeerd ambivalente attitudes wat 
deze eerste motiveert om hun ambivalentie weg te werken. Vroeger onderzoek toonde namelijk 
reeds aan dat het onaangename gevoel dat gepaard gaat met ambivalentie mensen motiveert om 
hun ambivalentie te reduceren. Als een gevolg zijn geanticipeerd ambivalente consumenten 
minder gemotiveerd om hun ambivalentie te reduceren aangezien deze niet als heel 
onaangenaam ervaren wordt. De initiële gemoedstoestand waarin consumenten verkeren, 
modereert deze relatie. Dat wil zeggen dat, enerzijds, geanticipeerd ambivalent consumenten die 
zich in een negatieve gemoedstoestand verkeren hun ambivalentie als onaangenamer 
beschouwen en deze ook zullen reduceren in tegenstelling tot wanneer zij zich in een positieve of 
neutrale gemoedstoestand bevinden. Anderzijds, manifest ambivalente consumenten in een 
positieve gemoedstoestand beschouwen hun ambivalentie als minder onaangenaam met als 
gevolg dat er geen ambivalentiereductie plaatsvindt in tegenstelling tot wanneer zij zich in een 
negatieve of neutrale gemoedstoestand bevinden.  
 Een tweede studie (Hoofdstuk III) onderzoekt hoe mensen omgaan met deze types 
ambivalentie door middel van de informatie die ze gaan verwerken in plaats van verspreiden. 
Analoog aan de eerste studie tonen de resultaten aan dat manifest ambivalente consumenten hun 
ambivalentie reduceren door zich vooral te focussen op negatieve informatie. Geanticipeerd 
ambivalente consumenten zijn meer gebalanceerd in hun informatieverwerking; ze focussen zich 
op zowel positieve als negatieve informatie wat niet leidt tot een reductie van hun ambivalentie.  
 Een derde studie (Hoofdstuk IV), tenslotte, tracht de conflicterende resultaten uit eerder 
onderzoek aangaande de voorspellende kracht van ambivalente attitudes op gedrag(sintentie) 
 xviii 
beter te begrijpen door middel van het onderscheid tussen manifeste en geanticipeerde 
ambivalentie. Resultaten tonen aan dat manifest ambivalente attitudes sterkere voorspellers van 
gedrag(sintentie) zijn in vergelijking met geanticipeerd ambivalente attitudes. Dit kan verklaard 
worden doordat manifest ambivalente consumenten zekerder zijn van hun attitude (niet omwille 
dat ze hun attitude beschouwen als meer correct, maar omdat hun attitude duidelijker is voor 
hen) aangezien zij weet hebben van zowel positieve als negatieve reacties in tegenstelling tot 
geanticipeerd ambivalente consumenten minder zeker zijn aangezien zij anticiperen op 
conflicterende informatie zonder er weet van te hebben. Uit Hoofdstuk II & III blijkt dat 
manifest (versus geanticipeerd) ambivalente personen meer gemotiveerd zijn om hun 
ambivalentie weg te werken door middel van het focussen op negatieve informatieverwerking 
ofwel verspreiden van negatieve informatie. Een mogelijke alternatieve verklaring voor het in dit 
hoofdstuk gevonden effect zou kunnen zijn dat manifest ambivalente attitudes betere 
voorspellers zijn van effectief gedrag omdat manifest ambivalente personen hun ambivalentie 
spontaan wegwerken op het moment dat ze deze ambivalentie ervaren, aangezien deze 
ambivalentie onaangenaam is. Indien ze hun ambivalentie spontaan wegwerken, ervaren ze 
mogelijks geen ambivalentie meer op het moment dat zij het gedrag uitvoeren wat leidt tot 
attitudes die meer consistent zijn met het gedrag. Echter, deze alternatieve verkaring wordt 
uitgesloten.
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CHAPTER I:  
INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
When walking through the city, browsing the internet, reading a newspaper, watching 
television, chatting with friends,  people are on a day-to-day basis confronted with a lot of 
information about products, services, different behaviors, other people and many other things. 
So, it is not inconceivable that this information will be to some extent conflicting. That is, people 
are confronted with both positive as well as negative information about a certain object through 
different sources. This conflicting information can evoke a conflicted attitude regarding a certain 
stimulus, originating from opposing positive and negative evaluations. Simultaneously 
evaluating an attitude object as positive and negative, is referred to as attitude ambivalence 
(Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995), which will be the 
topic of the present dissertation. During the last decade, ambivalence research has received 
considerable attention in social psychology and marketing (e.g., Clark, Wegener & Fabrigar, 
2008; Lau-Gesk, 2005; Nordgren, van Harreveld & van der Pligt, 2006; Nowlis, Kahn & Dhar, 
2002; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren & van der Pligt, 2009a; van Harreveld, van 
der Pligt & de Liver, 2009b). This is not surprising as it is a reflection of the prevalence of 
ambivalence in modern society (van Harreveld et al., 2009b; van Harreveld, Schneider, Nohlen 
& van der Pligt, 2012). In the consumer domain, for example, product information is often 
obtained from very different sources (e.g., company website, consumer reviews, publicity in 
newspapers, etc.). This product information frequently contains conflicting (cf. two-sided) 
evaluative components leading to conflicted or ambivalent attitudes (e.g. Sengupta & Johar, 
2002; van Harreveld et al., 2012). 
 4 
Traditionally, attitude research has been dominated by a bipolar perspective in which 
attitudes range from a negative extreme to a positive extreme (e.g. Cacioppo, von Hippel & 
Ernst, 1997; Kaplan, 1972; Thompson et al., 1995). That is, attitudes toward certain objects have 
been conceptualized as being univalent. So, they were either positive or negative. Furthermore, 
some attitude definitions even ignore or reject that one could simultaneously evaluate a stimulus 
as being positive and negative (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Thurstone, 1928). However, one could 
argue that it is not always possible to have a positive or negative attitude. People have both 
positive and negative evaluations regarding one and the same object for a variety of objects such 
as blood donation (e.g. Armitage, 2003; Priester & Petty, 2001), capital punishment (e.g. Newby-
Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002; Thompson et al., 1995), dieting (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 
2000; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Priester & Petty, 2001), smoking (e.g. van 
Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker & Verhue, 2004; Zhao & Cai, 2008), junk food 
(e.g. Priester & Petty, 2001), euthanasia (e.g. Schneider et al., 2012), abortion (e.g. Newby-Clark 
et al., 2002), alcohol consumption (e.g. Armitage, 2003), law and taxes (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; 
Schneider et al., 2012; van Harreveld et al., 2009a), genetically modified food (e.g. Nordgren et 
al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2004), nuclear power (e.g. Clark et al., 2008), waste recycling 
(e.g. Costarelli & Colloca, 2007), safe sex (e.g. Priester & Petty, 2001), another person (e.g. 
Clarkson, Tormala & Rucker, 2008; Petty, Tormala, Briñol & Jarvis., 2006; Priester & Petty, 
1996), immigrants/minority groups (e.g. Bell & Esses, 2002; Maio, Bell & Esses, 1996), 
wedding purchase behavior (e.g. Otnes, Lowrey & Shrum, 1997), partner transgressions (e.g. 
Kachadourian, Fincham & Davila, 2005), customer replacement decisions (e.g. Roster & 
Richins, 2009), supermarkets (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008) but also products such as shampoo (e.g. 
Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997), an iPod (e.g. Priester, Petty & Park, 2007), and a VCR ( e.g. 
 5 
Sengupta & Johar, 2002) to name but a few. Therefore, throughout the years, consumer and 
social psychology researchers began to dismiss the unidimensional approach to attitudes and to 
accept that individuals can evaluate an attitude object simultaneously positive and negative. 
Researchers challenged this unidimensional approach because they wondered how 
individuals experiencing both positivity as well as negativity toward a certain object could 
indicate this on a traditional bipolar attitude continuum. The midpoint seems to be the best 
option. However, this midpoint solution entails a loss of information as selecting the midpoint 
can have two different meanings. First, choosing for the midpoint could mean that the respondent 
is indifferent toward the attitude object. He or she is neither positive nor negative toward the 
object but simply neutral. The respondent has no real opinion about the object or does not care 
about it (e.g. because the object is new or irrelevant). Second, selecting the midpoint could also 
mean that the respondent feels both positive and negative about the object (cf. ambivalent). 
However, on a bipolar attitude scale, an ambivalent and a neutral attitude cannot be disentangled. 
This is also referred to as the bipolar problem (Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson 
et al., 1995) and is the main reason why this bipolar logic has been challenged. To avoid this 
problem, Kaplan (1972) entangled the bipolar scale into two unipolar scales. These scales assess 
the level of positivity and negativity toward an attitude object separately while asking 
respondents to ignore their negative/positive aspects respectively. The use of these two unipolar 
scales, also known as the ‘split semantic differential technique’, was an answer to the bipolar 
problem of measuring attitudes (Kaplan, 1972) and enabled attitude researchers to distinguish 
clearly between ambivalent and indifferent/neutral attitudes. 
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OBJECTIVE & SUBJECTIVE AMBIVALENCE 
An important distinction in ambivalence literature is the one between objective and 
subjective ambivalence. Objective ambivalence (in the literature sometimes also referred to as 
potential ambivalence) is measured by asking participants to evaluate the positive and negative 
reactions they hold toward an attitude object separately. With this method, participants are asked 
to indicate how positive they are about something, while ignoring the negative aspects and vice 
versa (cf. split semantic differential technique of Kaplan, 1972). Scores on these two scales are 
combined and calculated into an ambivalence index through one of several mathematical models 
(for a review of these methods, see Priester & Petty, 1996). Subjective ambivalence (in the 
literature also sometimes referred to as felt ambivalence), on the other hand, is assessed by 
directly asking individuals how one-sided, conflicted or torn their attitudes are toward a certain 
attitude object. This taps into the extent to which positive and negative evaluations toward a 
certain attitude object are experienced as being in conflict.  
Priester and Petty (1996) examined the link between objective and subjective indicators 
of ambivalence and found only moderate correlations, ranging from .21 to .52 (Priester & Petty, 
1996; 2001; Priester et al., 2007; Thompson et al., 1995). This implies that being ambivalent in 
an objective manner does not necessarily entail subjective feelings of ambivalence and vice 
versa. One explanation is that the subjective experience of attitude ambivalence is determined by 
more than only intrapersonal antecedents (cf. the extent of one’s own positive and negative 
reactions toward an attitude object). Objective ambivalence formulas take only intrapersonal 
antecedents into account whereas interpersonal antecedents can also produce feelings of 
ambivalence. That is, the extent to which someone’s personal feelings are discrepant from 
important others’ feelings can lead to feelings of ambivalence (Cowley & Czellar, 2012; Priester 
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& Petty, 2001). For example, if someone holds only positive personal reactions toward abortion 
whereas that individual’s partner holds a negative attitude toward abortion, this may create a 
greater evaluative tension (cf. ambivalence) for the individual than that predicted by the personal 
reactions alone. Hence, at an intrapersonal level, there would be no experienced ambivalence. 
However, there is interpersonal conflict which would create subjective ambivalence. The 
experience of subjective ambivalence is also influenced by the desire to (dis)agree with 
(dis)liked others (cf. balance theory).  
 
DOMINANT & CONFLICTING REACTIONS 
Priester and Petty (1996) investigated how two important indicators of objective 
ambivalence, namely dominant and conflicting reactions, induce subjective ambivalence. 
Dominant reactions refer to whichever of the positive or negative reactions is greater in number 
whereas conflicting reactions refer to whichever of the positive or negative reactions is fewer in 
number. In combination, these dominant and conflicting reactions produce a state of 
ambivalence. The more dominant (conflicting) thoughts and feelings a person has of one valence 
about an attitude object, the less (more) ambivalence they experience (Priester & Petty, 1996). 
The Gradual Threshold Model (GTM) of ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996) makes three 
specific predictions. First, ambivalence is a negative function of the amount of dominant 
reactions. The more dominant reactions an individual possesses towards a certain attitude object, 
the less ambivalence is experienced. Second, the number of conflicting reactions influences 
subjective ambivalence in a negative accelerating way. That is, the conflicting reactions thought 
of first cause a greater increase in subjective ambivalence compared to the conflicting reactions 
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individuals subsequently think about. Third, as the number of conflicting reactions increases, the 
influence of dominant reactions on subjective ambivalence gradually decreases to a certain 
threshold above which the number of dominant reactions no longer has an influence on 
subjective ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996). The threshold is determined by investigating the 
correlations between dominant reactions and subjective ambivalence. The level of conflicting 
reactions where the correlation between dominant reactions and subjective ambivalence becomes 
non-significant is considered as the threshold. The critical threshold is in many cases quite low 
(cf. between one and two; Priester & Petty, 1996). Hence, below this threshold subjective 
ambivalence is a joint function of dominant and conflicting reactions, whereas above the 
threshold subjective ambivalence is solely a function of conflicting reactions.  
 
MANIFEST & ANTICIPATED CONFLICTING REACTIONS 
However, an intriguing question remains unanswered. In prior research, Priester and 
Petty (1996) observed people with quite one-sided (no or few conflicting) reactions who still 
report feelings of evaluative tension. Why do individuals sometimes experience ambivalence 
when they have only positive or only negative reactions (i.e. univalent attitudes)? In other words, 
are there other influences, besides the interpersonal antecedents (see supra), for the low 
correlation between objective and subjective ambivalence? Priester et al. (2007) put forward the 
anticipation on positive or negative reactions depending on the magnitude of one’s personal 
reactions as another antecedent of subjective ambivalence. That is, consumers having only a few 
dominant reactions may assume that there are conflicting attributes of which they are unaware at 
that moment. Although, in an objective way, they have a univalent attitude because of the 
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absence of conflicting reactions or the presence of few conflicting reactions, they indicate (i.e. in 
a subjective way) feelings of ambivalence. That is when people are unaware of any specific 
information opposite to their dominant reactions, they may be concerned that such information 
exists. They may feel relatively uninformed and recognize that there are two sides to every story. 
When actual conflicting reactions are absent or low (i.e., below the threshold), individuals may 
be concerned that such information exists. Importantly, if dominant reactions increase, they 
would be less likely to expect conflicting attributes. That is, the more information one holds 
about one side (cf. positive or negative) of the evaluative continuum, the fewer conflicting 
information one expects. So, both dominant and conflicting reactions have to be limited in order 
to induce anticipated conflicting reactions. Furthermore, the anticipation of conflicting reactions 
is not tied to any particular valence of dominant reactions (Priester et al., 2007). Anticipated 
conflicting reactions emerge irrespective of the valence of the dominant reactions. This 
introduces a new construct, anticipated conflicting reactions which influence subjective 
ambivalence below the threshold (cf. no or few conflicting reactions; Priester et al., 2007). For 
example, when people have no negative (positive) information about a mostly positive (negative) 
product, they still may assume that the product will hold such negative (positive) attributes. The 
fact that they expect there to be conflicting attributes will lead to the experience of subjective 
ambivalence although they do not know any concrete conflicting attributes yet. They only 
assume there to be conflicting information without being able to define the specific conflicting 
attributes. Above the threshold (cf. when there are several or more conflicting reactions), 
ambivalence is fed by manifest conflicting reactions. That is, people can experience manifest 
conflicting reactions when they are knowledgeable of specific product attributes that conflict 
with their dominant reactions. In this case, one will be able to define both the dominant and 
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conflicting attributes of this product. As a consequence, one will also experience feelings of 
ambivalence. Hence, it seems that conflicting reactions, whether manifest (cf. above the 
threshold) or anticipated (cf. below the threshold), are at the heart of subjective ambivalence. 
These anticipated conflicting reactions serve, besides interpersonal antecedents (cf. Priester & 
Petty, 2001), as an important antecedent of the psychological experience of ambivalence and 
help explain the found discrepancy between objective and subjective indicators of ambivalence.  
 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF AMBIVALENCE 
As already explained, in the ambivalence construct, one can define two types of reactions 
(i.e. thoughts and feelings) underlying the feeling of evaluative tension; dominant and conflicting 
reactions. Priester and Petty (1996) distinguished between two types of conflicting reactions 
underlying subjective ambivalence; anticipated conflicting reactions and manifest conflicting 
reactions (Priester et al., 2007). Important to note is that regardless of the type, manifest or 
anticipated, conflicting reactions always underlie some level of subjective ambivalence. The only 
difference is whether people are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions or merely anticipate 
them (Priester et al., 2007). In this dissertation, we define two different types of attitudinal 
ambivalence based on the type of conflicting reactions (manifest vs. anticipated) underlying the 
evaluative conflict (see also Figure 1). When ambivalence is fed by especially conflicting 
reactions of which one is aware, we define it as manifest ambivalence. When people are unaware 
of any conflicting reactions or have few conflicting reactions, but anticipate that such reactions 
exist, individuals experience anticipated ambivalence. Little is known on the anticipation of 
conflicting reactions. To our knowledge, only one study (Priester et al., 2007) discussed this 
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phenomenon. Moreover, it only considered the antecedent of this type of reactions. With this 
dissertation we provide a first glance on additional processes (i.e. consequences) associated with 
feelings of ambivalence based upon anticipated conflicting reactions. Hence, the focus of this 
dissertation is on consequences of subjective ambivalence based upon different types of 
conflicting reactions. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
AMBIVALENCE-ASSOCIATED DISCOMFORT 
Experiencing a conflicted attitude makes you feel torn between two opposites and may 
elicit negative feelings due to this internal inconsistency. Ambivalent attitude holders are 
confronted with a discrepancy between their actual attitude (cf. ambivalent) and their ideal 
attitude (cf. univalent), which leads to unwanted affective responses (van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 
2009b). In other words, ambivalence is presumed to be aversive/unpleasant and a source of 
psychological discomfort (Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), especially 
when both positive and negative components of the attitude object are simultaneously salient and 
accessible (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey & Moore, 1992; Newby-Clark et al., 2002). Especially 
when the ambivalent attitude holder is knowledgeable of his or her conflicting reactions (de 
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Liver, van der Pligt and Wigboldus, 2007; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), ambivalence is 
experienced as negative. So, knowledge of conflicting information seems to play a pivotal role in 
the experience of ambivalence-associated negative feelings. This is also related to earlier work 
on cognitive dissonance which states that a psychological conflict is aversive (e.g. Cooper & 
Fazio, 1984; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Rydell, McConnel & Mackie, 2008), especially when a 
person is aware of his or her conflicting cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Zanna, Lepper & Abelson, 
1973).  
Although there are a lot of parallels to be drawn between dissonance and ambivalence 
research, as they both concern evaluative incongruence between cognitions, they are not 
isomorphic constructs. The main difference between both lies in the level of commitment (e.g. 
Rydell et al., 2008; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b; 2012). Ambivalent attitude holders 
experience an evaluative conflict between the positive and negative components of a certain 
attitude object without already having committed themselves by making a choice between these 
opposing perspectives. Dissonance, on the other hand, refers to behavior which is in conflict with 
a certain attitude. In that case people have already committed themselves to one side as they have 
already made a choice by exerting a certain behavior. Hence, ambivalence can be seen as driven 
by a pre-decisional conflict whereas dissonance is driven by a post-decisional conflict. Hogarth 
(1981) illustrated this difference with the distinction between aiming (judgment without making 
a choice already, cf. ambivalence) and pulling the trigger (making a choice). In a similar vein, 
van Harreveld et al. (2009a) describe this by the fact that ambivalent individuals stay ‘sitting on 
the fence’ without having to ‘jump of the fence’. They found that when ambivalent individuals 
are forced to make an explicit choice between two evaluative incongruent components of their 
conflicted attitude, this will elicit more discomfort accompanying ambivalence. Having to make 
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a choice is unpleasant because neither alternative is entirely satisfying. That is, ambivalent 
individuals  are caught between a rock and a hard place. When ambivalent individuals are not 
forced  to make a choice between both components within the evaluative conflict, they can hold 
on to the status quo and experience less discomfort (van Harreveld et al., 2009a).  
 
COPING WITH AMBIVALENCE 
As ambivalence is experienced as something unpleasant, people are motivated to get rid 
of these negative feelings. There are several ways in which ambivalent individuals can reduce 
their ambivalence-associated discomfort. Van Harreveld et al. (2009b) proposed two basic forms 
of coping with ambivalence: emotion-focused and problem-focused coping. Emotion-focused 
coping refers to searching for opportunities to avoid having to make a decision between the 
opposite perspectives in their conflicted attitude. Procrastination (cf. postponing a decision) or 
downplaying the importance of the situation or of certain components within the conflicted 
attitude are examples of emotion-focused coping. These less effortful coping ‘strategies’ may be 
successful in reducing the negative affect associated with ambivalence (e.g. Nohlen, van 
Harreveld, Rotteveel & van der Pligt, 2012; van Harreveld et al., 2009b). However, most 
ambivalence research focuses on problem-focused coping mechanisms (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), increasing one’s effort to make the 
best choice. The difference between both is straightforward. Although emotion-focused coping 
strategies may be effective in decreasing the discomfort associated with ambivalence, they do not 
solve the conflict itself (cf. problem) which is at the heart of experiencing ambivalence. Problem-
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focused coping mechanisms, however, try to tackle the problem by investing cognitive effort to 
reduce both ambivalence and the associated negative feelings.  
Previous research shows that ambivalent individuals try to get rid of their feelings of 
evaluative conflict (Bell & Esses, 2002; Clark et al., 2008; Hass et al., 1992; Lau-Gesk, 2005; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Nowlis et al., 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). More 
specifically, the negative feelings accompanied by ambivalence motivate individuals strongly to 
reduce their ambivalence (Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 
2009b). Because ambivalent attitude holders experience their ambivalence as unpleasant, they 
search for ways to decrease these feelings by reducing the ambivalence. One way to do so is by 
seeking (Zhao & Cai, 2008) and scrutinizing thoroughly any information that enables them to get 
rid of that discomfort (Jonas et al., 1997; Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & 
Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). This is also related to earlier work on cognitive 
dissonance (Maio et al., 1996; Newby-Clark et al., 2002). Individuals experiencing dissonance 
such as ambivalence will often seek to alter or restructure their cognitive elements, by searching 
for information and adding new information to their existing knowledge, to alleviate the 
psychological tension (Festinger, 1957). In that sense, ambivalence is associated with increased 
systematic processing of attitude-relevant information (Briñol, Petty & Wheeler, 2006; Jonas et 
al., 1997), more time to integrate attributes in a single evaluation (van Harreveld et al., 2004), 
increased cognitive activity (Monteith, Devine & Zuwerink, 1993), greater prefrontal cortex 
activity (Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore & Banaji, 2003), and more message elaboration 
as well as a greater ability to process information thoroughly and more analytically (Maio et al., 
1996; Zhao & Cai, 2008). These studies indicate that when experiencing ambivalence, 
individuals use more (cognitive) effort and deliberation in processing information as a way of 
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reducing their ambivalence. This can, for example, be achieved by carefully scrutinizing all 
alternatives or attributes of a product and involves a comprehensive effort to analyze and 
understand information (cf. systematic processing).  
However, as the ultimate goal of processing attitude-relevant information is to reduce 
feelings of evaluative conflict, less effortful forms than thorough systematic processing can also 
act as efficient coping mechanisms. In that sense, biased systematic processing or selective 
attention/elaboration can be an effective way to reduce ambivalence (Clark et al., 2008; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). That is, focusing on one side of the 
evaluative conflict in order to tip the balance of the ambivalent attitude to one side of the 
evaluative continuum. Nordgren et al. (2006) found that ambivalent people generate more one-
sided thoughts in a thought-listing task which leads to a subsequent reduction of their 
ambivalence. Furthermore, Clark et al. (2008) show that ambivalent people selectively focus on 
pro-attitudinal information (which is capable of reducing the ambivalence) and avoid counter-
attitudinal information (which threatens to increase ambivalence). So, ambivalent attitude 
holders will process information according to the slight evaluative inclination they may have.   
Besides biased information processing, it is also shown that ambivalent individuals 
process more heuristically (cf. use of simple decision aids for judging information; Chaiken, 
1980) as a way to reduce the ambivalence (Hodson, Maio & Esses, 2001; Zemborain & Johar, 
2007). This can be done ,for example, by following the choice of the majority (cf. Hodson et al., 
2001), relying on the opinion of an expert, mimicking the behavior of another person or 
becoming less likely to check the reliability of additional information (cf. Zemborain & Johar, 
2007). In sum, the prime function of emotion-focused coping mechanism is to deal with the 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings without resolving the problem (cf. ambivalent attitude) 
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itself, whereas problem-focused coping mechanisms aim to reduce the experienced ambivalence. 
Moreover, problem-focused coping can occur with high levels of cognitive effort (unbiased 
systematic information processing) or with low levels of cognitive effort (biased information 
processing or heuristic processing). Two chapters of this dissertation focus on the difference in 
problem-focused coping between manifest ambivalent individuals and anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. In Chapter II, we investigate spreading WOM and in Chapter III we focus on 
information processing as possible coping mechanisms. 
 
AMBIVALENCE & ATTITUDE STRENGTH 
A dominant approach in ambivalence literature is to view ambivalence as a measure of 
attitude strength with lower levels of ambivalence being associated with strong attitudes (e.g., 
Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner & Sparks, 2002; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 
2007; Thompson et al., 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). Strong attitudes are more persistent, 
resistant to attack, have a greater impact on thought, and are more predictive for behavior 
compared to weak attitudes (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Therefore, low ambivalence is associated 
with attitudes that are more predictive of behavior (e.g., Armitage, 2003; Armitage & Conner, 
2000; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Glasmann & Albarracín, 2006; Moore, 
1973; 1980; Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd & Povey, 2001; Thompson et al., 1995), more 
stable over time (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; Basilli, 1996), less pliable (e.g., 
Armitage & Conner, 2000; Basilli, 1996; Visser & Mirabile, 2004). In contrast, ambivalence is 
in a way even a characteristic of a strong attitude, in the sense that ambivalent individuals engage 
in more effortful processing of information about the object (Jonas et al., 1997; Maio et al., 1996; 
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Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). As 
ambivalent attitudes are based upon discrepant evaluations, they should attenuate attitude-
behavior consistency. The common explanation resides in the fact that people want to resolve 
and escape from their ambivalence, so they are less likely to base their behavior on ambivalent 
attitudes. That is, conflicting evaluative dimensions increase the likelihood that attitudes and 
behavior will be based on discrepant elements which should lead to lower attitude-behavior 
consistency.  
On the other hand, Jonas et al. (1997) and Sengupta & Johar (2002) provide evidence for 
ambivalent attitudes leading to higher attitude-behavior consistency. People are spontaneously 
motivated to make sense of inconsistencies in order to arrive at an integrated evaluation 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989).  Accordingly, exposure to inconsistent 
information causes the entire information set to be elaborated on and processed to a greater 
extent (both positive and negative items of information are carefully considered in relation to one 
another) than consistent information, increasing the strength and the predictive ability of the 
attitude based upon inconsistent information (Jonas et al., 1997; Petty, Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995; 
Sengupta & Johar, 2002). Of importance, a global attitude that is ambivalent need not to be 
neutral in overall valence. For example, a relatively positive attitude may go along with a feeling 
of evaluative tension if there is underlying negativity or when one anticipates negativity (e.g. 
Clark et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Priester et al., 2007).  
Finally, ambivalence researchers nowadays challenge the way ambivalence is 
traditionally viewed in research on attitudes (van Harreveld et al., 2012). They believe that each 
of the ambivalence effects described in this section can also be explained in terms of 
ambivalence-associated discomfort (see supra) rather than strength. For example, ambivalent 
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attitudes may be more pliable and less persistent because ambivalent attitude holders want to 
reduce their ambivalence instigated by the ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  
Chapter IV of this dissertation focuses on these conflicting findings concerning the 
predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes for behavior(al intention) by distinguishing between 
manifest and anticipated ambivalent attitudes. This Chapter could help explain these conflicting 
perspectives by showing that the type of conflicting reactions underlying attitudinal ambivalence 
could enhance or attenuate the predictive value of the accompanying attitudes. 
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DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The last decade, attitude ambivalence has received considerable attention in both social 
psychology and marketing. Although a lot is known about how ambivalent individuals cope with 
their ambivalence and the relationship with attitude strength features, several issues remain 
unclear and need clarification. Especially, the type of conflicting reactions - and as a 
consequence different types of ambivalence - which are at the heart of the experience of 
ambivalence seem to be neglected. In order to learn more about the factors and processes 
underlying these different types of ambivalence, the work presented in this dissertation addresses 
two central topics enclosed in three chapters (see also Table 1). The first topic pertains how 
different types of ambivalent attitude holders cope with their ambivalence (Chapter II & Chapter 
III). More specifically, do they experience their ambivalence differently in terms of ambivalence-
associated negative feelings and as a consequence differ in their motivation and/or ability to 
reduce their ambivalence and the associated discomfort? The second topic entails how predictive 
these different types of ambivalent attitudes are for behavior (Chapter IV). There are some 
opposing perspectives in the ambivalence literature on the predictive ability of ambivalent 
attitudes (see supra) which we try to clarify by making the distinction between our two types of 
ambivalence. 
Chapter II, Killing two birds with one word - Coping with ambivalence through 
spreading negative word-of-mouth, focuses on spreading WOM as a potential coping mechanism 
for our two types of ambivalence: manifest ambivalence (knowing conflicting information) 
versus anticipated ambivalence (anticipating conflicting information). In four studies we show 
that, although experiencing the same subjective ambivalence level, manifest (compared to 
anticipated) ambivalent individuals use what they are telling to others (WOM) to reduce their 
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own ambivalence and accompanying negative feelings due to more intense ambivalence-
associated negative feelings. WOM spread does not decrease ambivalence and accompanying 
negative feelings for anticipated ambivalent individuals as they experience less intense 
ambivalence-associated feelings. However, when anticipated ambivalent people are in a negative 
(compared to a positive or neutral) mood, they experience more intense negative feelings and 
will be able to reduce their ambivalence and these accompanying negative feelings. Manifest 
ambivalent people who are in positive (compared to a negative or neutral) mood experience less 
intense negative feelings and will not reduce their ambivalence and these accompanying negative 
feelings. These results suggest that different conflicting reactions underlying subjective 
ambivalence could make individuals feel different and differentially influence behavior.  
Chapter III, Reading the mind in the eyes - Coping with ambivalence through negative 
information processing, focusses on information processing as a potential coping mechanism for 
manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals. In four studies - using diverse techniques such 
as a thought-listing task, an eye-tracking Experiment, and a choice Experiment - we show that, 
although experiencing the same subjective ambivalence level, manifest ambivalent individuals 
predominantly process negative information to reduce their own ambivalence. In contrast, 
anticipated ambivalent individuals do not differ in their focus on positive or negative 
information, resulting in no ambivalence reduction. Similar to Chapter II, these results also 
indicate that different conflicting reactions underlying subjective ambivalence make individuals 
feel different and differentially influence their behavior as a way of reducing their ambivalence. 
Chapter IV, When being sure that you are unsure predicts behavior - Bridging the gap 
between ambivalent attitudes and behavior, concentrates on the strength of these different types 
of ambivalent attitudes by means of investigating the predictive ability for behavior(al) 
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(intention). In four studies we show that, although experiencing the same subjective ambivalence 
level, manifest (compared to anticipated) ambivalent attitudes are more predictive of behavior(al 
intention). This higher attitude-behavior consistency can be explained by the fact that manifest 
(compared to anticipated) ambivalent individuals are more certain of their attitude, not because 
they feel their attitude is more correct, but because their attitude is more clear to them. To 
provide stronger evidence that attitude certainty underlies the relation between ambivalence type 
and attitude-behavior consistency, a final Experiment rules out the alternative explanation that 
manifest ambivalent individuals (as they experience more intense ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals) would spontaneously engage 
in ambivalence reduction and as a consequence would have a lower ambivalence level at the 
moment of posing an intention or behavior than anticipated ambivalent people. These results 
shed a new light on the opposing perspectives in the ambivalence literature on the predictive 
ability of ambivalent attitudes.  
These three empirical chapters that follow are all based on articles that are currently in 
preparation for submission in scientific journals. To ensure that the chapters can be read 
independent from each other, they show some overlap. Each chapter investigates a different 
behavioral consequence of the two types of ambivalent attitudes. In each chapter, the distinction 
between the two types of ambivalent attitudes is introduced, as well as the associated discomfort, 
coping mechanism and/or attitude strength, if this is relevant for the behavioral consequence 
under investigation in the chapter. Discussion of these topics in each chapter is necessary as an 
introduction to the hypotheses and research design. 
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CHAPTER II: “KILLING TWO BIRDS WITH ONE WORD”                                               
COPING WITH AMBIVALENCE THROUGH SPREADING 
NEGATIVE WORD-OF-MOUTH 
 
This article introduces the difference between manifest ambivalence (knowing conflicting 
information) and anticipated ambivalence (anticipating conflicting information). After 
establishing that manifest ambivalence induces more negative feelings and triggers differential 
word-of-mouth (WOM, Pilot Study), we show that, although experiencing the same extent of 
subjective ambivalence, manifest  ambivalent individuals use WOM to reduce their ambivalence 
and negative feelings, whereas this is not the case for anticipated ambivalence individuals 
(Experiment 1). To provide evidence that the negativity of the ambivalence-associated feelings 
drives ambivalence reduction, we manipulate WOM in Experiment 2 (to generate similar WOM 
in both ambivalence conditions) and respondents’ mood in Experiment 3. Manipulating WOM 
did not change the results. However, decreasing manifest ambivalent individuals’ negative 
feelings eliminated their coping behavior whereas increasing the negativity of anticipated 
ambivalent individuals’ feelings triggered coping behavior (only in terms of ambivalence-
associated negative feelings).  These results suggest that distinguishing between the different 
conflicting reactions that underlie ambivalence is important as they evoke differential feelings 
and behavior.  
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Imagine that you intend to buy a new notebook and bump into one of your friends who 
recently bought one. Your friend tells you both positive and negative aspects about his/her 
notebook (situation A). Or your friend tells only a few positive aspects and tells you that there 
will be some negative aspects (situation B) although s/he does not know any at that time (cf. 
Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007). Both situations may induce an ambivalent attitude. That is, in both 
situations you may simultaneously experience positive and negative thoughts and feelings about 
the notebook. But, would the ambivalence resulting from knowing (situation A) versus expecting 
(situation B) negative attributes make you feel equally bad? And what can you do to make you 
feel better? Would talking to others about this notebook help? And would engaging in word-of-
mouth (WOM) make you think and feel any different about the notebook in the end?   
These questions are particularly relevant in the consumer domain because product 
information often contains conflicting evaluative components (e.g. Sengupta & Johar, 2002; van 
Harreveld, Schneider, Nohlen & van der Pligt, 2012). Moreover, even when consumers are only 
confronted with positive/negative information about a product, they will anticipate on conflicting 
information leading to feelings of subjective ambivalence (Priester et al., 2007). Hence, 
consumers oftentimes will feel a certain degree of ambivalence toward products. But, is all 
ambivalence created equally? The objective of the current paper is (1) to introduce different 
types of subjective ambivalence: manifest ambivalence (knowing conflicting information) versus 
anticipated ambivalence (anticipating conflicting information) (anticipating conflicting 
information) and (2) to investigate a differential tendency between these ambivalence types to 
use WOM as a mechanism to cope with ambivalence. We hypothesize and show that the type of 
ambivalence an individual experiences evokes a different intensity of negative, ambivalence-
associated feelings and triggers a differential type of WOM. As knowing (vs. anticipating) 
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conflicting information evokes more intense, negative ambivalent-induced feelings, manifest 
ambivalent individuals tend to use their WOM as a coping mechanism to reduce their 
ambivalence and accompanying feelings, whereas anticipated ambivalent individuals do not. By 
engaging in this coping behavior, individuals who know (vs. anticipate) conflicting information 
kill two birds with one ‘word’. That is, by talking about the attitude object, they influence others’ 
attitudes, preferences, and opinions and also ‘convince’ themselves as implied by the decrease in 
their ambivalence and accompanying negative feelings.  
This research contributes to the consumer behavior literature in several ways. In a more 
general sense, we show that not all ambivalence is created equally. Previous ambivalence 
research focused on the intensity of ambivalence and ignored the type of ambivalence. That is, 
former research ignores that the same level of subjective ambivalence can be caused by different 
types of conflicting reactions (i.e., knowing versus anticipating conflicting information). We 
show that this difference matters because different types of ambivalence make individuals feel 
differently, even though experiencing the same intensity of subjective ambivalence level, and 
this might differentially influence their behavior. Possibly, results of previous ambivalence 
research mainly apply to ambivalent individuals who know rather than anticipate on conflicting 
information. Second, how people deal with ambivalence is well documented in both marketing 
and social psychology literature (e.g. Clark, Wegener and Fabrigar, 2008; Lau-Gesk, 2005; 
Nordgren, van Harreveld and van der Pligt, 2006; Otnes, Lowrey and Shrum, 1997; Nowlis, 
Kahn and Dhar, 2002; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009a; van 
Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009b). However, although WOM has been proposed - but 
not empirically validated - as one of the most employed strategies to reduce cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957), it was not yet related to feelings of ambivalence. Therefore, we also advance 
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the literature by providing evidence that WOM can be used to cope with ambivalence. Finally, 
existing work on WOM especially focused on the influence on other consumers and firms 
without considering the impact on the storyteller (except for Moore, 2012). In this article, we 
take a look at what WOM can do for the storyteller. Specifically, we investigate the benefits of 
engaging in WOM for the storyteller in terms of reducing ambivalence and negative, 
ambivalence-associated feelings.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. After developing our theoretical 
framework, we examine in a Pilot Study whether both ambivalence types indeed differ in 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings and investigate the extent to which these types result in 
positive and/or negative WOM. Experiment 1 illustrates that WOM is as an effective way to 
reduce ambivalence and accompanying negative feelings for manifest ambivalent individuals, 
but not for anticipated ambivalent individuals. To provide initial evidence that the coping 
behavior of manifest ambivalent individuals is triggered by the intensity of the negative, 
ambivalence-associated feelings rather than the negativity of the WOM that the individuals 
spread, Experiment 2 manipulates WOM valence by switching the valence of respondents’ 
dominant and conflicting reactions and shows that increasing the negativity of the WOM spread 
by anticipated ambivalent individuals to even a higher level of manifest ambivalent individuals 
only leads the latter to show coping behavior. To provide further evidence for the crucial role of 
the negativity of the ambivalence-associated feelings, Experiment 3 induces a mood 
manipulation. Decreasing manifest ambivalent individuals’ negative feelings (positive mood 
condition) eliminated their coping behavior, whereas increasing the negativity of anticipated 
ambivalent individuals’ feelings (negative mood condition) triggered coping behavior. These 
results provide strong evidence that it is the difference in negative ambivalence-associated 
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feelings that drives the difference between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals in 
terms of using WOM as a coping strategy.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings 
Ambivalence is presumed to be aversive/unpleasant and a source of psychological 
discomfort (Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), especially when both 
positive and negative components of the attitude object are simultaneously salient and accessible 
(Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). So, 
knowledge of conflicting information seems to play a pivotal role in the experience of 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings (de Liver, van der Pligt and Wigboldus, 2007; van 
Harreveld et al., 2009b). This is also related to earlier work on cognitive dissonance which states 
that a psychological conflict is aversive (e.g. Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Elliot and Devine, 1994; 
Rydell, McConnel & Mackie, 2008), especially when they are aware of his or her conflicting 
cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Zanna, Lepper, & Abelson, 1973). This implies that, since only 
manifest ambivalent individuals are knowledgeable of both dominant and conflicting 
components, ambivalence could induce more intense negative feelings in manifest as compared 
to anticipated ambivalent individuals. For the latter, conflicting components are anticipated but 
not really known at the time. Hence, we hypothesize that - even though manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals experience the same extent of ambivalence - manifest ambivalent 
individuals experience more intense, negative ambivalence-associated feelings than anticipated 
ambivalent individuals. 
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Ambivalence and spreading WOM 
WOM can be defined as the expression of one’s evaluation about a certain object to peers 
(e.g. Chan & Cui, 2011; de Matos & Rossi, 2008; Moore, 2012). Both manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals can engage in positive and negative WOM as both dimensions are present 
in their evaluation. But, will ambivalence instigate a similar WOM-response in manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent individuals? Manifest ambivalent people are knowledgeable of both 
positive and negative reactions (whether they are dominant or conflicting). Even when these 
negative reactions are conflicting (i.e fewer in number) rather than dominant (i.e. higher in 
number), manifest ambivalent individuals may bias their WOM toward the negative side as 
negatives weigh more heavily in the evaluation of an attitude object (Herr, Kardes & Kim, 1991; 
Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Mizerski, 1982). This negativity bias of manifest 
ambivalent individuals may be largely fed by the negative feelings that manifest ambivalence 
induces. Ambivalence has been shown to incite negative feelings (Nordgren et al., 2006; van 
Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b) and negative feelings can instigate negative WOM (Wetzer, 
Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). That is, spreading negative WOM is a form of venting the negative 
emotions experienced in an aversive situation (Chan & Cui, 2011; de Matos & Rossi, 2008). 
Thus, if manifest ambivalent individuals indeed experience more negative ambivalence-
associated feelings, they can be expected to spread more negative and less positive WOM.  
Anticipated ambivalent individuals, on the other hand, do not know but expect conflicting 
information. Not knowing, but only anticipating negative reactions, may make consumers more 
reluctant to share them with others. That is, anticipated ambivalent individuals may be less prone 
to the negativity bias and may be more likely to bias their communication toward the valence of 
the dominant reactions of which they are truly knowledgeable (whether they are positive or 
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negative). On top, as compared to manifest ambivalent individuals, anticipated ambivalent 
individuals are expected to experience less negative feelings. So, negative feelings do not feed 
the negativity bias either. Taken together, the foregoing suggests that anticipated ambivalent 
individuals will focus more on the attributes they know best (dominant reactions), and hence 
engage less in spreading the conflicting information which they anticipate. For anticipated 
ambivalent consumers, the valence of their WOM will depend on the valence of the dominant 
and conflicting reactions. That is, when positives (negatives) are dominant, anticipated 
ambivalent consumers will spread more positive (negative) and less negative (positive) WOM. In 
contrast, manifest ambivalent individuals will always spread more negative and less positive 
WOM, irrespective of the valence of the dominant and conflicting reactions, due to the negativity 
bias and intense ambivalence-associated negative feelings.   
     
Coping with ambivalence  
Previous research shows that ambivalent individuals try to get rid of their feelings of 
evaluative conflict (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008; Hass et al., 1992; Lau-Gesk, 2005; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), for 
example by scrutinizing thoroughly information (Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Maio, Bell, & 
Esses, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 2009b) or by 
biased systematic processing (focusing on one side of the evaluative conflict) (Clark et al., 2008; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Van Harreveld et al., 2009b).  
In the absence of new information, ambivalent individuals could also try to convince 
themselves of one side of their evaluative conflict. In line with research on cognitive dissonance 
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(Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957) and self-persuasion (e.g. Briñol, McCaslin & Petty 2012; Maio 
& Thomas, 2007), we propose that spreading WOM could be an alternative coping mechanism to 
resolve ambivalence. That is, consumers could use what they tell others about an object as a 
means to reduce their subjective ambivalence and the associated negative feelings toward that 
object. This way, they could convince themselves that the focal object holds for example 
especially negative (positive) attributes by convincing others of these negative (positive) 
attributes. By focusing on negative (positive) attributes, they downplay the positive (negative) 
attributes, leading to a reduction in their ambivalence level and accompanying negative feelings. 
As especially manifest ambivalent individuals may experience intense, negative ambivalence-
associated feelings, we hypothesize that they will be more motivated to use their WOM (negative 
due to the negativity bias) as a way to reduce their ambivalence and the accompanying negative 
feelings. Unlike manifest ambivalent individuals, anticipated ambivalent individuals are 
expected to experience less intense negative feelings caused by their anticipated ambivalence. 
Therefore, engaging in WOM (positive or negative WOM depending on which attributes that are 
dominant and thus known best) may be less functional for them and is less likely to result in a 
reduction of their ambivalence level or associated negative feelings. 
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
In a series of four Experiments, we investigate how different types of ambivalence, based 
on whether conflicting reactions are known or anticipated, cope with their ambivalence by 
spreading WOM. A Pilot Study demonstrates that manifest ambivalent individuals, despite 
having the same ambivalence level as anticipated ambivalent ones, engage in more negative 
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WOM and less positive WOM, which is partially mediated by the more intense negative feelings 
accompanying manifest ambivalence compared to anticipated ambivalence. Experiment 1 is a 
first test of WOM as a coping mechanism. More specifically, we replicate and extend the 
findings of the Pilot Study by showing that the predominant engagement in negative WOM by 
manifest ambivalence individuals reduces their ambivalence and associated negative feelings, 
whereas the predominant engagement in positive WOM by anticipated ambivalence individuals 
does not reduce their ambivalence and accompanying negative feelings. As both the intensity of 
the negative, ambivalence-associated feelings and WOM valence differs between manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent individuals, Experiment 2 and 3 are designed to provide evidence that the 
intensity of the ambivalence-associated feelings are the real trigger of coping behavior. To this 
end, Experiment 2 manipulates WOM valence by making negative reactions dominant (as 
compared to the positive reactions in the Pilot Study and Experiment 1). Doing so, makes both 
manifest and anticipated ambivalent people predominantly spread negative WOM,  thus 
eliminating the valence difference in WOM between the two ambivalence types. As the 
conclusions remain the same, we can exclude WOM valence as the instigator of the coping 
process in manifest ambivalent individuals.  Experiment 3 manipulates respondents’ mood to get 
an idea what happens if the intensity of respondents’ feelings change. Decreasing manifest 
ambivalent individuals’ negative feelings eliminates their coping behavior whereas increasing 
the negativity of anticipated ambivalent individuals’ feelings triggers coping behavior (cf. only 
in terms of negative feelings reduction). These findings provide strong evidence for the idea that 
the ambivalence-associated negative feelings are the true instigator of ambivalence reduction and 
since different types of ambivalence instigate different levels of negative feelings, the difference 
between manifest and anticipated ambivalence is rather substantial. 
 44 
PILOT STUDY 
The objective of this Pilot Study is twofold. First, we test the notion that manifest 
ambivalence is experienced as more aversive (cf. more intense ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings) than anticipated ambivalence. Second, we investigate the relationship between type of 
ambivalence and WOM. We predict that, although having the same subjective ambivalence 
level, manifest ambivalent individuals will engage in more negative WOM and less positive 
WOM compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals. A univalent condition (many dominant 
and few conflicting reactions) is included in order to investigate how anticipated ambivalence 
relates to univalence. 
 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and two respondents (56 female and 46 male), between the 
ages of 17 and 30 years (M = 22.37, SD = 3.40), participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (univalence (control), 
manifest ambivalence, anticipated ambivalence).  
Procedure.  Level of subjective ambivalence and manifest/anticipated conflicting 
reactions was manipulated by varying the amount of positive and negative attributes respondents 
received about an MP3-player (cf. Priester et al., 2007) and varying the opinion of one’s best 
friend (cf. Priester & Petty, 2001). Respondents were instructed to imagine a situation where 
they intend to buy a new MP3 player and received a set of attributes (provided by their best 
friend) that described a certain MP3 player. They were asked to regard these attributes as equally 
important (cf. Priester & Petty, 1996; Priester et al., 2007). The attributes describing our focal 
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attitude object were randomly selected out of an attribute pool in the context of MP3 players as 
displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1: Attribute descriptions used in Pilot Study (MP3-player) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
Good sound quality Poor sound quality 
High display quality (pixels) Low display quality (pixels) 
Large memory capacity Small memory capacity 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Many connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
No connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
Many wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc. 
No wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc 
 
Since valence did not interact with any of the dependent variables in former research 
(Priester et al., 2007), only positive attributes were used as dominant reactions in this study. In 
the univalent condition (few manifest and anticipated conflicting reactions), respondents were (i) 
provided with four positive attributes and no negative ones and (ii) were told that their best 
friend thought the MP3 player really has no negative attributes at all. In the anticipated 
ambivalent condition (anticipated but few manifest conflicting reactions), individuals were (i) 
confronted with only one positive attribute and, in order to induce anticipation of conflicting 
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reactions, (ii) were told that their best friend was convinced that the MP3 player has negative 
attributes which (s)he has not experienced yet. In the manifest ambivalent condition (manifest 
but few anticipated conflicting reactions), respondents received (i) four positive and two negative 
attributes and (ii) were informed that their best friend thought the MP3 player really has no other 
negative attributes. In line with earlier attitude research (e.g. Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), these 
manipulations were constructed in such a way that they do not differ in general attitude and 
subjective ambivalence levels toward the focal object. The latter is essential, so that the 
differences found in our Experiments can be ascribed to the difference in the underlying nature 
of the conflicting reactions feeding the ambivalence rather than a mere difference in attitude or 
subjective ambivalence level. 
Respondents rated their attitude (α =.96), subjective ambivalence (α= .83), manifest 
positive/negative reactions, and anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.93, αneg=.84) on 
11-point scales (Priester et al., 2007). In line with earlier research (Priester & Petty, 1996; 2001; 
Priester et al., 2007), individuals completed two separate measures in order to provide 
independent assessments of both their positive and negative reactions toward the MP3-player (0= 
not at all positive/negative; 10= completely positive/negative). The number of positive and 
negative reactions was transformed to equivalent measures of conflicting and dominant 
reactions. The highest score on one of these two scales was categorized as being the dominant 
reactions and the lowest as the conflicting reactions. Whenever the numbers of positive and 
negative reactions were equivalent (N=10), the negative reactions were defined as the dominant 
reactions and the positives as the conflicting ones according to the negativity bias (Herr et al., 
1991; Ito et al, 1998; Mizerski, 1982). Still, defining the negatives as conflicting reactions 
instead of dominant reactions in the former situation did not alter any of the results. Furthermore, 
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similar to the procedure of Nordgren et al. (2006), we asked respondents to what extent the 
words irritation, frustration, and discontentment described their negative feelings toward the 
MP3-player on five-point scales as an assessment of the negative feelings accompanying 
ambivalence. These three items (α=.89) were presented alongside positive and neutral emotions, 
so as not to arouse suspicion in our participants. Finally, positive WOM (α=.95; Maxham III & 
Netemeyer, 2002) assessed the extent to which participants would recommend, tell to buy this 
MP3-player to friends and relatives as well as the chance that they will spread positive WOM. In 
contrast, negative WOM (α=.83; Blodget, Hill, & Tax, 1997; Richins, 1983) tapped on the extent 
to which participants would tell, warn their friends and relatives not to buy the MP3-player as 
well as the chance that they will spread negative WOM. Both positive and negative WOM were 
assessed on seven-point scales.  
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  A series of one-way ANOVA’s revealed significant effects of 
condition on subjective ambivalence (F(2,99)=8.37, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions 
(F(2,99)=15.26, p<.001), and anticipated conflicting reactions (F(2,99)=9.73, p<.001). 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 2) indicate that our manipulations were 
successful. Hence, although individuals in the anticipated ambivalent and manifest ambivalent 
condition have the same subjective ambivalence level, there is a difference in the type of 
conflicting reactions underlying the feeling of evaluative conflict. In the anticipated ambivalent 
condition subjective ambivalence is largely fed by anticipated conflicting reactions, whereas in 
 48 
the manifest ambivalent condition especially manifest conflicting reactions appear to be at the 
heart of subjective ambivalence.   
Table 2: Manipulation checks, Pilot Study, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 34 4.48a 2.12 4.38a 2.67 5.28a 2.14 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
34 6.03b 2.05 4.88a 2.52 7.24b 2.21 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
34 6.40b 1.98 7.44b 2.12 5.09a 2.31 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
           
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed an 
effect of condition on the negative feelings accompanying ambivalence (F(2,99)=12.16, p<.001). 
Dunnett T3 post-hoc tests confirmed our prediction that manifest ambivalent respondents report 
more intense negative feelings (M=3.11) compared to participants in the anticipated ambivalent 
(M=2.17, p<.001) and univalent condition (M=1.99, p<.001) while the latter two did not differ 
(p=.873).  
Word-of-mouth.  Results show that within conditions, manifest ambivalent people spread 
more negative (M=4.18) than positive WOM (M=2.44, t(33)=-4.77, p<.001), whereas anticipated 
ambivalent individuals and univalent individuals spread more positive than negative WOM 
(M=3.94 vs. M=2.80, t(33)=3.29, p=.002 and M=4.89 vs. M=2.17, t(33)=9.42, p<.001, 
respectively). Significant differences were also found across ambivalence conditions for both 
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negative (F(2,99)=27.95, p<.001) and positive WOM (F(2,99)=37.13, p<.001) (Figure 1). 
Manifest ambivalent respondents spread more negative WOM (M=4.18) than anticipated 
ambivalent respondents (M=2.80, p<.001) who in turn spread marginally more negative WOM 
than univalent ones (M=2.17, p=.067). In contrast, anticipated ambivalent respondents (M=3.94) 
spread more positive WOM than manifest ambivalent respondents (M=2.44, p<.001), but less 
than univalent respondents (M=4.89, p=.004). Introducing attitude as a covariate did not 
attenuate any of these results. Positive and negative WOM correlated negatively (r= -.52, 
p<.001).  
Figure 1: Reported positive and negative WOM by condition, Pilot Study 
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The negative feelings associated with ambivalence partially mediate the differences in 
negative WOM between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals. Independent 
regressions show that the dummy variable created for anticipated versus manifest ambivalence 
(coded 0 and 1 respectively) significantly affects both negative WOM (β=.51, t(66)=4.83, 
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p<.001) and negative feelings (β=.46, t(66)=4.26, p<.001). Negative feelings also significantly 
predict negative WOM (β=.58, t(66)=5.83, p<.001). In a simultaneous regression predicting 
negative WOM, negative feelings continues to be a significant predictor (β=.44, t(66)=4.11, 
p<.001), whereas the dummy variable remains significant but is reduced in absolute size (β=.31, 
t(66)=2.86, p=.006). The mediating role of negative feelings accompanying ambivalence was 
further assessed by a bootstrapping test (Preacher & Hayes 2004; Shrout & Bolger 2002). 
Because the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 
95% CI = .24, upper bound 95% CI = 1.06), we can conclude that ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings significantly mediate the effect of ambivalence type on negative WOM. 
 
Discussion 
This study provides support for the hypothesis that manifest ambivalence induces more 
negative feelings than anticipated ambivalence, even though the extent of experienced 
ambivalence is the same. Furthermore, manifest ambivalent individuals, despite having more 
knowledge on positive compared to negative attributes, engage in more negative WOM and less 
positive WOM. This difference is partially driven by the more intense negative feelings that 
accompany manifest ambivalence versus anticipated ambivalence. At first sight, it may not come 
as a surprise that manifest ambivalent individuals spread more negative WOM than anticipated 
ambivalent ones. After all, manifest ambivalent people received two negative attributes whereas 
anticipated ambivalent ones received none. However, manifest ambivalent people also received 
four positive attributes about the object. Intuitively, they should then engage in more positive 
WOM. Moreover, anticipated ambivalent people did not receive multiple positive attributes (as 
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manifest ambivalent people did), but only one. Again, we should intuitively expect that manifest 
ambivalent individuals thus spread more positive WOM compared to anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. Nevertheless, anticipated ambivalent consumers spread more positive WOM 
compared to manifest ambivalent individuals. This is an indication that the negativity bias plays 
a more vital role in this story than the absolute number of positive and negative attributes 
individuals received. We now turn to the question whether WOM can serve as a mechanism to 
cope with ambivalence and its associated negative feelings.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to extend the findings of our Pilot Study by investigating 
whether telling others mainly positive (cf. anticipated ambivalence, when dominant reactions are 
positive) or negative (cf. manifest ambivalence) things about an object may help reduce one’s 
ambivalence toward that object. We expect that (negative) WOM accounts as an effective way to 
reduce the ambivalence and the associated negative feelings that manifest ambivalent individuals 
experience. 
 
Method 
Participants.  Ninety-two respondents (56 female and 36 male), between the ages of 17 
and 25 years (M = 21.14, SD = 1.99), participated in exchange for monetary compensation and 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
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Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to our Pilot Study, but some 
modifications were made to enhance the generalizability of the findings. First, we used a 
different product stimulus (digital camera) to generalize across products. Second, instead of 
instructing participants to regard the attributes as equally important (Priester & Petty, 1996; 
Priester et al., 2007) we used six equally important attributes1 to compose our attribute pool (see 
Table 3). Similar to Experiment 1, we randomly selected the attributes for our manipulations out 
of this pool. Third, in order to mirror more real-life situations and to enhance ecological validity, 
WOM was assessed using an open-ended question. Finally, a second subjective ambivalence 
measure, and ambivalence-associated negative feelings measure (which were identical to the 
initial measures) were inserted after the WOM measure.  
Attitude (α=.97), subjective ambivalence before (α=.83) and after (α=.88) WOM, 
individual assessments of positive and negative reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, 
anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.87, αneg=.89), and ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings before (α=.88) and after (α=.91) WOM were measured and transformed as in our Pilot 
Study. Participants were requested to imagine bumping into one of their friends and asked, in an 
open-ended question, what they would tell him/her. We explicitly did not ask respondents what 
they would tell about the digital camera to give them the opportunity to freely talk about it. The 
part of the conversation that dealt with the digital camera was coded for valence and number of 
arguments listed in order to construct separate measures of positive and negative WOM. For 
example, when a participant indicated that (s)he would tell that the digital camera seems like a 
very easy one to use but has a rather poor zoom and would recommend not to buy this camera, 
                                                          
1
 To this end, we pretested 15 attributes in the context of digital cameras on their importance with 31 
respondents (15 female and 16 male), age ranging from 17 to 30 years (M = 25.48, SD = 4.11). We 
selected the six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,180)=1.48, p=.199). 
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was indicated as scoring ‘1’ on positive WOM (very easy to use) and ‘2’ on negative WOM 
(poor zoom & not recommending it). Two judges scored each conversation and discrepancies 
were resolved through discussion. Interjudge agreement for positive and negative WOM was 
89.13% and 91.30% respectively. 
Table 3: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 1 (digital camera) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
High resolution (pixels) Low resolution (pixels) 
Long range (optical zoom) Short range (optical zoom) 
Very qualitative lens Less qualitative lens 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
High memory capacity Low memory capacity 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence 
(F(2,89)=12.05, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,89)=14.62, p<.001), and anticipated 
conflicting reactions (F(2,89)=4.92, p=.009) in each of the experimental conditions by a series of 
one-way ANOVA’s as in our Pilot Study. Bonferroni post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 4) 
indicate that the manipulations were successful. 
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Table 4: Manipulation checks, Experiment 1, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 31 3.73a 1.93 4.71a 2.92 5.16a 2.12 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
30 6.01b 2.04 4.32a 2.04 6.68b 2.31 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
31 5.97b 2.28 7.47b 2.36 5.18a 2.09 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
             
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Similar to the Pilot Study, Bonferroni post-
hoc tests denote that manifest ambivalent respondents report more intense negative feelings 
(M=2.91) compared to participants in the anticipated ambivalent (M=2.09, p=.005) and univalent 
condition (M=1.70, p<.001), while the latter two did not differ (p=.391) (F(2,89)=11.69, p<.001). 
Word-of-mouth.  In line with our Pilot Study, manifest ambivalent people spread more 
negative (M=1.97) than positive WOM (M=.80, t(29)=-4.59, p<.001) and vice versa for 
anticipated ambivalent and univalent individuals (M=1.32 vs M=.39, t(30)=5.54, p<.001 and 
M=2.03 vs M=.13, t(30)=6.95, p<.001, respectively). We further investigated these types for 
WOM valence whereby valence equals the number of negative elements participants 
communicated about the product subtracted from the number of positive elements (cf. P-N). A 
one-way ANOVA revealed an effect of condition on WOM valence (F(2,89)=40.12, p<.001). 
Dunett T3 post-hoc tests indicate that univalent respondents focus more on spreading positive 
elements about the product (M=1.87) than anticipated ambivalent (M=.90, p=.009) and manifest 
ambivalent ones (M=-1.17, p<.001) who seem to focus on negative elements when spreading 
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WOM to others. In turn, anticipated ambivalent consumers focus also more on positive elements 
in their communication to others compared to manifest ambivalent consumers (p<.001). 
Controlling for attitude as a covariate did not attenuate any of these results. Positive and negative 
WOM correlated negatively (r= -.33, p=.001). 
Figure 2: Reported positive and negative WOM by condition, Experiment 1 
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Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that 
ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between initial (before WOM) and 
subsequent ambivalence (after WOM) (F(2,89)=4.29, p=.017, see Figure 3). In the univalent 
(Minitial=3.73 vs. Msubsequent=3.81, F(1,30)=.24, p=.628) and anticipated ambivalent condition 
(Minitial=6.01 vs. Msubsequent=6.06, F(1,30)=.03, p=.862), subsequent subjective ambivalence did 
not differ from initial subjective ambivalence. However, as expected, in the manifest ambivalent 
condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence was lower than initial subjective ambivalence 
(Minitial=5.97 vs. Msubsequent=4.97, F(1,29)=6.76, p=.015). Moreover, between conditions 
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(F(2,89)=4.29, p=.017), we may conclude that the (negative) ambivalence change of manifest 
ambivalent individuals (M=-1.00) is significantly different from the (positive) ambivalence 
change of anticipated ambivalent (M=+.05, p=.041) and univalent individuals (M=+.08, p=.036), 
while the latter two do not differ (p=1.000).  
Figure 3: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 1 
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Ambivalence-associated negative feelings reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of 
variance indicated that ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between the initial 
negative feelings (before WOM) and subsequent negative feelings (after WOM) (F(2,89)=4.60, 
p=.013, see Figure 4). In the univalent condition, subsequent negative feelings did not differ 
from initial negative feelings (Minitial=1.70 vs. Msubsequent=1.76, F(1,30)=1.13, p=.296). In the 
anticipated ambivalent condition, subsequent negative feelings were marginally higher than 
initial negative feelings (Minitial=2.09 vs. Msubsequent=2.37, F(1,30)=3.14, p=.086). However, as 
expected, in the manifest ambivalent condition, subsequent negative feelings were marginally 
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lower than initial negative feelings (Minitial=2.91 vs. Msubsequent=2.62, F(1,29)=3.31, p=.079). 
Moreover, between conditions (F(2,89)=4.60, p=.013), we may conclude that the (negative) 
aversion change of manifest ambivalent individuals (M=-.29) is significantly different from the 
(positive) aversion change of anticipated ambivalent individuals (M=+.28, p=.040) but not from 
univalent individuals (M=+.06, p=.126), while the latter two also do not differ (p=.502). The 
reduction in ambivalence and in ambivalence-associated negative feelings correlated positively 
(r=.47, p<.001).  
Figure 4: Repeated measure of ambivalence aversion by condition, Experiment 1 
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Path Model.  To study the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings, WOM valence (cf. P-N), and ambivalence reduction as well as aversion reduction, we 
specify a path model in AMOS 18.0. The outcome variables ambivalence reduction (i.e., 
difference between initial ambivalence, before WOM, and subsequent ambivalence, after WOM) 
and aversion reduction (i.e., difference between initial ambivalence-associated negative feelings, 
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before WOM, and subsequent ambivalence-associated negative feelings, after WOM) are 
regressed on ambivalence type, negative feelings and WOM valence. For ambivalence type, we 
specify a dummy variable differentiating between anticipated ambivalence and manifest 
ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 respectively). First, starting from the unconstrained model, we test 
whether the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction and aversion reduction is fully 
mediated by negative feelings and WOM valence. This is not completely the case: the direct 
effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction and aversion reduction, as well as the direct 
effect of negative feelings on ambivalence reduction and aversion reduction is not significant (all 
p’s >.005), but the direct effect of ambivalence type on negative WOM is significant (p<.001). 
When fixing the insignificant direct effects to zero, model fit does not significantly deteriorate 
(χ² difference test: χ² (4)=7.55, p=.110), whereas additionally fixing the significant direct effect 
of ambivalence type on WOM valence to zero does deteriorate model fit (χ² difference test: χ² 
(1)=13.58, p<.001). The foregoing results indicate that the effect of ambivalence type on WOM 
valence is partially mediated by the associated negative feelings (as in our Pilot Study), whereas 
the effect of these negative feelings on ambivalence reduction and aversion reduction is fully 
mediated by WOM valence. Figure 5 displays the model (chi²(12)=24.18, p=.019, CMIN/df 
=2.015, CFI =.924) and Table 5 presents estimates for the mediated model. The total effects in 
Table 5 indicate the overall impact of ambivalence type on negative WOM as mediated by 
negative feelings, as well as the overall impact of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction 
and aversion reduction as mediated by negative feelings and negative WOM.  
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Figure 5: Path Model, Experiment 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Model Estimates, Experiment 1 
 Dependent variable Independent variable B SE P 
Total effects 
WOM valence Ambivalence type -2.07   
Ambivalence reduction Ambivalence type .76   
Aversion reduction Ambivalence type .46   
Direct effects 
Negative feelings Ambivalence type .91 .29 .002 
WOM valence Negative feelings -.82 .18 <.001 
WOM valence Ambivalence type -1.32 .31 <.001 
Ambivalence reduction WOM valence -.37 .15 .011 
Aversion reduction WOM valence -.16 .06 .015 
Aversion reduction Ambivalence reduction .18 .05 <.001 
* Note: Total and direct effects are non-standardized as the model includes a dummy variable, ambivalence type (0= 
anticipated ambivalence, 1=manifest ambivalence) 
 
Discussion 
This study replicates and extends the Pilot Study. That is, manifest ambivalent 
individuals spread more negative and less positive WOM even though they know more positive 
Ambivalence 
type 
WOM 
valence 
Aversion 
reduction 
Ambivalence 
reduction 
Negative 
feelings 
.428 -.540 
-.408 
.384 
-.311 
-.279 
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attributes. They also spread more negative (and less positive WOM) compared to anticipated 
ambivalent and univalent individuals. This difference in WOM is partially mediated by a 
difference in negative feelings accompanying the type of ambivalence. Importantly, engaging in  
especially negative WOM  reduces the  ambivalence level as well as the experienced negative 
feelings for manifest ambivalent individuals. Engaging in especially positive WOM does not 
reduce the ambivalence level experienced by anticipated ambivalent individuals, however it 
tends to affect their negative feelings. Ambivalence is experienced more negatively afterwards. It 
seems like not being able to reduce their ambivalence instigates more ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings afterwards. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 showed that in case respondents are offered more positive than negative 
information about a product, manifest ambivalent individuals experience more intense negative, 
ambivalence-associated feelings which led them to predominantly engage in negative WOM. 
This (negative) WOM served as an effective coping mechanism to reduce their ambivalence. 
Anticipated ambivalent individuals predominantly engaged in positive WOM which did not 
prove to be effective in reducing ambivalence. The question is whether the ambivalence 
reduction of manifest ambivalent individuals occurred because negative WOM is more powerful 
than positive WOM or because coping behavior only occurs when the feelings associated with 
the ambivalence are more negative. In case of the former, the ambivalence of anticipated 
ambivalent individuals should also decrease when they predominantly engage in negative WOM. 
To test this, Experiment 2 used negative attributes to create negative dominant reactions (in 
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contrast to the positive attributes used in the Pilot Study and Experiment 1). Hence, the valence 
of the dominant and conflicting reactions in our manipulations were switched compared to 
Experiment 1. When both manifest and anticipated ambivalent people are confronted with 
especially negative information (dominant information) and no (cf. anticipated ambivalent 
condition) or less (cf. manifest ambivalent condition) positive conflicting information, we expect 
that both will predominantly engage in negative WOM because all respondents know more 
negative than positive information. However, manifest ambivalence will still be accompanied by 
more intense negative feelings compared to anticipated ambivalence, thus the former respondents 
still have more of an incentive to engage in negative WOM to reduce their ambivalence and the 
associated negative feelings. Anticipated ambivalent individuals experience less intense negative 
feelings. Therefore, engaging in negative WOM is not a means to an end for them, but just a safe 
way to go since they only know negative information. Therefore, for them negative WOM is less 
likely to result in a reduction of their ambivalence level and the accompanying negative feelings.      
 
Method 
Participants.  Ninety-two respondents (58 female and 34 male), between the ages of 18 
and 25 years (M = 21.18, SD = 1.65), participated in exchange for monetary compensation and 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following. First, we again used a different product stimulus (notebook). Similar to Experiment 1, 
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we used six equally important attributes2 to compose our attribute pool (Table 6) out of which we 
randomly selected the attributes for our manipulations. Second, negative attributes were used as 
dominant reactions in this study (in contrast to the positive attributes of the Pilot Study and 
Experiment 1). In the univalent condition, respondents were (i) provided with four negative 
attributes and no positive ones and (ii) were told that their best friend thought the notebook really 
has no positive attributes at all. In the anticipated ambivalent condition, individuals were (i) 
confronted with only one negative attribute and, in order to induce anticipation of conflicting 
reactions, (ii) were told that their best friend was convinced that the notebook has positive 
attributes which (s)he has not experienced yet. In the manifest ambivalent condition, respondents 
received (i) four negative and two positive attributes and (ii) were informed that their best friend 
thought the notebook really has no other positive attributes. 
Attitude (α=.96), subjective ambivalence before (α=.78) and after (α=.87) WOM, 
individual assessments of positive and negative reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, 
anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.92, αneg=.88), and ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings before (α=.70) and after (α=.73) WOM were measured and transformed as in 
Experiment 1. WOM was assessed by an open-ended question similar to Experiment 1. 
Interjudge agreement for positive and negative WOM was 90.22% and 86.96% respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 To this end, we pretested 20 attributes in the context of notebooks on their importance with 79 
respondents (49 female and 30 male), age ranging from 18 to 28 years (M = 22.43, SD = 2.08). We 
selected the six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,478)=1.19, p=.315). 
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Table 6: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 2 (notebook) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
High display quality (resolution) Low display quality (resolution) 
Large storage capacity on hard drive Small storage capacity on hard drive 
Very light notebook Very heavy notebook 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
Many USB ports Very few USB ports 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence 
(F(2,89)=10.73, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,89)=13.95, p<.001), and anticipated 
conflicting reactions (F(2,89)=4.98, p=.009) in each of the experimental conditions by a series of 
one-way ANOVA’s as in Experiment 1. Bonferroni post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 7) 
indicate that the manipulations were successful. 
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 Table 7: Manipulation checks, Experiment 2, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 31 4.62a 1.78 3.68a 2.14 6.06a 2.19 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
31 6.75b 2.17 4.10a 2.33 7.50b 1.86 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
30 6.30b 1.73 6.50b 2.27 5.82a 2.66 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
          
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Similar to the Pilot Study and Experiment 1, 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests denote that manifest ambivalent respondents report more intense 
negative feelings (M=3.13) compared to participants in the anticipated ambivalent (M=2.51, 
p=.008) and univalent condition (M=2.64, p=.047), while the latter two did not differ (p=1.000) 
(F(2,89)=5.36, p=.006).  
Word-of-mouth.  Results show that within conditions, manifest ambivalent as well as 
anticipated and univalent people spread more negative than positive WOM (M=2.00 vs M=.50, 
t(29)=-11.24, p<.001 and M=1.52 vs M=.19, t(30)=-12.29, p<.001 and M=1.81 vs M=.10, t(30)=-
11.55, p<.001, respectively). A one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of condition on WOM 
valence (F(2,89)=2.22, p=.115). Univalent respondents (M=-1.71) as well as anticipated 
ambivalent (M=-1.32) and manifest ambivalent (M=-1.50) respondents focus especially on 
spreading negative elements about the product. Controlling for attitude as a covariate did not 
attenuate any of these results. Positive and negative WOM correlated negatively (r= -.57, 
p=.001). 
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Figure 6: Reported positive and negative WOM by condition, Experiment 2 
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Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that 
ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between initial (before WOM) and 
subsequent ambivalence (after WOM) (F(2,89)=10.92, p<.001, see Figure 7). In the univalent 
(Minitial=4.62 vs. Msubsequent=4.54, F(1,30)=.09, p=.773) and anticipated ambivalent condition 
(Minitial=6.75 vs. Msubsequent=6.52, F(1,30)=.60, p=.445), subsequent subjective ambivalence did 
not differ from initial subjective ambivalence. However, as expected, in the manifest ambivalent 
condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence was significantly reduced (Minitial=6.30 vs. 
Msubsequent=3.93, F(1,29)=20.82, p<.001). Moreover, between conditions (F(2,89)=10.92, 
p<.001), we may conclude that the (negative) ambivalence change of manifest ambivalent 
individuals (M=-2.37) is significantly higher from the (negative) ambivalence change of 
anticipated ambivalent (M=-.24, p=.003) and univalent individuals (M=-.09, p=.001), while the 
latter two do not differ (p=.979). 
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Figure 7: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 2 
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Ambivalence-associated negative feelings reduction.  Ambivalence type also significantly 
affected the difference between the initial negative feelings (before WOM) and subsequent 
negative feelings (after WOM) (F(2,89)=5.00, p=.009). As expected, in the manifest ambivalent 
condition, subsequent negative feelings were (marginally) lower than initial negative feelings 
(Minitial=3.13 vs. Msubsequent=2.77, F(1,29)=3.44, p=.074), whereas no difference emerged in the 
anticipated ambivalent condition (Minitial=2.52 vs. Msubsequent=2.65, F(1,30)=.77, p=.388). In the 
univalent condition, subsequent ambivalence-associated feelings were even higher than initial 
negative feelings (Minitial=2.64 vs. Msubsequent=3.04, F(1,30)=5.41, p=.027). Moreover, between 
conditions (F(2,89)=5.00, p=.009), we may conclude that the (negative) aversion change of 
manifest ambivalent individuals (M=-.37) is significantly different from the (positive) aversion 
change of univalent  individuals (M=+.40, p=.007) but not from anticipated ambivalent 
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individuals (M=+.13, p=.138), while the latter two also do not differ (p=.815). The reduction in 
ambivalence and in negative feelings correlated positively (r=.48, p<.001). 
Figure 8: Repeated measure of ambivalence aversion by condition, Experiment 2 
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Mediation analysis
3
.  To study the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings, WOM valence, ambivalence reduction, we specify two mediation analyses for 
each ambivalence type separately. For manifest ambivalent individuals, WOM valence mediates 
the relationship between the associated negative feelings and ambivalence reduction (i.e., 
difference between initial ambivalence, before WOM, and subsequent ambivalence, after 
WOM). The mediating role of WOM valence was further assessed by a bootstrapping test 
(Preacher & Hayes 2004; Shrout & Bolger 2002). Because the 95% confidence interval of the 
                                                          
3 The previous path analysis of Experiment 1 could not be specified here due to the non-difference 
between both conditions (manifest vs. anticipated ambivalence) concerning negative WOM. Moreover, a 
multigroup SEM analysis is not appropriate because of the low numbers of respondents (n=61). 
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indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = .14, upper bound 95% CI = 1.11), 
we can conclude that, for manifest ambivalent individuals, WOM valence significantly mediates 
the effect of ambivalence-associated negative feelings on ambivalence reduction. However, for 
anticipated ambivalent, WOM valence seems not to mediate the effect of the negative feelings 
associated with the ambivalence on  ambivalence reduction as the 95% confidence interval of the 
indirect effect does contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = -.04, upper bound 95% CI = 1.26). 
 
Discussion 
 These results show that when negative reactions are dominant and positive are conflicting 
(whether it be manifest or anticipated), both manifest and anticipated ambivalent consumers 
spread especially negative WOM. However, only for manifest ambivalent individuals an 
ambivalence reduction will take place due to more intense ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings. That is, these negative feelings seem to be the ‘true’ instigator of ambivalent reduction. 
Furthermore, manifest ambivalent individuals feel better after spreading WOM, whereas this is 
not the case for anticipated ambivalent individuals. It seems like (negative) WOM only decreases 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings when one has substantial negative feelings 
accompanying one’s ambivalent attitude to begin with. However, between conditions the 
reduction of negative feelings for manifest ambivalent individuals is not different from the 
change in negative feelings of anticipated ambivalent individuals. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 2 provided evidence that the ambivalence reduction of manifest ambivalent 
individuals occurred because of the intensity of the negative, ambivalence-associated feelings 
rather than the valence of their WOM. To provide additional evidence for negative feelings as 
the real instigator of the coping process, we manipulate respondents’ mood in Experiment 3. A 
pre-existing mood dampens the intensity of an incongruent emotion, while increasing the 
intensity of the affectively congruent emotion (Neumann et al. 2001). Hence, the intensity of the 
negative feelings accompanying ambivalence could be lower for manifest ambivalent people in a 
positive (versus negative/neutral) mood, while anticipated ambivalent people could experience 
more intense negative feelings accompanying ambivalence in a negative (versus positive/neutral) 
mood. As a result, for manifest ambivalence, WOM should reduce ambivalence and its 
associated negative feelings in both the neutral and negative mood condition, but not in the 
positive mood condition. For anticipated ambivalence, WOM should reduce ambivalence and its 
accompanying negative feelings in the negative mood condition, but not in the neutral and 
positive mood condition. Hence, initial mood will act as a moderator in this story. As we do not 
expect an ambivalence reduction in any of the mood conditions for univalent respondents, 
Experiment 3 is confined to manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals only.   
 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and seventy-four respondents (107 female and 67 male), 
between the ages of 18 and 27 years (M = 20.98, SD = 1.99), participated in exchange for 
monetary compensation.  
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Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 1, but this time 
respondents were first randomly assigned to one of three mood conditions in which a five minute 
movie clip induced either a positive, negative, or neutral mood (cf. Elen et al. 2012). Positive 
mood was induced by a humorous movie clip of a local comedy show. The neutral mood 
condition contained a DIY (Do It Yourself) tutorial on how to install solar panels on a rooftop. 
Negative mood was induced by a movie trailer of a local movie which deals with topics such as 
autism, bullying, and suicide. Participants were asked to especially pay attention to the funny or 
sad parts, respectively. After watching the movie clip, respondents indicate how they feel by 
means of the 20-item PANAS scale (Watson, Cark & Tellegen, 1988). This scale measures 
affective states by means of different emotions on a five-point scale.   
Positive affect (α=.93), negative affect (α=.88), attitude (α=.97), subjective ambivalence 
before (α=.78) and after (α=.78) WOM, individual assessments of positive and negative 
reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.90, 
αneg=.90), and ambivalence-associated negative feelings before (α=.84) and after (α=.89) WOM 
were measured and transformed as in Experiment 1. WOM was assessed by an open-ended 
question similar to Experiment 1 and 2. Interjudge agreement for positive and negative WOM 
was 80.46% and 82.18% respectively. 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  Two one-way ANOVA’s revealed an effect of mood condition on 
positive affect (F(2,171)=19.15, p<.001) and negative affect (F(2,171)=60.36, p<.001). 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests denote that the happy movie clip induces more positive affect 
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(M=3.04) compared to the sad (M=2.20, p<.001) and neutral movie clip (M=2.40, p=<.001), 
while the latter two do not differ (p=.561). On the other hand, Dunnett T3 post hoc tests indicate 
that levels of negative affect are higher when watching the sad movie clip (M=2.14) than 
watching the positive (M=1.23, p=<.001) or neutral movie clip (M=1.28, p=<.001), while the 
latter two do not differ (p=.923). Thus, the selected movie clips prove to be successful in creating 
a differential mood. As in the previous Experiments, independent samples t-tests (summarized in 
Table 8) indicate that the manipulations were successful. 
  Table 8: Manipulation checks, Experiment 3, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
87 5.52a 2.17 3.79a 2.19 6.77a 2.60 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
87 5.43a 2.25 6.83b 2.44 5.66b 2.25 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
            
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  A 2 (manifest ambivalence vs. anticipated 
ambivalence) x 3 (negative mood vs. neutral mood vs. positive mood) ANOVA showed that 
there is a main effect of ambivalence type (F(1,168)=12.80, p<.001) as well as a main effect of 
mood (F(2,168)=14.41, p<.001) on the intensity of the ambivalence associated negative feelings. 
That is, manifest ambivalent individuals experience more intense negative feelings (M=2.90) 
compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals (M=2.38). In addition, when being in an initial 
positive mood, one experiences less negative feelings (M=2.18) compared to a neutral (M=2.64, 
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p=.011) and negative mood (M=3.09, p<.001), whereas the difference between the latter is also 
significant (p=.015). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between the effects of 
ambivalence type and mood on ambivalence associated negative feelings (F(2,168)=3.21, 
p=.043). Contrasts show that there is no difference between anticipated ambivalent individuals in 
a positive (M=2.11), and neutral mood (M=2.12) and manifest ambivalent individuals in a 
positive mood (M=2.25) whereas they significantly differ from anticipated ambivalent 
individuals in a negative mood (M=2.90), and manifest ambivalent individuals in a neutral 
(M=3.16) and negative mood (M=3.29). 
Word-of-mouth.  A 2 (manifest ambivalence vs. anticipated ambivalence) x 3 (negative 
mood vs. neutral mood vs. positive mood) ANOVA showed that there is a main effect of 
ambivalence type (F(1,168)=83.84, p<.001) as well as a main effect of mood (F(2,168)=10.09, 
p<.001) on WOM valence. That is, manifest ambivalent individuals focus more on negative 
elements when spreading WOM (M=-.91) compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals 
(M=.66). In addition, when being in an initial positive mood, one focuses (marginally) more on 
positive elements throughout his/her WOM spread (M=.30) compared to a neutral (M=-.08, 
p=.077) and negative mood (M=-.60, p<.001), whereas the difference between the latter is also 
significant (p=.017). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between the effects of 
ambivalence type and mood on WOM valence (F(2,168)=3.41, p=.035). Contrasts show that 
anticipated ambivalent individuals in a positive (M=.82) and neutral mood (M=1.00) are 
significantly different in terms of WOM valence compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals 
in a negative mood (M=.16) and manifest ambivalent individuals in a positive mood (M=-.22), 
which in turn significantly differ from manifest ambivalent individuals in a neutral (M=-1.14) 
and negative mood (M=-1.36). Positive and negative WOM do not correlate (r= .06, p=.423). 
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Figure 9: Reported positive and negative WOM by mood condition, Experiment 3 
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Ambivalence reduction.  A 2 (manifest ambivalence vs. anticipated ambivalence) x 3 
(negative mood vs. neutral mood vs. positive mood) ANOVA showed that there is a (marginally) 
main effect of ambivalence type (F(1,168)=2.97, p=.087) as well as a main effect of mood 
(F(2,168)=6.71, p=.002) on ambivalence reduction. That is, manifest ambivalent individuals 
reduce their ambivalence (marginally) more (M=-.97) compared to anticipated ambivalent 
individuals (M=-.38). In addition, when being in an initial negative mood, people will reduce 
their ambivalence more (M=-1.43) compared to a positive mood (M=+.04, p<.001) but not 
compared to a neutral mood (M=-.64, p=.107), whereas the difference between the latter is 
marginally significant (p=.073). Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between the 
effects of ambivalence type and mood on ambivalence reduction (F(2,168)=.04, p=.957).  
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Nevertheless, when conducting a repeated measure analysis of variance, we do find that 
initial mood significantly affected the difference between initial (before WOM) and subsequent 
ambivalence (after WOM) in both the anticipated (F(2,84)=3.29, p=.042, see Figure 10) and 
manifest ambivalent condition (F(2,84)=3.49, p=.035, see Figure 10). In the anticipated 
ambivalent condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence did not differ from initial subjective 
ambivalence for the positive (Minitial=5.46 vs. Msubsequent=5.76, F(1,33)=.99, p=.327) and neutral 
mood condition (Minitial=5.58 vs. Msubsequent=5.30, F(1,21)=.49, p=.492). However, as expected, in 
the negative mood condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence was lower than initial 
subjective ambivalence (Minitial=5.55 vs. Msubsequent=4.38, F(1,30)=4.58, p=.040). In the manifest 
ambivalent condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence did not differ from initial subjective 
ambivalence for the positive mood condition (Minitial=5.11 vs. Msubsequent=4.90, F(1,31)=.66, 
p=.422). However, as expected, in the negative (Minitial=6.06 vs. Msubsequent=4.38, F(1,27)=11.42, 
p=.002) and neutral (Minitial=5.16 vs. Msubsequent=4.15, F(1,26)=5.65, p=.025) mood condition, 
subsequent subjective ambivalence was lower than initial subjective ambivalence.  
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 Figure 10: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 3 
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Ambivalence-associated negative feelings reduction.  A 2 (manifest ambivalence vs. 
anticipated ambivalence) x 3 (negative mood vs. neutral mood vs. positive mood) ANOVA 
showed that there is a (marginally) main effect of ambivalence type (F(1,168)=3.75, p=.054) as 
well as a main effect of mood (F(2,168)=15.69, p<.001) on ambivalence reduction. That is, 
manifest ambivalent individuals reduce their negative feelings associated with their ambivalence 
(marginally) less (M=+.03) compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals (M=-.27). In 
addition, when being in an initial negative mood, people will reduce their negative feelings more 
(M=-.57) compared to a positive mood (M=+.43, p<.001) and (marginally) more compared to a 
neutral mood (M=-.22, p=.073), whereas the difference between the latter is also significant 
(p=.001). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between the effects of ambivalence 
type and mood on the reduction of ambivalence associated negative feelings (F(2,168)=4.00, 
p=.020). Contrasts show that anticipated ambivalent individuals in a negative mood (M=-.76) 
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reduce their aversion significantly more than manifest ambivalent individuals in a negative (M=-
.38) and neutral mood (M=-.36). In turn the latter change their aversion significantly compared to 
anticipated ambivalent individuals in a positive (M=+.03) and neutral mood (M=-.08), whereas 
the latter also significantly differ from manifest ambivalent individuals in a positive mood 
(M=+.83). 
Figure 11: Repeated measure of ambivalence aversion by condition, Experiment 3 
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Discussion 
Results show that manifest ambivalent people in a positive (versus negative and neutral) 
mood experience less intense negative feelings accompanying ambivalence. Hence, they spread 
less negative WOM and no ambivalence reduction and accompanying negative feelings 
reduction after spreading WOM occurs. In contrast, anticipated ambivalent individuals 
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experience more intense negative feelings accompanying their ambivalence in a negative (versus 
positive and neutral) mood. Hence, they spread more negative WOM and an ambivalence 
reduction and negative feelings reduction after spreading WOM occurs. This indicates that initial 
mood acts as a moderator and provides additional support for the idea that the negative feelings 
which go along with the type of ambivalence motivate people to get rid of their ambivalence and 
these associated negative feelings. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Four studies underscore the relevance of distinguishing between two types of 
ambivalence based on the type of conflicting reactions underlying the ambivalence (knowing 
versus anticipating). In all studies, differences are found between manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals, even though ambivalence intensity and the amount of experienced 
conflict did not differ. Manifest ambivalent individuals, who are knowledgeable of both positive 
and negative reactions (whether they are dominant or conflicting), bias their WOM toward the 
negative side as negatives weigh more heavily in the evaluation of an attitude object (Herr et al., 
1991; Ito et al., 1998; Mizerski, 1982). Even when manifest ambivalent individuals have more 
knowledge on positive, compared to negative reactions, they still engage in a negativity bias and 
rather talk about negative instead of positive attributes. So, irrespective of the valence of the 
dominant and conflicting reactions, manifest ambivalent individuals always spread more 
negative than positive WOM. This negativity bias is also fed by the intense negative feelings 
associated with manifest ambivalence. Anticipated ambivalent individuals, on the other hand, do 
not know but expect conflicting information. Not knowing, but only anticipating negative 
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reactions, make consumers more reluctant to share them with others. Anticipated ambivalent 
individuals bias their communication toward the valence of the dominant reactions of which they 
are truly knowledgeable (whether they are positive or negative). That is, when positives 
(negatives) are dominant, anticipated ambivalent consumers will spread more positive (negative) 
and less negative (positive) WOM. On top, as compared to manifest ambivalent individuals, 
anticipated ambivalent individuals experience less ambivalence-associated negative feelings. 
Moreover, spreading (negative) WOM, which is driven by the negative feelings 
accompanying manifest ambivalence, seems an effective way for manifest ambivalent 
individuals to reduce their subjective ambivalence and the accompanying negative feelings. By 
spreading negative WOM, manifest ambivalent individuals can not only vent their negative 
feelings (cf. de Matos & Rossi, 2008), but they can also convince themselves of their opinion by 
convincing others of the same opinion, a mechanism also put forward in dissonance literature 
(Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957). If so, manifest ambivalent individuals kill two birds with one 
‘word’. That is, by talking negatively about the attitude object, they influence others’ attitudes, 
preferences, and opinions and also convince themselves which is implied by their reduced 
ambivalence and reduced accompanying negative feelings. For anticipated ambivalent 
individuals, however, spreading (negative or positive) WOM is not an effective coping 
mechanism to reduce the ambivalence and associated negative feelings. Initial mood people hold 
moderates this relationship. On the one hand, when anticipated ambivalent people are in a 
negative (compared to a positive or neutral) mood, they experience more intense negative 
feelings accompanying ambivalence, spread more negative WOM and are motivated to reduce 
their ambivalence and the associated negative feelings. On the other hand, manifest ambivalent 
people who are in a positive (compared to a negative or neutral) mood, experience less intense 
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negative feelings accompanying ambivalence, and their WOM does not reduce their ambivalence 
neither does it reduce their associated negative feelings. Hence, this paper provides additional 
support for the idea that the negative feelings which go along with the type of ambivalence are 
the true instigator whether or not ambivalent people will be able to get rid of their ambivalence 
and these associated negative feelings. 
These results fit with ambivalence research on motivated one-sided information 
processing to reduce ambivalence and are additional proof for the notion that it is specifically the 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings accompanying the type of ambivalence that fosters 
ambivalence reduction (Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 
2009b). The present findings can be viewed within the consistency seeking motivation of 
individuals and offers new insights into the process of resolving evaluative conflict which is an 
important aspect within the ambivalence literature (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006; 
van Harreveld et al., 2009a). Our studies suggest that when an ambivalent attitude is based upon 
both positive and negative reactions of which individuals are knowledgeable of (cf. manifest 
ambivalence), this ambivalent attitude may be resolved through spreading negative WOM. 
Manifest ambivalent individuals will ‘jump of the fence’ (cf. van Harreveld et al., 2009a) and 
shift to one side of the conflict and try to behave consistent to this side. However, when an 
ambivalent attitude is based upon anticipated conflicting reactions (cf. anticipated ambivalence), 
it seems harder to comply with one side and to behave consistent with it. Anticipated ambivalent 
individuals will stay ‘sitting on the fence’ as van Harreveld et al. (2009a) describe it. 
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Implications and Possibilities for Further Research 
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects.  First, based upon earlier work 
of Priester et al. (2007), we have defined two types of ambivalence based on the extent to which 
the conflicting reactions underlying the evaluative conflict are known. Although Priester et al. 
(2007) introduced the construct ‘anticipation of conflicting reactions’, this paper is the first to 
extend it to types of ambivalence and to link it with accompanying negative feelings and 
spreading WOM. It is clearly shown that individuals can experience the same level of subjective 
ambivalence although their ambivalence is based upon different knowledge levels of conflicting 
reactions. Moreover, past research (Priester et al., 2007) only looked at anticipated conflicting 
reactions as a function of the magnitude of dominant reactions. This paper and especially the 
way the types of ambivalence were operationalized, broadens anticipated conflicting reactions to 
a function of both the magnitude of dominant reactions and interpersonal influence (it is the 
opinion of a friend that incites/inhibits the anticipation of conflicting reactions, cf. Priester & 
Petty, 2001). 
Second, we show that the mere experience of ambivalence is not sufficient to experience 
discomfort. Although several studies (Hass et al., 1992; Newby-Clark et al., 2002; Nordgren et 
al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b) already indicated that conflict awareness plays a 
pivotal role in experiencing ambivalence-associated negative feelings, a direct test has not been 
provided yet. This study is the first to show a more direct link between the knowledge of 
conflicting reactions and ambivalence-associated negative feelings. That is, ambivalent 
individuals who are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions (cf. manifest ambivalence), and 
hence their evaluative conflict, experience more intense ambivalence-associated negative 
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feelings than their counterparts who are not knowledgeable of but anticipate conflicting 
information (cf. anticipated ambivalence). 
Third, although spreading WOM has been proposed as a strategy to reduce dissonance 
(Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957), it has never been directly tested as a potential mechanism to 
cope with the discomfort of ambivalence. This paper is the first to do so and clearly indicates that 
negative WOM can reduce subjective (manifest) ambivalence. We have thus challenged the 
belief that the experience of ambivalence is sufficient for individuals to cope with it. It rather 
depends on the type of conflicting reactions, which are at the heart of the experience of 
ambivalence, and the accompanying ambivalence-associated negative feelings whether or not 
ambivalent individuals are able or motivated to cope with their ambivalence. 
Fourth, although several authors (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006) have 
looked at how people cope with the discomfort of ambivalence, most of them seem to focus on 
the reduction of their ambivalence while ignoring a possible reduction in ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings. In other words, they seem to fail whether or not ambivalent people really are 
able to reduce the discomfort of their ambivalence. In this paper, we contribute to the 
‘ambivalence coping’ literature by showing that not only ambivalence can be reduced but also 
the associated negative feelings which are the true motivator of whether or not ambivalent 
individuals will deal with their ambivalence.  
Our findings raise several questions for future research and potentially could resolve 
some conflicting findings in past research. Several studies have shown that attitudinal 
ambivalence results in lower attitude-behavior consistency (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2000; 
Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2004; Thompson et al., 1995). That is, conflicting 
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evaluative dimensions increase the likelihood that attitudes and behavior will be based on 
discrepant elements which should lead to lower attitude-behavior consistency. In contrast, Jonas 
et al. (1997) and Sengupta and Johar (2002) found that ambivalent attitudes lead to higher 
attitude-behavior consistency. That is, ambiguous attitude-relevant information can promote 
cognitive effort and increase attitude-behavior correspondence (Jonas et al., 1997) especially 
when the positive and negative information are simultaneously accessible (Sengupta & Johar, 
2002). We argue that the type of conflicting reactions underlying attitudinal ambivalence could 
help explain these different results. Previous ambivalence research possibly measured different 
types of ambivalence caused by the specific manipulations, attitude objects, research cover 
stories, etc.  For example, Jonas et al. (1997) as well as Sengupta and Johar (2002) potentially 
manipulated manifest rather than anticipated ambivalence by providing information of a 
consumers’ association which could be seen as accurate and complete (i.e., no anticipation of 
conflicting reactions). In contrast, Armitage and Conner (2000) as well as Costarelli and Colloca 
(2004) for example asked about evaluations of an out-group without providing information, this 
could evoke anticipated ambivalence, especially when the respondents have no experience with 
the out-group.  Based on theoretical arguments, we could argue that manifest ambivalent 
individuals display higher attitude-behavior consistency compared to anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. Individuals are spontaneously motivated to make sense of inconsistencies in order to 
arrive at an integrated evaluation (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989).  
Accordingly, exposure to inconsistencies stimulates information processing, increasing the 
strength and the predictive ability of the attitude (Jonas et al., 1997; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 
1995). Since manifest ambivalent individuals are confronted with positive and negative 
information, they will probably consider both in an effort to create an integrated judgment that is 
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predictive of behavior (i.e., a strong attitude). Anticipated ambivalent individuals are 
knowledgeable of only positive items and merely anticipate on negative information. As an 
outcome, judgments can be expected to be less integrated and hence less predictive of behavior. 
Future research may also contribute by examining other attitude strength attributes as 
ambivalent attitudes are generally seen as weak attitudes (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2000; Bassili, 
1996; Conner et al., 2002; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). Manifest (versus 
anticipated) ambivalent attitudes could be for example more resistant to persuasion and more 
stable as individuals are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions. Thus, manifest ambivalent 
attitudes could be stronger than anticipated ambivalent attitudes. Furthermore, researchers should 
continue to investigate the relationship between different types of ambivalence and other 
mechanisms to cope with ambivalence such as (biased) information processing. The more 
intense negative feelings accompanying manifest ambivalent individuals may motivate them to 
process information that can resolve their conflict in a different way than anticipated ambivalent 
individuals by for example biased information processing (cf. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 
2006). 
We suggest ambivalence researchers to always measure the underlying conflicting 
reactions, next to measuring subjective ambivalence to identify whether individuals hold 
manifest ambivalent versus anticipated ambivalent attitudes. Our results suggest that the 
distinction between both types is substantial as both types of ambivalent individuals can feel 
differently, behave differently, and/or influence whether or not they will deal with their 
ambivalence (cf. reducing ambivalence) through several coping mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER III: “READING THE MIND IN THE EYES”                                       
COPING WITH AMBIVALENCE THROUGH               
NEGATIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
This paper discerns two types of ambivalence: manifest ambivalence (knowing 
conflicting information) versus anticipated ambivalence (anticipating conflicting information).  
Previous research shows that - because manifest (vs. anticipated) ambivalent people experience 
more negative ambivalence-associated feelings - they are more likely to spread negative WOM 
as a coping mechanism.  In a similar vein, manifest ambivalent individuals may also focus more 
on negative information processing to reduce their ambivalence, whereas anticipated ambivalent 
individuals can be expected to process more balanced information as coping is not a concern for 
them. We scutinize this hypothesis in four studies in which information processing is measured 
in three different ways: by means of a thought-listing task (Pilot Study and Experiment 1), eye-
tracking (Experiment 2), and choice between positive and negative information cues (Experiment 
3). The results of our studies further indicate the importance of distinguishing between the 
different conflicting reactions that underlie ambivalence as they trigger differential feelings, 
cognitions and behavior. 
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As already explained in Chapter II of this dissertation, attitude ambivalence is prevalent 
in modern society. Moreover, as ambivalence indicates a conflict between positive and negative 
reactions within an attitude, it is experienced as something unpleasant (Newby-Clark, McGregor, 
& Zanna, 2002; Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006; van Harreveld, Rutjens, 
Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009a; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver 2009b) 
which evokes ambivalent people to deal with their ambivalence by means of reducing it (e.g. 
Clark, Wegener and Fabrigar, 2008; Lau-Gesk, 2005; Nordgren et al., 2006; Otnes, Lowrey and 
Shrum, 1997; Nowlis, Kahn and Dhar, 2002; van Harreveldet al., 2009a; 2009b). In the previous 
Chapter, it is shown that manifest ambivalent consumers may reduce their ambivalence 
effectively by talking (negatively) to others about the product whereas anticipated ambivalent 
consumers are not able to reduce their ambivalence by spreading WOM. This seems to be driven 
by more intense negative feelings accompanying manifest ambivalence compared to anticipated 
ambivalence. 
The objective of the current paper is to investigate theses different types of subjective 
ambivalence (i.e., knowing versus anticipating conflicting information) and information 
processing as a potential mechanism to cope with ambivalence. We argue that the type of 
ambivalence one experiences triggers a particular type (cf. valence) of information processing 
which in turn helps reduce ambivalence. Similar to Chapter II, we assume that manifest 
ambivalent consumers (who are knowledgeable of both positive and negative information) 
process more negative than positive information, even when they have more knowledge on 
positive information. For example, even though one especially knows positive product attributes, 
knowledge of some negative attributes, makes one to process more negatives about a product. In 
turn, this negative information processing makes people feel less ambivalent. For anticipated 
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ambivalent consumers, on the contrary, it is less clear what information they will process and 
similar to previous results no ambivalence reduction will occur as coping is not a concern for 
them. Consistent with Chapter II, this negativity bias (Herr, Kardes & Kim, 1991; Ito, Larsen, 
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Mizerski, 1982) is fed by negative feelings that knowledge (versus 
anticipation) of conflicting information evokes.  
In this paper, we take a look at how ambivalent people will process information as a way 
of dealing (cf. reducing) with their ambivalence. As in Chapter II, we do not focus on the 
intensity of ambivalence but rather on the type of ambivalence caused by different types of 
conflicting reactions (i.e., knowing versus anticipating conflicting information). We argue that 
this difference matters because different types of ambivalence make individuals feel different, 
even though experiencing the same subjective ambivalence level (cf. intensity), and this might 
differentially influence behavior. Possibly, results of previous ambivalence research mainly 
apply to ambivalent individuals who know rather than anticipate on conflicting information. 
This paper presents four studies investigating these two ambivalence types and focuses 
on how they cope (cf. reduce) with their ambivalence through information processing. In a Pilot 
Study, we investigate the extent to which these types result in positive and/or negative 
information processing by means of a thought-listing task. Experiment 1 replicates and further 
extends this by examining if and for whom information processing (cf. thought-listing) is an 
effective way to reduce ambivalence. Experiment 2 is identical to the former, except that an eye-
tracking part, in which respondents were simultaneously exposed to additional positive and 
negative information, replaces the thought-listing task. Finally, Experiment 3 investigates the 
impact of ambivalence type on information processing by looking at a choice task in which 
respondents have to choose between getting additional positive or negative information. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Coping with ambivalence 
Previous research shows that ambivalent individuals try to get rid of their feelings of 
evaluative conflict (Clark et al., 2008; Hass et al., 1992; Lau-Gesk, 2005; Nordgren et al., 2006; 
Nowlis et al., 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). More specifically, the negative feelings 
accompanied by ambivalence motivate individuals to reduce their ambivalence (Nordgren et al., 
2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). One way to do so is by seeking (Zhao & Cai, 2008) 
and scrutinizing thoroughly any information that enables them to get rid of that discomfort 
(Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & 
Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). In that sense, ambivalence is associated with 
increased systematic processing of attitude relevant information (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; 
Jonas et al., 1997), more time to integrate attributes in a single evaluation (van Harreveld, van 
der Pligt, De Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004), increased cognitive activity (Monteith, Devine, 
& Zuwerink, 1993), greater prefrontal cortex activity (Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & 
Banaji, 2003), and more message elaboration as well as a greater ability to process information 
thoroughly and more analytically (Maio et al., 1996; Zhao & Cai, 2008). Hence, these studies 
indicate that when experiencing ambivalence, individuals use more (cognitive) effort and 
deliberation in processing information as a way of reducing their ambivalence. This can be, for 
example, achieved by carefully scrutinizing all alternatives or attributes of a product and 
involves a comprehensive effort to analyze and understand information (cf. systematic 
processing). However, as the goal of processing attitude relevant information is to reduce 
feelings of evaluative conflict, less effortful forms than thorough systematic processing can also 
act as efficient coping mechanisms. In that respect, biased systematic processing or selective 
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attention can be an effective way to reduce ambivalence (Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 
2006; Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). That is, one can focus on one side of the evaluative 
conflict. Besides biased information processing, it has also been shown, for example, that 
ambivalent individuals can process more heuristically (Chaiken, 1980) as a way to reduce the 
ambivalence (Hodson, Maio,& Esses, 2001; Zemborain & Johar, 2007).  
In line with the negativity bias found in Chapter II, we expect that (manifest) ambivalent 
people will especially tend to the negative side of their conflicted attitude when engaging in 
(biased) information processing, even when the positive side is stronger (i.e., more knowledge on 
positive versus negative attributes). Manifest ambivalent people are knowledgeable of both 
positive and negative reactions (whether they are dominant or conflicting) and even when these 
negative reactions are conflicting (i.e., smaller in number) rather than dominant (i.e., higher in 
number), they will bias their information processing toward the negative side as negatives weigh 
more heavily in the evaluation of an attitude object (Herr et al., 1991; Ito et al, 1998; Mizerski, 
1982). By focusing on negative attributes, manifest ambivalent consumers downplay the positive 
attributes, leading to a reduction in their ambivalence level. As we know from Chapter II that 
especially manifest ambivalent individuals experience more intense negative feelings caused by 
their manifest ambivalence, we assume that they will also be more motivated to use negative 
(versus positive) information processing as a way to reduce their ambivalence. However, this 
negativity bias will only set in when individuals have real knowledge of negative reactions and 
not when they merely anticipate negative reactions (cf. anticipated ambivalence). Unlike 
manifest ambivalent individuals, anticipated ambivalent individuals experience less intense 
negative feelings caused by their anticipated ambivalence as seen in Chapter II. Therefore, 
engaging in positive and/or negative information processing may be less functional for them and 
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is less likely to result in a reduction of their ambivalence level. When individuals especially 
anticipate negative reactions, it is not really clear which information type, in terms of valence, 
will be processed. That is, both positive and/or negative information can be processed. On the 
one hand, they could process more negative information as a way of confirming the negative 
information which they are anticipating. On the other hand, they could also process more 
positive information in order to gain cognitive clarity. Or even more, they could process both 
positive and negative (cf. balanced) information in order to obtain a clear view of the attitude 
object.  
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
A Pilot Study and three Experiments investigate how different types of ambivalence, 
based on whether conflicting reactions are merely known (cf. manifest) or anticipated, cope with 
their ambivalence by means of (biased) information processing. A Pilot Study demonstrates that 
manifest ambivalent individuals, despite having the same ambivalence level as anticipated 
ambivalent ones (cf. anticipating on negative reactions), engage in more negative than positive 
thoughts. Experiment 1 replicates and extends the findings of this Pilot Study by showing that 
engaging in  negative information processing (cf. thought-listing) reduces the  ambivalence for 
manifest ambivalent individuals whereas engaging in positive information processing (cf. 
thought-listing) does not reduce the ambivalence experienced by anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. Experiment 2 further indicates that, by means of an eye-tracking Experiment, 
manifest ambivalent consumers process more negative than positive information when being 
confronted with additional information as a way of reducing the accompanied ambivalence 
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whereas anticipated ambivalent consumers do not differ in the extent to which they process 
additonal positive and/or negative information resulting in no ambivalence reduction. Finally, 
Experiment 3 shows that when having to choose between additional positive or negative 
information (compared to Experiment 2 where respondents could acquire both positive and 
negative information through the eye-tracking Experiment), manifest ambivalent people choose 
more for additional negative than positive information and reduce their ambivalence whereas 
anticipated ambivalent people, once again, do not differ in the extent to which they choose 
positive or negative information and no ambivalence reduction occurs. Together, the results of 
Chpater II and III indicate that manifest ambivalence, in contrast to anticipated ambivalence, 
induces a negativity bias which helps manifest ambivalent individuals to reduce their 
ambivalence.  
 
PILOT STUDY 
The objective of this Pilot Study is to investigate the relationship between type of 
ambivalence and information processing as assessed by means of a thought-listing task. We 
predict that, although having the same subjective ambivalence level, manifest ambivalent 
individuals will engage in more negative and less positive thoughts compared to anticipated 
ambivalent individuals. A univalent condition (many dominant and few conflicting reactions) is 
included in order to investigate how manifest and anticipated ambivalence relate to univalence. 
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Method 
Participants.  One hundred and two respondents (53 female and 49 male), between the 
ages of 18 and 28 years (M = 21.65, SD = 2.99), participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (univalence (control), 
manifest ambivalence, anticipated ambivalence).  
Procedure.  Level of subjective ambivalence and manifest/anticipated conflicting 
reactions was manipulated by varying the amount of positive and negative attributes respondents 
received about an MP3-player (cf. Priester, Petty & Park, 2007) and varying the opinion of one’s 
best friend (cf. Priester & Petty, 2001). Respondents were instructed to imagine a situation where 
they intend to buy a new MP3 player and received a set of attributes (provided by their best 
friend) that described a certain MP3 player. They were asked to regard these attributes as equally 
important (cf. Priester & Petty, 1996; Priester et al., 2007). The attributes describing our focal 
attitude object were randomly selected out of an attribute pool in the context of MP3 players as 
displayed in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Attribute descriptions used in Pilot Study (MP3-player) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
Good sound quality Poor sound quality 
High display quality (pixels) Low display quality (pixels) 
Large memory capacity Small memory capacity 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Many connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
No connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
Many wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc. 
No wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc 
 
Since valence did not interact with any of the dependent variables in former research 
(Priester et al., 2007), only positive attributes were used as dominant reactions in this study. In 
the univalent condition (few manifest and anticipated conflicting reactions), respondents were (i) 
provided with four positive attributes and no negative ones and (ii) were told that their best 
friend thought the MP3 player really has no negative attributes at all. In the anticipated 
ambivalent condition (anticipated but few manifest conflicting reactions), individuals were (i) 
confronted with only one positive attribute and, in order to induce anticipation of conflicting 
reactions, (ii) were told that their best friend was convinced that the MP3 player has negative 
attributes which (s)he has not experienced yet. In the manifest ambivalent condition (manifest 
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but few anticipated conflicting reactions), respondents received (i) four positive and two negative 
attributes and (ii) were informed that their best friend thought the MP3 player really has no other 
negative attributes. In line with earlier attitude research (e.g. Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), these 
manipulations were constructed in a way so they do not differ in general attitude and subjective 
ambivalence levels toward the focal object. As already mentioned before, the latter is essential, 
so that the differences found in our Experiments can be ascribed to the difference in the 
underlying nature of the conflicting reactions feeding the ambivalence rather than a mere 
difference in attitude or subjective ambivalence level. 
Attitude (α =.96), subjective ambivalence (α= .83), manifest positive/negative reactions, 
and anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.93, αneg=.84) were measured on 11-point scales 
and transformed similar to our previous Experiments in Chapter II (Priester et al., 2007). 
Information processing was assessed through a thought-listing task (Nordgren et al., 2006). 
Thought-listing is a primary tool for measuring the extent of information processing (Greenwald, 
1968; Nordgren et al., 2006). Participants were instructed to write down any thoughts and 
feelings they had about the MP3-player. Answers were coded for valence and number of 
arguments listed by two independent judges. For example, when a participant indicated that (s)he 
thinks the MP3-player seems like a very qualitative one but expects a high price leading to not 
considering this product to buy it, was indicated as having 1 positive (very qualitative MP3-
player) and 2 negative (high price & not buying) thoughts. Disagreements between judges were 
resolved through discussion. Interjudge agreement for positive and negative thoughts was 
82.35% and 89.22% respectively.  
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Results  
Manipulation checks.  In order to assess whether the manipulations were successful, we 
conducted a series of one-way ANOVA’s which revealed significant effects of condition on 
subjective ambivalence (F(2,99)=10.89, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,99)=15.84, 
p<.001), and anticipated conflicting reactions (F(2,99)=12.97, p<.001). Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
(summarized in Table 2) indicate that our manipulations were successful. Hence, although 
individuals in the anticipated ambivalent and manifest ambivalent condition have the same 
subjective ambivalence level, there is a difference in the type of conflicting reactions underlying 
the feeling of evaluative conflict. In the anticipated ambivalent condition subjective ambivalence 
is largely fed by anticipated conflicting reactions whereas in the manifest ambivalent condition 
especially manifest conflicting reactions appear to be at the heart of subjective ambivalence. 
Table 2: Manipulation checks, Pilot Study, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 34 4.36a 2.01 4.45a 2.63 5.34a 2.08 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
34 6.28b 2.01 4.74a 2.31 7.49b 1.98 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
34 6.31b 1.91 7.35b 2.06 5.13a 2.26 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
 
Information processing.  Results show that manifest ambivalent consumers generate 
more negative (M=2.12) than positive thoughts (M=.59, t(33)=-7.07, p<.001), whereas 
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anticipated ambivalent and univalent consumers generate more positive than negative thoughts 
(M=1.15 vs. M=.44, t(33)=4.55, p<.001 and M=2.09 vs. M=.44, t(33)=7.98, p<.001, 
respectively). Moreover, two one-way ANOVA’s (see Figure 1) revealed an effect of condition 
on thought valence (F(2,99)=70.39, p<.001) but not on thought sidedness (F(2,99)=1.57, 
p=.212). Thought sidedness equals the average number of positive and negative thoughts 
subtracted from the absolute difference between positive and negative thoughts (cf. |P-N| - 
(P+N)/2) and reflects how biased these thoughts are. A constant of two was added to each score 
so that the most two-sided thoughts we obtained (two positives and two negatives) received a 
score of zero (as in Nordgren et al., 2006). Hence, higher values indicate more one-sided (cf. 
biased) thoughts. We further investigated these types for thought valence whereby valence 
equals the number of negative thoughts subtracted from the number of positive thoughts (cf. P-
N). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicate that univalent respondents focus more on positive thoughts 
(M=1.65) than anticipated ambivalent (M=.71, p=.003) and manifest ambivalent ones (M=-1.53, 
p<.001). In turn, anticipated ambivalent consumers have more positive thoughts about the digital 
camera compared to manifest ambivalent consumers (p<.001). Controlling for attitude as a 
covariate did not attenuate any of these results. 
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Figure 1: Thought sidedness and thought valence by condition, Pilot Study 
-2
-1
0
1
2
Thought Sidedness Thought Valence
Univalence Anticipated Ambivalence Manifest Ambivalence
 
Discussion 
These results validate our hypothesis that manifest ambivalent individuals, despite having 
more knowledge on positive compared to negative attributes about the MP3-player, will generate 
more negative than positive thoughts. Furthermore, it is not surprising that manifest ambivalent 
individuals engage in more negative and less positive thoughts compared to anticipated 
ambivalent ones. After all, manifest ambivalent respondents were confronted with both positive 
and negative (four and two, respectively) attributes describing the MP3-player, whereas 
anticipated ambivalent respondents were only confronted with one positive attribute and no 
negative attributes at all. However, one could argue that manifest ambivalent individuals, as they 
are confronted with four positive attributes about the object compared to only two negative 
attributes, should engage in more positive thoughts compared to anticipated ambivalent 
individuals who are confronted with only one positive and no negative attributes. Nevertheless, 
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anticipated ambivalent consumers generate more positive thoughts compared to manifest 
ambivalent individuals. This is an indication that the negativity bias plays a vital role in this 
story, rather than the absolute number of positive or negative attributes individuals are 
confronted with. In line with this, there is no difference regarding the bias of the thoughts (cf. 
thought sidedness) between manifest and anticipated ambivalent consumers. It is only the 
valence which differs. Hence, manifest ambivalent attitude holders especially engage in negative 
thinking (i.e., information processing) whereas anticipated ambivalent individuals engage more 
in positive thinking (i.e., information processing). The next question, which is tested in 
Experiment 1, is what the motivation and the effect of this differential processing is. More 
specifically, do people in the anticipated ambivalent condition attempt and/or succeed in 
resolving their ambivalence level through generating mostly positive thoughts and individuals in 
the manifest ambivalent condition through mainly negative thoughts? 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to extend the findings of our Pilot Study by investigating 
whether engaging in especially positive (cf. anticipated ambivalence) or negative (cf. manifest 
ambivalence) thoughts may help reduce one’s ambivalence toward that object. Hence, the 
objective of Experiment 1 is to examine whether thinking about negative (positive) information 
could account as an effective coping strategy to reduce ambivalence for manifest (anticipated) 
ambivalent individuals. We have already shown in Chapter II of this dissertation that manifest 
ambivalent consumers experience more intense negative feelings compared to anticipated 
ambivalent people. Furthermore, manifest ambivalent consumers reduce their ambivalence 
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through spreading negative WOM whereas for anticipated ambivalent individuals spreading 
positive WOM does not reduce their ambivalence. Similar to these results, the negative 
information processing of manifest ambivalent individuals could serve as a way to reduce their 
ambivalence. In contrast, anticipated ambivalent individuals’ focus on positive information 
processing could not lead to a reduction in their ambivalence as coping is not a concern for them 
due to the less intense ambivalence induced negative feelings accompanying anticipated 
ambivalence (see also Chapter II).  
 
Method 
Participants.  Eighty-nine respondents (59 female and 30 male), between the ages of 18 
and 29 years (M = 20.98, SD = 2.22), participated in exchange for monetary compensation and 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to our Pilot Study, but some 
modifications were made to enhance the generalizability of the findings. First, we used a 
different product stimulus (digital camera) to generalize across products. Second, instead of 
instructing participants to regard the attributes as equally important (Priester & Petty, 1996; 
Priester et al., 2007) we used six equally important attributes to compose our attribute pool (see 
Table 3). To this end, we pretested 15 attributes in the context of digital cameras on their 
importance with 31 respondents (15 female and 16 male), age ranging from 17 to 30 years (M = 
25.48, SD = 4.11). We selected the six most important attributes which did not differ in 
importance (F(5,180)=1.48, p=.199). Similar to our Pilot Study, we randomly selected the 
attributes for our manipulations out of this pool. Third, similar to the procedure of Nordgren et 
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al. (2006), we asked respondents to what extent the words irritation, frustration, and 
discontentment described their negative feelings toward the digital camera on five-point scales as 
an assessment of the negative feelings accompanying ambivalence. These three items (α=.90) 
were presented alongside positive and neutral emotions, so as not to arouse suspicion in our 
participants. Finally, a second subjective ambivalence measure (which was identical to the initial 
measure) was inserted after the thought-listing task.  
Attitude (α=.98), subjective ambivalence before (α=.79) and after (α=.81) the thought-
listing task, individual assessments of positive and negative reactions, manifest positive/negative 
reactions, anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.95, αneg=.92) were measured and 
transformed as in our Pilot Study. The part of the thought-listing task that dealt with the digital 
camera was coded for valence and number of arguments listed in order to construct separate 
measures of positive and negative thoughts listed. Two judges scored each thought-listing and 
discrepancies were resolved through discussion. Interjudge agreement for positive and negative 
thoughts was 89.89% and 86.51% respectively. 
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Table 3: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 1 (digital camera) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
High resolution (pixels) Low resolution (pixels) 
Long range (optical zoom) Short range (optical zoom) 
Very qualitative lens Less qualitative lens 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
High memory capacity Low memory capacity 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
  
Results 
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence (F(2,86)=5.91, 
p=.004), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,86)=4.72, p=.011), and anticipated conflicting 
reactions (F(2,86)=4.87, p=.010) in each of the experimental conditions by a series of one-way 
ANOVA’s as in our Pilot Study and Chapter II. Post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 4) indicate 
that the manipulations were successful. 
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 Table 4: Manipulation checks, Experiment 1, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 30 4.24a 2.41 4.40a 2.90 5.60a 2.80 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
31 6.00b 2.32 4.52a 2.64 7.34b 2.13 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
28 5.86b 1.76 6.39b 2.72 5.62a 2.48 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
  
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Consistent with results of Chapter II, a one-
way ANOVA revealed an effect of condition on negative feelings accompanying ambivalence 
(F(2,86)=20.33, p<.001). Bonferroni post-hoc tests denote that manifest ambivalent respondents 
report more intense negative feelings (M=3.23) compared to participants in the anticipated 
ambivalent (M=2.14, p<.001) and univalent condition (M=1.68, p<.001), while the latter two did 
not differ (p=.180). 
Information processing.  In line with our Pilot Study, results show that within conditions 
manifest ambivalent consumers generate more negative (M=1.89) than positive thoughts (M=.96, 
t(27)=-3.20, p=.004), whereas anticipated ambivalent and univalent consumers generate more 
positive than negative thoughts (M=1.52 vs. M=.65, t(30)=3.94, p<.001 and M=2.27 vs. M=.37, 
t(29)=6.97, p<.001, respectively). Moreover, two one-way ANOVA’s (see Figure 2) revealed an 
effect of condition on both thought sidedness (F(2,86)=4.49, p=.014) and thought valence 
(F(2,86)=29.19, p<.001). Dunnett T3 post-hoc tests denote that anticipated ambivalent 
respondents (M=2.72) have less one-sided thoughts compared to univalent respondents (M=3.37, 
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p=.028) but not compared to manifest ambivalent respondents (M=2.86, p=.860). The latter two 
also do not differ (p=.131). We further investigated these types for thought valence whereby 
valence equals the number of negative thoughts subtracted from the number of positive thoughts 
(cf. P-N). Bonferroni post-hoc test indicate that univalent respondents focus more on positive 
thoughts (M=1.90) than anticipated ambivalent (M=.87, p=.018) and manifest ambivalent ones 
(M=-.93, p<.001). In turn, anticipated ambivalent consumers have more positive thoughts about 
the digital camera compared to manifest ambivalent consumers (p<.001). Controlling for attitude 
as a covariate did not attenuate any of these results. 
 Figure 2: Thought sidedness and thought valence by condition, Experiment 1 
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Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that 
ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between initial (before the thought-listing) 
and subsequent ambivalence (after the thought-listing) (F(2,86)=3.71, p=.028, see Figure 3). In 
the univalent (Minitial=4.24 vs. Msubsequent=4.26, F(1,29)=.001, p=.977) and anticipated ambivalent 
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condition (Minitial=6.00 vs. Msubsequent=6.10, F(1,30)=.14, p=.710), subsequent subjective 
ambivalence did not differ from initial subjective ambivalence. However, as expected, in the 
manifest ambivalent condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence was lower than initial 
subjective ambivalence (Minitial=5.86 vs. Msubsequent=4.71, F(1,27)=7.33, p=.012). Moreover, 
between conditions (F(2,86)=3.71, p=.028), we may conclude that the (negative) ambivalence 
change of manifest ambivalent individuals (M=-1.14) is significantly different from the (positive) 
ambivalence change of anticipated ambivalent (M=+.10, p=.047) and marginally different from 
univalent individuals (M=+.01, p=.076), while the latter two do not differ (p=1.000). 
Figure 3: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 1 
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Path Model.  To study the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings, thought valence, and ambivalence reduction, we specify a path model in AMOS 18.0, 
as we also did for WOM in Chapter II. The outcome ambivalence reduction (i.e., difference 
between initial ambivalence, before thought-listing, and subsequent ambivalence, after thought 
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listing) is regressed on ambivalence type, negative feelings and thougt valence. For ambivalence 
type, we specify a dummy variable differentiating between anticipated ambivalence and manifest 
ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 respectively). First, starting from the unconstrained model, we test 
whether the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction is fully mediated by negative 
feelings and thought valence. This is not completely the case: the direct effect of ambivalence 
type on ambivalence reduction, as well as the direct effect of negative feelings on ambivalence 
reduction is not significant (all p’s >.005), but the direct effect of ambivalence type on thought 
valence is significant (p=.023). When fixing the insignificant direct effects to zero, model fit 
does not significantly deteriorate (χ² difference test: χ² (2)=4.07, p=.130), whereas additionally 
fixing the significant direct effect of ambivalence type on thought valence to zero does 
deteriorate model fit (χ² difference test: χ² (1)=4.93, p=.026). The foregoing results indicate that 
the effect of ambivalence type on thought valence is partially mediated by the associated 
negative feelings, wehereas the effect of these negative feelings on ambivalence reduction is 
fully mediated by thought valence. Figure 4 displays the model (chi²(8)=12.93, p=.114, CMIN/df 
=1.616, CFI =.968) and Table 5 presents estimates for the mediated model. The total effects in 
Table 5 indicate the overall impact of ambivalence type on thought valence as mediated by 
negative feelings, as well as the overall impact of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction as 
mediated by negative feelings and thought valence.  
Figure 4: Path Model, Experiment 1 
 
  
 
 
Ambivalence 
type 
Negative 
feelings 
Thought 
valence 
Ambivalence 
reduction 
.488 -.652 -.224 
-.233 
 116 
Table 5: Model Estimates, Experiment 1 
 Dependent variable Independent variable B SE p 
Total effects 
Thought valence Ambivalence type -1.80   
Ambivalence reduction Ambivalence type .48   
Direct effects 
Aversion Ambivalence type .97 .26 <.001 
Thought valence Aversion -1.06 .19 <.001 
Ambivalence reduction Thought valence -.26 .15 .081 
Thought valence Ambivalence type -.76 .33 .020 
* Note: Total and direct effects are non-standardized as the model includes a dummy variable, ambivalence type (0= 
anticipated ambivalence, 1=manifest ambivalence) 
 
Discussion 
This study replicates and extends the Pilot Study. That is, manifest ambivalent 
individuals engage in more negative and less positive thoughts even though they know more 
positive attributes. They also generate more negative and less positive thoughts compared to 
anticipated ambivalent and univalent individuals. Importantly, according to these results, it 
seems that biased information processing (in terms of thinking about negative information) only 
helps manifest ambivalent people in resolving their subjective ambivalence level. In contrast, 
anticipated ambivalent people also engage in biased information processing (i.e. thinking about 
positive information), but it does not reduce their subjective ambivalence level. A possible 
explanation for this finding may reside in the fact that manifest ambivalence is associated with 
more intense negative feelings compared to anticipated ambivalence.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The major limitation of our previous studies is that although thought-listing is a primary 
tool for assessing information processing (cf. Greenwald, 1968; Nordgren et al., 2006), it is a 
retrospective technique which has several limitations (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; 
Shapiro, 1994; Zhao, Strasser, Cappella, Lerman, & Fishbein, 2011). For example, since 
thought-listing is essentially a memory-based reconstructive process, systematic bias may be 
introduced by this procedure. Moreover, as thoughts have to be analyzed and scored by 
independent judges, it is not the most ‘objective’ measure of information processing. In addition, 
in the Pilot Study and Experiment 1 respondents were not able to search for new information 
and, hence, scrutinizing both positive and negative information was impossible, especially for 
anticipated ambivalent individuals who are not aware of (but merely expected) negative 
information. Therefore, Experiment 2 assessed information processing in a more direct way 
through an eye-tracking study in which respondents could acquire additional positive and/or 
negative information.  
  
Method 
Participants.  Sixty-eight respondents (45 female and 23 male), between the ages of 18 
and 31 years (M = 21.60, SD = 3.32), participated in exchange for monetary compensation and 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. All respondents had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and none participated in eye-tracking research before. 
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 1, except that an eye-
tracking part replaced the thought-listing task. Respondents were confronted with eight consumer 
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reviews (four positive and four negative) about the same digital camera as in the manipulations. 
To this end, we pretested these eight reviews on several aspects (all on 11-point scales) with 237 
undergraduates (126 female and 111 male), between the ages of 17 and 30 years (M = 22.43, SD 
= 3.78). The four positive reviews were more positive (M=9.34, M=8.83, M=9.06, M=8.60) 
compared to the four negative reviews (M=1.88, M=2.55, M=2.44, M=2.24) (F(7,229)=114.97, 
all p’s<.001). There was no difference within positive and negative reviews on 
positivity/negativity (all p’s >.95). Reviews did not differ on reading time (F(7,229)=1.03, 
p=.412), realism (F(7,229)=1.40, p=.204), usefulness (F(7,229)=1.76, p=.097), clarity 
(F(7,229)=1.27, p=.265), informative strength (F(7,229)=.77, p=.612), conviction 
(F(7,229)=1.22, p=.294), reliability (F(7,229)=.47, p=.856), and expertise (F(7,229)=1.15, 
p=.332). Respondents were told that they would not have sufficient time to read them all without 
being told the specific time constraint (cf. 2.5 minutes). Therefore, they were instructed to read 
those which seem most relevant to them. The eight reviews appeared, in randomized order, on 
one screen and were clearly legible. We measured the time respondents inspected the positive 
and negative reviews as a proxy of information processing.  
A remote eye tracking system (SensoMotoric Instruments) recorded eye movements, with 
a sampling rate of 60 Hz and an accuracy of 0.40°. All the instructions appeared on a 22” LCD 
monitor with a resolution of 1280 ´ 1024 pixels. Placed at a distance of 70–80 centimeters, the 
equipment allows for free head movement in a virtual box of approximately 40 centimeters. An 
infrared-sensitive video camera, positioned below the computer monitor, observes the subject’s 
eyes, and specialized image software generates the accompanying x,y coordinates for that gaze. 
Participants first engaged in a calibration task to adjust the system to each person’s eye 
movements. We excluded data from seven participants from the final analysis due to 
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unsatisfactory calibration values (mainly because of problems with recording eye movements 
when wearing heavy glasses), so the final data set featured 61 participants. After the system 
calibration, respondents were confronted with the eight reviews about the digital camera on one 
screen. Around each review, non-overlapping areas of interest (AOI) were defined, so that we 
could track how long and how often participants inspected each review. For the final analyses, 
we focused on the AOI’s of the valence of the reviews (cf. negative versus positive). 
The eye-movement measures produced three indicators of interest. First, we investigated 
attention toward the specific review by recording the gaze duration toward the AOI’s as the total 
time (in seconds) a participant attended to a particular AOI. To avoid a difference effect due to 
the sizes of the AOIs, the measurement units were seconds per 1000 pixels. We also recorded the 
number of fixations on AOI’s and the fixation duration, but these measures were almost perfectly 
correlated (r > .90) with nearly identical results, so we only discuss gaze duration. 
Attitude (α=.98), subjective ambivalence before (α=.85) and after (α=.82) the eye-
tracking part, individual assessments of positive and negative reactions, manifest 
positive/negative reactions, and anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.82, αneg=.89), and 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings (α=.80) were measured and transformed as in 
Experiment 1.  
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence 
(F(2,58)=20.75, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,58)=35.95, p<.001), and anticipated 
conflicting reactions (F(2,58)=4.54, p=.015) in each of the experimental conditions by a series of 
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one-way ANOVA’s as in Experiment 1. Post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 6) indicate that the 
manipulations were successful. 
Table 6: Manipulation checks, Experiment 2, means as a function of condition 
Condition N 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 20 3.45a 1.40 3.05a 1.82 5.60a 2.58 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
21 6.44b 1.68 3.86a 1.53 7.50b 1.72 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
20 6.23b 1.84 7.55b 2.01 5.70a 2.47 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
          
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed an 
effect of condition on negative feelings associated with ambivalence (F(2,58)=27.57, p<.001). 
Similar to Experiment 1, Bonferroni post-hoc tests denote that manifest ambivalent respondents 
report more intense negative feelings (M=3.17) compared to participants in the anticipated 
ambivalent (M=2.13, p<.001) and univalent condition (M=1.67, p<.001), while the latter two do 
marginally differ (p=.054).  
Information processing. There was no difference in percentage of time devoted to reading 
reviews (F(2,58)=1.04, p=.358) between conditions. However, within conditions (see Figure 5), 
manifest ambivalent individuals devoted more time (in percentage of total gaze time) reading 
negative reviews compared to positive reviews (Mneg=54.27% vs. Mpos=45.73% , t(19)=2.18, 
p=.042) whereas there is no difference for anticipated ambivalent (Mneg=50.46% vs. 
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Mpos=49.54%, t(20)=.28, p=.785) and univalent individuals (Mneg=52.93% vs. Mpos=47.07%, 
t(19)=1.41, p=.175). Introducing attitude as a covariate did not attenuate any of these results. 
Figure 5: Reading time reviews (% of total gaze time) by condition, Experiment 2 
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Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that 
ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between initial (before the eye-tracking 
part) and subsequent ambivalence (after the eye tracking part) (F(2,58)=24.72, p<.001, see 
Figure 6). In the univalent condition, ratings of subsequent subjective ambivalence were higher 
than ratings of initial subjective ambivalence (Minitial=3.45 vs. Msubsequent=7.75, F(1,19)=90.88, 
p<.001) which seems rather tautological as they are confronted with both positive and negative 
information through the reviews. In the anticipated ambivalent condition (Minitial=6.44 vs. 
Msubsequent=6.30, F(1,20)=.06, p=.806), subsequent subjective ambivalence did not differ from 
initial subjective ambivalence. In contrast, as expected, in the manifest ambivalent condition, 
subsequent subjective ambivalence was marginally lower than initial subjective ambivalence 
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(Minitial=6.23 vs. Msubsequent=4.73, F(1,19)=3.93, p=.062). However, between conditions 
(F(2,58)=24.72, p<.001), we may conclude that the (positive) ambivalence change of univalent 
individuals (M=+4.30) is significantly different from the (negative) ambivalence change of 
anticipated (M=-.14, p<.001) and manifest ambivalent individuals (M=-1.50, p<.001), while the 
latter two do not differ (p=.352). 
Figure 6: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 2 
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Path Model.  In line with Experiment 1, we wanted to study the effect of ambivalence 
type on ambivalence-associated negative feelings, negative reading time (in % of total reading 
time), and ambivalence reduction by specifying a path model in AMOS 18.0. First, starting from 
the unconstrained model, we test whether the effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence 
reduction is fully mediated by negative feelings and negative reading time. However, the model 
only indicated a significant link (p>.001) between ambivalence type and negative feelings 
associated with ambivalence, even when fixing the insignificant direct effects to zero.
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the findings of Experiment 1. That is, manifest 
ambivalent individuals devoted more of their time (in percentage of total time) to reading 
negative than positive reviews. In contrast, anticipated ambivalent individuals do not differ in the 
percentage of time devoted to reading positive versus negative reviews. Similar to Experiment 1, 
biased information processing (in terms of reading negative reviews) helps manifest ambivalent 
people in resolving their subjective ambivalence level. In contrast, information processing does 
not help anticipated ambivalent individuals in reducing their subjective ambivalence level. 
Although, the change in ambivalence between manifest ambivalent and anticipated ambivalent 
indivuduals is not significant. Furthermore, the path model did not prove to be significant. 
Although recognizing the downsides of the thought-listing technique and opting for a more 
‘objective’ way of measuring information processing by means of an eye-tracking part, manifest 
(compared to anticipated) ambivalent individuals do not engage in more negative information 
due to more intense ambivalence associated negative feelings and the predominantly focus on 
negative information does not reduce their ambivalence. A possible explanation resides in the 
fact that the eye-tracker measures something objective (looking at negative/positive information) 
but is not able to fully reflect what is going on in the head of respondents. This questions, in a 
way, the operationalization of reading time as a good proxy for attention. That is, people could 
look/stare at a certain review without really reading it and giving attention to it. Looking at 
something and reading it are two things. In addition, respondents may read for example positive 
information but at the same time think about negative features of the device and vice versa. 
Hence, eye-tracking seems not the best way to operationalize attention in this Experiment. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
In a third Experiment, we wanted to investigate what would happen if consumers really 
had to make a choice between getting additional positive or negative information. Although one 
could argue that the eye-tracking part of the previous Experiment also involved a choice context 
(cf. we instructed participants to read only those reviews which seemed relevant to them as they 
had insufficient time to read all reviews), there is a difference between the former and the choice 
task in this Experiment. Here, individuals will really have to make a choice between additional 
positive or negative information whereas in the eye-tracking part individuals were still able to 
choose reading both positive and negative reviews. As a consequence, anticipated ambivalent 
individuals were maybe not able to reduce their ambivalence in the latter Experiment because 
they selected both positive and negative information. However, if they have to make a choice 
between reading additional positive and negative information, this could make them to behave 
consistent to this choice and therefore reduce their ambivalence. That is, people have a general 
preference for consistency (cf. Van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b) and making a choice is a 
potential way to reduce ambivalence (de Liver et al., 2007; van Harreveld et al., 2009b). 
Therefore, we assessed information processing by a choice study in which respondents could 
choose one of two reviews to acquire additional positive or negative information.  
 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and fifty-one respondents (97 female and 54 male), between 
the ages of 17 and 30 years (M = 22.88, SD = 2.44), participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation.  
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Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 1 & 2, but two 
modifications were made to enhance the generalizability of the findings. First, we used a 
different product stimulus (notebook) to generalize across products. Similar to previous 
Experiments, we used six equally important attributes to compose our attribute pool (see Table 
7) out of which we randomly selected the attributes for our manipulations. To this end, we 
pretested 20 attributes in the context of notebooks on their importance with 79 respondents (49 
female and 30 male), age ranging from 18 to 28 years (M = 22.43, SD = 2.08). We selected the 
six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,478)=1.19, p=.315). 
Second, the eye-tracking part of Experiment 2 was replaced by a choice task in which 
respondents could acquire additional information about the notebook by means of a positive or 
negative review. They had the choice between a four-stars or one-star review (with a maximum 
of five stars). The only thing they saw at the moment of making the choice was two reviews with 
only the number of stars in the heading. After they had indicated their actual choice, they were 
confronted with the complete review (cf. stars and text). To this end, we pretested these two 
reviews on several aspects (all on 11-point scales) with 56 undergraduates (29 female and 27 
male), between the ages of 17 and 30 years (M = 22.05, SD = 3.78). The positive review was 
more positive (M=9.37) compared to the negative review (M=2.38, t(56)=17.40, p<.001). 
Reviews did not differ on reading time (t(56)=-.13, p=.896), realism (t(56)=1.05, p=.297), 
usefulness (t(56)=-.39, p=.698), clarity (t(56)=.16, p=.878), informative strength (t(56)=.03, 
p=.980), conviction (t(56)=.72, p=.472), reliability (t(56)=.47, p=.637), and expertise (t(56)=.54, 
p=.594).  
 
 
 126 
Table 7: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 3 (notebook) 
Positive attributes Negative attributes 
High display quality (resolution) Low display quality (resolution) 
Large storage capacity on hard drive Small storage capacity on hard drive 
Very light notebook Very heavy notebook 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
Many USB ports Very few USB ports 
 
Attitude (α=.97), subjective ambivalence before (α=.71) and after (α=.74) the review 
choice task, individual assessments of positive and negative reactions, manifest positive/negative 
reactions, and anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.88, αneg=.88), and ambivalence-
associated negative feelings (α=.90) were measured and transformed as in Experiment 1 & 2. 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence 
(F(2,148)=10.81, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,148)=13.53, p<.001), and 
anticipated conflicting reactions (F(2,148)=8.61, p=.015) in each of the experimental conditions 
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by a series of one-way ANOVA’s as in Experiment 1. Post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 8) 
indicate that the manipulations were successful. 
 Table 8: Manipulation checks, Experiment 3, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 52 4.77a 1.81 4.02a 2.42 6.18a 1.93 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
49 6.19b 1.77 4.82a 2.24 7.39b 1.91 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
50 6.30b 1.93 6.46b 2.58 5.80a 2.14 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
             
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed an 
effect of condition on negative feelings associated with ambivalence (F(2,148)=19.92, p<.001). 
Similar to Experiment 1, Bonferroni post-hoc tests denote that manifest ambivalent respondents 
report more intense negative feelings (M=3.03) compared to participants in the anticipated 
ambivalent (M=2.06, p<.001) and univalent condition (M=2.25, p<.001), while the latter two do 
not differ (p=.639).  
Information processing.  Crosstab analysis (see Table 9) shows that there is a significant 
difference between conditions (χ2(2, 151)=31.23, p<.001) with respect to the choice for a 
negative/positive review (coded 0=positive and 1=negative, respectively). Similar to our 
previous Experiments, manifest ambivalent consumers choose (marginally) more for the 
negative than positive review (63.50% vs. 36.50%, respectively, χ2(1, 52)=3.77, p=.052), 
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whereas anticipated ambivalent consumers did not differ in their choice for the positive or 
negative review (55.10% vs. 44.90%, respectively, χ2(1, 49)=.51, p=.475). In contrast, more 
univalent respondents chose for the positive than the negative review (90% vs. 10%, 
respectively, χ2(1, 50)=32.00, p<.001). Introducing attitude as a covariate did not attenuate these 
results. 
Table 9: Crosstab Analysis, Experiment 3 
Condition  
Review choice 
Positive Negative 
Univalence 
Count 19 33 
% within condition 36,5% 63,5% 
Anticipated Ambivalence 
Count 27 22 
% within condition 55,1% 44,9% 
Manifest Ambivalence 
Count 45 5 
% within condition 90,0% 10,0% 
     
Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that 
ambivalence type significantly affected the difference between initial (before the review choice 
task) and subsequent ambivalence (after the review choice task) (F(2,148)=11.35, p<.001, see 
Figure 7). In the univalent (Minitial=4.77 vs. Msubsequent=4.33, F(1,49)=2.63, p=.111) and 
anticipated ambivalent condition (Minitial=6.19 vs. Msubsequent=5.84, F(1,48)=1.17, p=.284), 
subsequent subjective ambivalence did not differ from initial subjective ambivalence. In contrast, 
as expected, in the manifest ambivalent condition, subsequent subjective ambivalence was lower 
than initial subjective ambivalence (Minitial=6.30 vs. Msubsequent=4.07, F(1,51)=40.00, p<.001). 
 129 
Moreover, between conditions (F(2,148)=11.35, p<.001), we may conclude that the (negative) 
ambivalence change of manifest ambivalent individuals (M=-2.23) is significantly higher 
compared to the (negative) ambivalence change of anticipated ambivalent (M=-.35, p<.001) and 
univalent individuals (M=-.44, p=.001), while the latter two do not differ (p=.995). 
Figure 7: Repeated measure of subjective ambivalence by condition, Experiment 3 
3
4
5
6
Univalence Anticipated Ambivalence Manifest Ambivalence
Initial subjective ambivalence Subsequent subjective ambivalence
 
Path Model.  In line with Experiment 1, we study the effect of ambivalence type on 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings, review choice (coded 0=positive and 1=negative, 
respectively), and ambivalence reduction by specifying a path model in AMOS 18.0. First, 
starting from the unconstrained model, we test whether the effect of ambivalence type on 
ambivalence reduction is fully mediated by negative feelings and review choice. This is not 
completely the case: the direct effect of ambivalence type on review choice, as well as the direct 
effect of negative feelings on ambivalence reduction is not significant (all p’s >.005), but the 
direct effect of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction is significant (p=.004). When fixing 
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the insignificant direct effects to zero, model fit does not significantly deteriorate (χ² difference 
test: χ² (2)=1.26, p=.533), whereas additionally fixing the significant direct effect of ambivalence 
type on ambivalence reduction to zero does deteriorate model fit (χ² difference test: χ² (1)=12.20, 
p<.001). Figure 8 displays the model (chi²(8)=13.23, p=.104, CMIN/df =1.654, CFI =.979) and 
Table 10 presents estimates for the mediated model. The total effects in Table 10 indicate the 
overall impact of ambivalence type on review choice as mediated by negative feelings, as well as 
the overall impact of ambivalence type on ambivalence reduction as mediated by negative 
feelings and review choice. 
Figure 8: Path Model, Experiment 3 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 10: Model Estimates, Experiment 3 
 Dependent variable Independent variable B SE p 
Total effects 
Review choice Ambivalence type .10   
Ambivalence reduction Ambivalence type 1.80   
Direct effects 
Aversion Ambivalence type .89 .16 <.001 
Review choice Aversion .110 .06 .083 
Ambivalence reduction Review choice .93 .47 .049 
Ambivalence reduction Ambivalence type 1.71 .47 <.001 
* Note: Total and direct effects are non-standardized as the model includes a dummy variable, ambivalence type (0= 
anticipated ambivalence, 1=manifest ambivalence) 
.551 .178 .182 Ambivalence 
type 
Negative 
feelings 
Review 
choice 
Ambivalence 
reduction 
.336 
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Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicates and extends the findings of Experiment 1 & 2. That is, manifest 
ambivalent individuals are more likely to choose the negative review than the positive review. In 
contrast, anticipated ambivalent individuals are equally likely to choose the positive as the 
negative review. Importantly, also here the negative review only helps manifest ambivalent 
individuals in resolving their subjective ambivalence level. Anticipated ambivalent individuals, 
whether they choose the positive or negative review, do not reduce their subjective ambivalence 
level. Hence, choosing for additional (negative) information processing is capable of reducing 
the ambivalence experienced by manifest ambivalent consumers. In contrast, for anticipated 
ambivalent consumers choosing additional positive/negative information, is not capable of 
reducing the experienced ambivalence.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Four studies underscore the relevance of distinguishing between two types of 
ambivalence based on the type of conflicting reactions underlying the ambivalence (knowing 
versus anticipating). In all studies, differences are found between manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals, even though ambivalence intensity and the amount of experienced 
conflict did not differ. Manifest ambivalent individuals, who are knowledgeable of both positive 
and negative reactions, process more negative and less positive information compared to 
anticipated ambivalent individuals who are not knowledgeable of, but just anticipate on 
conflicting (negative) reactions. Apparently, similar to the results out of Chapter II, manifest 
ambivalent consumers engage in a negativity bias and rather process additional negative 
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information instead of positive information. For anticipated ambivalent people, it is less clear 
what type of information (cf. valence) they are going to process. In our Pilot Study as well as 
Experiment 1, anticipated ambivalent consumers generate more positive thoughts than negative 
thoughts. However, people were not able to search for new information making it hard for 
anticipated ambivalent people, as they are not knowledgeable of negative information, to engage 
in negative information processing by means of a thought-listing task. When shifting to a 
‘cleaner’ way to tap into information processing in Experiment 2 & 3, anticipated ambivalent 
consumers do not have a real preference for processing additional positive or negative 
information. Experiment 2, for example, shows that they divide their time quite equally between 
reading positive as well as negative information. Also in Experiment 3, anticipated ambivalent 
people do not have a dominant choice for additional positive or negative information. Hence, 
although it seems like anticipated ambivalent people engage in biased information processing 
when the latter is assessed with a thought-listing task, this is not the case when anticipated 
ambivalent individuals have the choice between processing positive and/or negative information. 
It seems that anticipated ambivalent consumers’ information processing is more balanced. 
However, for manifest ambivalent consumers, all methods used to assess information processing 
point to biased (cf. negative) information processing. Moreover, manifest ambivalence is 
accompanied by more intense ambivalence-associated negative feelings compared to anticipated 
ambivalence and because of this they should be more motivated to engage in coping behavior.  
The processing of negative information seems to serve as such a coping mechanism for manifest 
ambivalence, just as spreading negative WOM did in Chapter II.  
These results fit with ambivalence research on motivated one-sided information 
processing to reduce ambivalence (Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 
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2009a; 2009b). The present findings can be viewed within the consistency seeking motivation of 
individuals and offers new insights into the process of resolving evaluative conflict which is an 
important aspect within the ambivalence literature (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006; 
van Harreveld et al., 2009a). Our studies suggest that when an ambivalent attitude is based upon 
both positive and negative reactions of which individuals are knowledgeable (cf. manifest 
ambivalence), this ambivalent attitude may be resolved through processing negative information. 
Manifest ambivalent individuals will ‘jump of the fence’ (cf. van Harreveld et al., 2009a) and 
shift to one side of the conflict and try to behave consistent to this side. However, when an 
ambivalent attitude is based upon anticipated conflicting reactions (cf. anticipated ambivalence), 
it seems harder to comply with one side and to behave consistent with it. Anticipated ambivalent 
individuals will stay ‘sitting on the fence’ as van Harreveld et al. (2009a) describe it. 
 
Implications and Possibilities for Further Research 
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects.  Information processing as a 
coping mechanism to deal with the agony of ambivalence has received considerable attention in 
the literature (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Zhao & Cai, 2008). 
However, most studies have focussed on thought-listing (cf. Nordgren et al., 2006), self-reported 
measures (cf. Zhao & Cai, 2008), or message elaboration (cf. in terms of polarization or 
ambivalence change) of persuasive messages with variable (cf. low vs. high) argument strength 
(Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996) such that greater processing is associated with greater 
argument quality effects as an indicator of information processing (cf. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to assess information processing in a more direct way 
through an eye-tracking study and choice-study. Although thought-listing is a primary tool for 
 134 
assessing information processing (cf. Greenwald, 1968; Nordgren et al., 2006), it is rather 
retrospective and the technique has its limitations (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Shapiro, 1994; Zhao et 
al., 2011). For example, since thought-listing is essentially a memory-based reconstructive 
process, systematic bias may be introduced by this procedure. Moreover, as thoughts have to be 
analyzed and scored by independent judges, it is not the most ‘objective’ measure of information 
processing. In addition, respondents are not able to search for new information and hence, 
scrutinizing both positive and negative information is impossible, especially for anticipated 
ambivalent individuals who are not aware of negative information. Finally, in former research 
(Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996) ambivalent individuals are confronted with either positive 
or negative additional information with variable argument strength to look at how people deal 
with their ambivalence. In contrast, our research provides ambivalent people simultaneously with 
positive and negative information which are similar in strength (cf. pretest reviews, Experiment 
2). This enables us to give a better and more ‘realistic’ understanding of which type of additional 
information, in terms of valence, ambivalent people will prefer (Experiment 3) and also 
effectively process (Experiment 2) to deal with their ambivalence.  
Although we tried to use different and more ‘realistic’ techniques compared to former 
research (see supra) in order to asses information processing, the way we operationalized 
information processing is not fully capable of reflecting what is really happening in people’s 
head. For example, with respect to the thought-listing technique, respondents do not or are 
unable to write down all their thoughts. They could be thinking of certain elements about the 
product without writing them down, just because they forgot it or because they maybe think it is 
not important to communicate or many other reasons. Concerning the eye-tracking, as already 
mentioned, looking at certain information does not mean that you are attentively processing it. 
 135 
Finally, making a choice between additional positive or negative information does not lead to 
only thinking about positive or negative information, respectively. That is, people may still think 
about positive (negative) information when writing down, looking at or choosing for negative 
(positive) information. Therefore, future research may contribute by looking at other ways to 
asses information processing. For example, MRI brain research could look at which brain 
regions are activated when being in an anticipated or manifest ambivalent state and as a 
consequence whether people predominantly think about positive or negative information (cf. 
event-related brain potentials as a measure of information processing operations; e.g., Ito et al., 
1998). 
Our findings raise several questions for future research and can potentially resolve some 
conflicting findings in past research. Several studies have shown that attitudinal ambivalence 
results in lower attitude-behavior consistency (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner et al., 
2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2004; Thompson et al., 1995). That is, conflicting evaluative 
dimensions increase the likelihood that attitudes and behavior will be based on discrepant 
elements which should lead to lower attitude-behavior consistency. In contrast, Jonas et al. 
(1997) and Sengupta and Johar (2002) found that ambivalent attitudes lead to higher attitude-
behavior consistency. That is, ambiguous attitude-relevant information can promote cognitive 
effort and increase attitude-behavior correspondence (Jonas et al., 1997) especially when the 
positive and negative information are simultaneously accessible (Sengupta & Johar, 2002). The 
type of conflicting reactions may underlying attitudinal ambivalence could perhaps help explain 
these different results. Previous ambivalence research possibly measured different types of 
ambivalence caused by the specific manipulations, attitude objects, research cover stories, etc.  
For example, Jonas et al. (1997) as well as Sengupta and Johar (2002) potentially manipulated 
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manifest rather than anticipated ambivalence by providing information of a consumers’ 
association which could be seen as accurate and complete (i.e., no anticipation of conflicting 
reactions). In contrast, Armitage and Conner (2000) as well as Costarelli and Colloca (2004) 
asked about evaluations of an out-group without providing information, this could evoke 
anticipated ambivalence, especially when the respondents have no experience with the out-
group.  Based on theoretical arguments, we could argue that manifest ambivalent individuals 
display higher attitude-behavior consistency compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals. 
Individuals are spontaneously motivated to make sense of inconsistencies in order to arrive at an 
integrated evaluation (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989).  Accordingly, 
exposure to inconsistencies stimulates information processing, increasing the strength and the 
predictive ability of the attitude (Jonas et al., 1997; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Since 
manifest ambivalent individuals are confronted with positive and negative information, they will 
probably consider both in an effort to create an integrated judgment that is predictive of behavior 
(i.e., a strong attitude). Anticipated ambivalent individuals are knowledgeable of dominant items 
and merely anticipate on conflicting information. As an outcome, judgments can be expected to 
be less integrated and hence less predictive of behavior. 
Future research may also contribute by examining other attitude strength attributes as 
ambivalent attitudes are generally seen as weak attitudes (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2000; Bassili, 
1996; Conner et al., 2002; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). Manifest (versus 
anticipated) ambivalent attitudes could be for example more resistant to persuasion and more 
stable as these individuals are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions. Thus, manifest 
ambivalent attitudes could be stronger than anticipated ambivalent attitudes. 
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 Furthermore, researchers should continue to investigate the relationship between 
different types of ambivalence and other mechanisms to cope with ambivalence. Moreover, there 
are two basic forms of dealing with the negative feelings associated with ambivalence-associated 
discomfort (van Harreveld et al., 2009b); emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping. 
Emotion-focused coping (e.g., postponing the decision, downplaying the importance) involves 
the effort to feel better about an ambivalent choice without solving the problem itself (cf., 
reducing the ambivalence) whereas problem-focused coping (e.g., (biased) information 
processing, spreading WOM) involves eliminating the problem itself (cf., reducing the 
ambivalence). Another venue for future research is to investigate the defined types of 
ambivalence in relation to these coping forms. For example, when and under which 
circumstances will postponing an ambivalent decision (avoidant behavior) be more suited for 
manifest ambivalent individuals compared to really resolving the problem itself by, for example, 
biased information processing? And does the fact that anticipated ambivalent individuals have 
less intense ambivalence-associated negative feelings instigate that they will never try to deal 
with their ambivalence?  
We suggest ambivalence researchers to always measure the underlying conflicting 
reactions, next to measuring subjective ambivalence to identify whether individuals hold 
manifest ambivalent versus anticipated ambivalent attitudes. Our results once again suggest that 
the distinction between both types is substantial as both types of ambivalent individuals can feel 
differently, behave differently, and/or influence whether or not they will deal with their 
ambivalence (cf. reducing ambivalence) through different coping mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER IV: “WHEN BEING SURE THAT YOU ARE UNSURE 
PREDICTS BEHAVIOR” BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
AMBIVALENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 
 
This paper discerns two types of ambivalence: manifest ambivalence (knowing 
conflicting information) versus anticipated ambivalence (anticipating conflicting information). 
We hypothesize and provide evidence that, although being experienced as equally ambivalent, 
attitudes of manifest ambivalent individuals are more predictive of behavioral intentions and 
behavior compared to the ones of anticipated ambivalent individuals. This higher attitude-
behavior consistency can be explained by the fact that manifest (vs. anticipated) ambivalent 
individuals are more certain of their attitude, not because they feel their attitude is more correct, 
but because their attitude is more clear to them. To provide stronger evidence that attitude 
certainty underlies the relation between ambivalence type and attitude-behavior consistency, a 
final Experiment rules out the alternative explanation that manifest ambivalent individuals would 
spontaneously engage in ambivalence reduction and as a consequence would have a lower 
ambivalence level at the moment of posing an intention or behavior than anticipated ambivalent 
people. Taken together, the results of four studies shed a new light on the opposing perspectives 
in the ambivalence literature concerning the predictive power of ambivalent attitudes. 
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Attitudes are often seen as precursors of behavioral intentions and actual behavior. 
However, the predictive ability of attitudes is often invalidated in marketing as well as social 
psychology.  Indeed, not all attitudes predict behavior (for a review see Glasman & Albarracín, 
2006; Kraus, 1995). For example, someone who has a positive attitude toward organic coffee 
will not necessarily buy this coffee when being in the supermarket. By now, it is generally 
acknowledged that the extent to which attitudes predict behavior depends on the strength of the 
attitude. That is, strongly held attitudes are more predictive than weakly held ones (Krosnick & 
Petty, 1995). An attitude strength indicator which has received increasing attention is attitude 
ambivalence (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Thompson et al., 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 
2007). Attitude ambivalence can be defined as an attitude that is positive and negative at the 
same time (e.g. Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995). 
Especially in a marketing context, ambivalence is a very relevant variable. Indeed, every day 
individuals are confronted with an overload of product information which can be to some extent 
conflicting. That is, it is very likely that one will be faced with positive and negative information 
about a certain product leading to feelings of ambivalence (e.g. Sengupta & Johar, 2002; van 
Harreveld, Schneider, Nohlen & van der Pligt, 2012).  
Concerning the relation between attitude ambivalence and attitude-behavior consistency, 
several studies have shown that attitudinal ambivalence results in lower attitude-behavior 
consistency leading to the general assumption that ambivalent attitudes are weak in nature 
(Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2004; Thompson et al., 
1995; Zemborain & Johar, 2007). However, in contrast to these results, Jonas, Diehl & Brömer 
(1997) and Sengupta & Johar (2002) found that ambivalent attitudes lead to higher attitude-
behavior consistency, suggesting that ambivalent attitudes are strong. To help explain these 
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divergent research results and to get a better insight in when ambivalent attitudes can be 
expected to be a good predictor of behavior, we introduce type of ambivalence as an important 
determining variable. Thus, unlike previous research that mainly focused on the intensity of 
ambivalence, we propose that not all ambivalence is created equally and distinguish between two 
types of ambivalence: manifest versus anticipated ambivalence. That is, former research ignores 
that the same level of subjective ambivalence can be caused by different types of conflicting 
reactions (i.e., knowing versus anticipating conflicting information) as we have already seen in 
Chapter II & III of this dissertation. When consumers are well aware of both positive and 
negative reactions within their ambivalent attitude, it is called manifest ambivalence. However 
when people are not knowledgeable of any specific information opposite to their dominant 
reactions, they may be concerned that such information exists and anticipate it (Priester , Petty & 
Park, 2007). Hence, although consumers are only confronted with one-sided information (for 
example only positive information) about a product, they still may feel ambivalent toward the 
product due to the fact that they expect conflicting information (in this example negative 
information) about the product. That is called anticipated ambivalence. This distinction between 
ambivalence fed by knowing or anticipating conflicting information could possibly help explain 
opposing findings out of previous literature. As manifest ambivalent people are knowledgeable 
of their conflicting reactions whereas anticipated ambivalent people only expect but do not know 
conflicting reactions, manifest ambivalent individuals are likely to feel more certain of their 
attitude which in turn could induce more attitude-consistent behavior.  
In sum, the objective of this paper is (1) to investigate whether the type of ambivalence 
(manifest vs. anticipated) differentially affects attitude-behavior(al intention) consistency, and 
(2) whether attitude certainty underlies this difference. In a first Experiment, we investigated the 
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attitude-behavior relationship for our defined types of ambivalence: anticipated ambivalence 
(i.e., knowing only good features, but expecting bad features as well) and manifest ambivalence 
(i.e., knowing good and bad features). Experiment 2 focused on the difference in attitude 
certainty and two underlying constructs of attitude certainty: attitude clarity and attitude 
correctness for our defined types of ambivalence. In a third Experiment, we examined the 
mediating role of attitude certainty concerning the attitude-behavioral intention relation for our 
types of ambivalence. Finally, an alternative explanation for this effect (cf. spontaneously 
reducing the ambivalence for manifest ambivalent compared to anticipated ambivalence) has 
been scrutinized in a fourth Experiment. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Attitude Ambivalence & Attitude-Behavior(al intention) Consistency 
Attitudinal ambivalence has been treated as a measure of attitude strength with lower 
levels of ambivalence being associated with strong attitudes (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; 
Conner & Sparks, 2002; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Thompson et al., 1995; 
Zemborain & Johar, 2007). Strong attitudes are more persistent, resistant to attack, have a greater 
impact on thought, and are more predictive for behavior compared to weak attitudes (Krosnick & 
Petty, 1995). Therefore, low ambivalence is associated with attitudes that are more predictive of 
behavior (e.g., Armitage, 2003; Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & 
Colloca, 2007; Glasmann & Albarracín, 2006; Moore, 1973; 1980; Sparks et al., 2001; 
Thompson et al., 1995), more stable over time (e.g. Bargh et al., 1992; Basilli, 1996), less pliable 
(e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Basilli, 1996; Visser & Mirabile, 2004). In contrast, 
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ambivalence is in a way even a characteristic of a strong attitude, in the sense that ambivalent 
individuals engage in more effortful processing of information about the object (Jonas et al., 
1997; Maio et al., 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 
2009a; 2009b). Hence, as ambivalent attitudes are based upon discrepant evaluations, they 
should attenuate attitude-intention consistency. The common explanation resides in the fact that 
people want to resolve and escape from their ambivalence, so they are less likely to base their 
behavior on ambivalent attitudes. That is, conflicting evaluative dimensions increase the 
likelihood that attitudes and behavior are based on discrepant elements which should lead to 
lower attitude-behavior consistency.  
On the other hand, Jonas et al. (1997) and Sengupta & Johar (2002) provide evidence for 
ambivalent attitudes leading to higher attitude-behavior consistency. People are spontaneously 
motivated to make sense of inconsistencies in order to arrive at an integrated evaluation 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989).  Accordingly, exposure to inconsistent 
information causes the entire information set to be elaborated on and processed to a greater 
extent than consistent information. Both positive and negative items of information are likely to 
be carefully considered in relation to one another. As such the strength and the predictive ability 
of attitudes based upon inconsistent information may be higher (Jonas et al., 1997; Petty, 
Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995; Sengupta & Johar, 2002).  
Clearly, there are two opposing perspectives in the literature with respect to the predictive 
value of ambivalent attitudes. The type of conflicting reactions underlying attitudinal 
ambivalence could perhaps help explain these opposing results. People are spontaneously 
motivated to make sense of inconsistencies in order to arrive at an integrated evaluation 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989).  Accordingly, exposure to inconsistencies 
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stimulates information processing, increasing the strength and the predictive ability of the 
attitude (Jonas et al., 1997; Petty et al., 1995). Since manifest ambivalent people are aware of 
positive and negative information, they will probably consider both in an effort to create an 
integrated judgment that is predictive of behavior (i.e., a strong attitude). Anticipated ambivalent 
people are aware of either only positive items or only negative items and merely anticipate on 
opposite-valenced information4. As an outcome, judgments can be expected to be less integrated 
and hence less predictive of behavior.  
 
Attitude Ambivalence & Attitude Certainty  
Ambivalence and certainty tend to correlate negatively leading to the general assumption 
that ambivalence is associated with uncertainty (Basilli, 1996; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995; 
Jonas et al., 1997; Petrocelli, Tormala & Rucker, 2007; Petty, Tormala, Briñol & Jarvis, 2006; 
Tormala & Rucker, 2007). Moreover, ambivalent attitudes often show characteristics similar to 
attitudes held with low certainty (e.g. lower attitude-behavior consistency and/or lower resistance 
to persuasion; Clarskon, Tormala & Rucker, 2008). However, former research (e.g. Clarkson et 
al., 2008; Gross et al., 1995; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Thompson et al., 1995; Petrocelli et al., 
2007) pointed out that attitude ambivalence and attitude certainty are empirically and 
conceptually distinct. For example, one can be highly certain of both the positive (e.g., tastes 
                                                          
4 In this paper when talking about anticipated ambivalence, consumers are always aware of positive 
information (cf. dominant reactions) and anticipate/expect negative information (cf. conflicting reactions). 
That is, since valence did not interact with any of the dependent variables in former research (Priester et 
al., 2007), only positive attributes were used as dominant reactions in our Experiments.  However, 
switching the valence of the dominant and conflicting reactions will not alter our predictions in any of our 
Experiments.  
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good) and negative (e.g., unhealthy nature) features of fast food. Hence, one can feel certain of 
his or her ambivalent attitude toward a given attitude object. 
According to Petrocelli et al. (2007), attitude certainty is not a monolithic construct, but 
consists of two different dimensions with unique antecedents and consequences. First, attitude 
correctness refers to the extent to which one feels confident that his/her attitude is correct, valid, 
or justified. Individuals with high attitude correctness not only believe that their attitude is 
correct, but also think that other people should have the same attitude. Second, attitude clarity is 
the extent to which people know what their true attitude toward a topic is and to what extent this 
attitude is clear to them. Although attitude clarity and correctness often correlate (e.g., Petrocelli 
et al., 2007), they are conceptually distinct. For example, one might be quite certain what one’s 
true attitude (cf. attitude clarity) is (e.g., I know I like that movie), without being certain of the 
correctness of this attitude (e.g., but everyone else seemed to dislike it, so maybe I missed 
something; Tormala & Rucker, 2007). Moreover, although attitude clarity might be seen as the 
inverse of attitude ambivalence, they are distinct. An ambivalent person may be convinced that 
his conflicted attitude represents what (s)he really thinks or is warranted given the available 
information (Petrocelli et al., 2007). For example, one might be very sure that one’s ambivalent 
attitude toward fast food (e.g., tastes good but is unhealthy) is one’s true attitude and is very 
clear. 
Manifest ambivalent individuals evaluate an object based solely upon manifest reactions 
(both dominant and conflicting), possibly leading to higher attitude certainty because these 
individuals are knowledgeable of positive and negative information at the moment of forming an 
attitude. In contrast, anticipated ambivalent individuals are unaware of any conflicting 
information at the moment of forming an attitude, but only anticipate that such information will 
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exist, resulting in a lower attitude certainty. Although both types of ambivalent individuals will 
experience about the same levels of subjective ambivalence, we expect differences in attitude 
certainty.  
Furthermore, it seems likely that anticipated ambivalent people are less likely to know 
their true attitude (cf. attitude clarity) toward a focal product because they anticipate, but are not 
really knowledgeable of any conflicting information. They expect that there will be counter 
attitudinal information about the product without being aware of it or being able to define it. 
Hence, it is not really clear to them what to truly think about the focal product. In contrast, 
manifest ambivalent individuals are well aware of conflicting information and are able to define 
it. Therefore, they could perceive their attitude to be clearer compared to anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. With respect to attitude correctness, no differences between manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals are expected. Anticipated ambivalent individuals can be as convinced as 
manifest ambivalent individuals that their attitude is the correct/valid one given the available 
information, and that people confronted with the same information will have the same attitude. 
Hence, the lower attitude certainty for anticipated ambivalent people compared to manifest 
ambivalent people is likely to be driven by a difference in attitude clarity between ambivalence 
types rather than a difference in attitude correctness. 
Moreover, attitude certainty is traditionally seen as a crystallizing agent, boosting an 
attitude’s durability and impact (for a review see Tormala & Rucker, 2007). Attitudes held with 
high, rather than low, certainty yield greater attitude-behavior consistency (e.g. Fazio & Zanna, 
1978; Glasmann & Albarracín, 2006; Rucker & Petty, 2004, Tormala, Clarkson & Petty, 2006; 
Tormala & Petty, 2004a; 2004b; Tormala & Rucker, 2007), increase attitude persistence (e.g. 
Bassili, 1996; Bizer, Tormala, Rucker & Petty, 2006) and increase resistance to persuasive 
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attacks (e.g. Bassilli, 1996; Petrocelli et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 2006; Tormala & Petty, 2002; 
2004a; 2004b). In other words, increasing attitude certainty is perceived to inherently strengthen 
attitudes. Hence, as we expect manifest ambivalent people to be more certain of their attitude 
compared to anticipated ambivalent people, they may also display higher attitude-behavior(al 
intention) correspondence. 
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
A total of four Experiments address the questions (1) whether the two types of 
ambivalence differentially influence behavior(al intention) and (2) whether this difference can be 
explained by a difference in attitude certainty. Our Pilot Study starts off with demonstrating that 
manifest ambivalent individuals show a higher attitude-behavior consistency than anticipated 
ambivalent individuals. To pinpoint the underlying reason for this difference, Experiment 1 
reveals that manifest (vs. anticipated) ambivalent people are more certain of their attitudes and 
that this certainty is driven by attitude clarity rather than attitude correctness. Experiment 2 
builds further on the first two studies and shows that attitude certainty indeed mediates the 
relation between ambivalence type and attitude-behavior consistency. Finally, Experiment 3 
refutes a possible alternative explanation for the effect of ambivalence type on attitude-behavior 
consistency. That is, as results have shown in Chapters II & III of this dissertation, manifest 
ambivalent consumers are motivated to solve their ambivalence (cf. reducing) by spreading 
negative WOM or engaging in negative information processing. In a similar vein, manifest (vs 
anticipated) ambivalent consumers could be more motivated (due to the more intense 
ambivalence-associated feelings) to cope spontaneously with their ambivalence (cf. reduce 
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ambivalence), leading to a lower ambivalence at the moment of expressing or exerting the 
behavior(al intention) and as a consequence an attitude which is more predictive of behavior(al 
intention). Together these findings provide strong evidence for the idea that the type of 
underlying conflicting reactions (manifest versus anticipated) feeding the feelings of 
ambivalence could help explain opposing perspectives in the literature on the predictive nature of 
ambivalent attitudes. 
 
PILOT STUDY 
 The main question of this paper is whether the distinction between manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent helps to shed light on the divergent results in earlier research concerning 
how good a predictor ambivalent attitudes are. Specifically, whereas some researchers reported 
on reduced predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes, whereas others reported on an increase in 
predictive ability, we argue that the underlying type of conflicting reactions could help explain 
these different results. Since manifest ambivalent people are confronted with inconsistent 
positive and negative items of information, they can be expected to consider both in an effort to 
create an integrated judgment that is predictive of behavior (i.e., a strong attitude). Anticipated 
ambivalent people are only aware of positive information and merely anticipate on possible 
negative information. As an outcome, judgments could be less integrated and hence less 
predictive of behavior. Hence, the objective of this Experiment is to investigate the attitude-
behavior consistency for manifest ambivalent attitudes versus anticipated ambivalent attitudes. 
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Method 
Participants.  Ninety-three business graduates (39 female and 54 male), between the ages 
of 20 and 28 years (M = 22.49, SD = 1.19) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions 
(univalence (control), manifest ambivalence, anticipated ambivalence).  
Procedure.  Only business graduates, who would go on the job market within 2 months 
and who were actively looking for a job, were selected to participate in this Pilot Study. The 
cover story was that they had to evaluate the attractiveness of a ‘real’ job description. They were 
confronted with a job description (containing positive and/or negative elements) provided by 
someone who graduated last year, at the same school respondents were studying at the moment, 
and was currently working in a similar position in the business as the one (s)he described. Level 
of subjective ambivalence and manifest/anticipated conflicting reactions was manipulated by 
varying the amount of positive and negative attributes respondents received about the job (cf. 
Priester et al., 2007) and varying the opinion of the one providing the job description (cf. Priester 
& Petty, 2001) resulting in three conditions (i.e. univalent, manifest ambivalent and anticipated 
ambivalent). We used six equally important attributes5 to compose our attribute pool (see Table 
1), out of which we randomly selected the attributes for our manipulations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 To this end, we pretested 20 attributes in the context of a job on their importance with 25 business 
graduates (13 female and 12 male), age ranging from 21 to 24 years (M = 21.96, SD = .89). We selected 
the six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,144)=1.36, p=.243). 
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Table 1: Attribute descriptions used in Pilot Study (job description) 
Positive traits Negative traits 
Pleasant working environment Less pleasant working environment 
Much job variation Less job variation 
High wage compared to others in the sector Low wage compared to others in the sector 
Many personal growth opportunities Few personal growth opportunities 
Many fringe benefits Few fringe benefits 
Easy to reach Hard to reach 
 
Since valence did not interact with any of the dependent variables in former research 
(Priester et al., 2007), only positive attributes were used as dominant reactions in our 
Experiments. In the univalent condition (few manifest and anticipated conflicting reactions), 
respondents were (i) provided with four positive attributes and no negative ones and (ii) were 
told that the one describing the job taught there were no negative features at all about the job. In 
the anticipated ambivalent condition (anticipated but few manifest conflicting reactions), 
individuals were (i) confronted with only one positive attribute and, in order to induce 
anticipation of conflicting reactions, (ii) were told that the one describing the job was convinced 
that there will be negative features about the job which (s)he, however, has not experienced yet. 
In the manifest ambivalent condition (manifest but few anticipated conflicting reactions), 
respondents received (i) four positive and two negative attributes and (ii) were informed that the 
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one describing the job thought there were really no other negative features about the job. In line 
with earlier attitude research (e.g. Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), these manipulations were 
constructed in a way so respondents do not differ in subjective ambivalence levels toward the 
focal object. The latter is essential, so that the differences found in our Experiments can be 
ascribed to the difference in the underlying nature of the conflicting reactions feeding the 
ambivalence rather than a mere difference in subjective ambivalence level.  
Attitude (α= .97), subjective ambivalence (α= .90), manifest positive/negative reactions, 
and anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.94, αneg=.94) were assessed on 11-point scales 
(Priester et al., 2007). In line with earlier research (Priester & Petty, 1996; 2001; Priester et al., 
2007), individuals completed two separate measures in order to provide independent assessments 
of both their positive and negative reactions toward the job description (0= not at all 
positive/negative; 10= completely positive/negative). The number of positive and negative 
reactions was transformed to equivalent measures of conflicting and dominant reactions. The 
highest score on one of these two scales was categorized as being the dominant reactions and the 
lowest as the conflicting reactions. Whenever the numbers of positive and negative reactions 
were equivalent, the negative reactions were defined as the dominant reactions and the positives 
as the conflicting ones according to the negativity bias (Herr, Kardes & Kim, 1991; Ito, Larsen, 
Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; Mizerski, 1982). Defining the negatives as conflicting reactions 
instead of dominant reactions in the former situation did not alter any of the results. Finally, 
potential applicants could provide their e-mail address if they were interested in applying for the 
described job as this firm was still looking for applicants. This response served as an indicator of 
actual behavior (Barber, 1998; Highhouse, Lievens & Sinar, 2003). 
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Results  
Manipulation checks.  In order to assess whether the manipulations were successful, we 
examined the scores on subjective ambivalence (F(2,90)=16.58, p<.001), manifest conflicting 
reactions (F(2,90)=33.03, p<.001), and anticipated conflicting reactions (F(2,90)=5.29, p=.007) 
in each of the experimental conditions by a series of one-way ANOVA’s. Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests (summarized in Table 2) indicate that the manipulations were successful. Hence, although 
individuals in the anticipated ambivalent and manifest ambivalent condition have the same 
subjective ambivalence level, there is a difference in the type of conflicting reactions underlying 
the feeling of evaluative conflict. In the anticipated ambivalent condition subjective ambivalence 
is largely fed by anticipated conflicting reactions, whereas in the manifest ambivalent condition 
especially manifest conflicting reactions appear to drive subjective ambivalence.  
Table 2: Manipulation checks, Pilot Study, means as a function of condition 
Condition N 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 32 4.01a 2.06 2.62a 2.06 7.47a 2.29 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
31 6.90b 2.19 3.27a 2.50 9.03b 2.56 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
30 6.76b 2.47 6.94b 2.21 7.05a 2.67 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
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Attitude-behavior relationship.  
  We conducted a logistic regression with behavior (not providing e-mail=0/providing e-
mail=1) as dependent variable and attitude, two dummy variables created for our manipulations 
(with the anticipated ambivalent condition as reference category; anticipatedVSunivalent & 
anticipatedVSmanifest), and the interaction of these two dummy variables with attitude as 
independent variables (see Table 3). Both manipulations*attitude interaction regression 
coefficients were (marginally) significant concluding that there is a significant difference 
concerning the attitude-behavior relationship between on the one hand anticipated ambivalent 
and manifest ambivalent condition (β=1.536, p=.039) and on the other hand the anticipated 
ambivalent and univalent condition (β=1.712, p=.064). There is no difference regarding the 
predictive ability of manifest ambivalent and univalent attitudes for behavior as the interaction 
coefficient between univalentVSmanifest and the attitude is non-significant (β=-.176, p=.874) 
when conducting a similar logistic regression but with the univalent condition as reference 
category. Based on the regression coefficients of this logistic regression, we calculated the 
probabilities that the attitude will guide to ‘real’ behavior’. Figure 1 nicely shows that anticipated 
ambivalent attitudes are less predictive of ‘real’ behavior compared to manifest ambivalent 
attitudes and univalent attitudes, while the latter two do not differ.  
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Table 3: Logistic regression (anticipated ambivalence as reference category), Pilot Study 
  
Behavior 
β P 
Attitude  .284 .329 
AnticipatedVSunivalent  -11.226 .082 
AnticipatedVS manifest 
Attitude*AnticipatedVSunivalent 
Attitude*AnticipatedVSmanifest 
Constant 
 
-9.552 
1.712 
1.536 
-2.088 
.040 
.064 
.039 
.276 
 
Figure 1: Probabilities that attitude will guide behavior by condition, Pilot Study 
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Discussion 
The results of this Pilot Study show that manifest ambivalent attitudes are more 
predictive of behavior compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes, even to the extent that they 
are not different from univalent attitudes. Hence, it seems that the underlying type of conflicting 
reactions (manifest versus anticipated) which are at the heart of the experienced ambivalence 
have an influence on the predictive ability of the accompanying ambivalent attitude on behavior. 
However, we want to further investigate whether attitude certainty could mediate the relation 
between ambivalence type and attitude-behavioral intention consistency.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Before focussing on the mediating role of attitude certainty, Experiment 1 digs into the 
relationship between the defined types of ambivalence and attitude certainty. The objective of 
this first Experiment is twofold. First, we test the hypothesis that manifest ambivalent consumers 
are more certain of their attitude compared to anticipated ambivalent ones. Second, we 
investigate whether this difference originates in attitude clarity and/or attitude correctness. Doing 
so, we establish how the underlying structure (cf. type of conflicting reactions) of ambivalent 
attitude determines the certainty with which ambivalent people hold their attitudes.  We predict 
that, although having the same subjective ambivalence level, manifest ambivalent individuals are 
more certain of their attitude compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals which is mediated 
by a difference in attitude clarity rather than attitude correctness. 
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Method 
Participants.  Ninety-three respondents (49 female and 44 male), between the ages of 18 
and 30 years (M = 21.00, SD = 2.41), participated in exchange for monetary compensation and 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to our Pilot Study, except for some 
modifications. First, we used a different product stimulus: MP3-player. Respondents were 
instructed to imagine a situation where they intend to buy a new MP3 player and received a set 
of attributes (provided by their best friend) that described a certain MP3 player. They were asked 
to regard these attributes as equally important (cf. Priester & Petty, 1996; Priester et al., 2007). 
The attributes describing our focal attitude object were randomly selected out of an attribute pool 
in the context of MP3 players as displayed in Table 4. Second, respondents rated their attitude 
certainty, clarity, and correctness. Attitude certainty was assessed (α =.80) by how (i) certain 
respondents are of and (ii) how much confidence respondents have in their attitude toward the 
MP3-player on 11-point scales (Rucker & Petty, 2004). The attitude clarity scale (α=.89) covered 
the extent to which (i) respondents are certain what their true attitude toward the MP3-player is, 
(ii) respondents are certain that the expressed attitude toward the MP3-player reflects their true 
thoughts and feelings, (iii) respondents’ true attitude toward the MP3-player is clear to them, and 
(iv) respondents are certain that their expressed attitude toward the MP3-player reflects their real 
attitude (Petrocelli et al., 2007). The attitude correctness scale (α=.79) covered the extent to 
which respondents (i) are certain that their attitude toward the MP3-player is the correct attitude 
to have, (ii) think other people should have the same attitude toward the MP3-player, and (iii) are 
certain that of all possible attitudes one might have toward the MP3-player, their attitude reflects 
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the right way to think and feel about it (Petrocelli et al., 2007). The order of the clarity and 
correctness items was randomized.  
Table 4: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 1 (MP3-player) 
Positive traits Negative traits 
Good sound quality Poor sound quality 
High display quality (pixels) Low display quality (pixels) 
Large memory capacity Small memory capacity 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Many connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
No connection options with for example Hifi, 
car audio, etc. 
Many wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc. 
No wireless connection options like 
Bluetooth, Wifi, etc 
 
Attitude (α =.97), subjective ambivalence (α= .80), individual assessments of 
positive/negative reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, and anticipated 
positive/negative reactions (αpos=.89, αneg=.86) were measured and transformed as in our Pilot 
Study.  
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Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence (F(2,90)=9.41, 
p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,90)=8.83, p<.001), and anticipated conflicting 
reactions (F(2,90)=7.25, p=.001). Bonferroni post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 5) indicate 
that our manipulations were successful.  
Table 5: Manipulation checks, Experiment 1, means as a function of condition 
Condition N 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 32 4.08a 1.86 4.28a 2.07 4.56a 1.95 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
31 6.16b 1.95 4.77a 2.23 6.37b 2.24 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
30  5.51b 2.03 6.83b 2.16 4.57a 1.92 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
     
Attitude Certainty, Clarity and Correctness.  Results of three one-way ANOVA’s 
revealed an effect of condition on attitude certainty (F(2,90)=9.08, p<.001) and attitude clarity 
(F(2,90)=17.24, p<.001) but not on attitude correctness (F(2,90)=2.40, p=.097). Bonferonni post-
hoc tests confirmed our prediction that anticipated ambivalent participants (M=6.29) are less 
certain of their attitude compared to manifest ambivalent (M=8.30, p=.002) and univalent 
participants (M=8.37, p=.001) while the latter two did not differ (p=1.000). The same pattern was 
observed for attitude clarity. That is, anticipated ambivalent participants (M=5.27) are less 
certain what their true attitude toward the MP3-player is compared to manifest ambivalent 
(M=7.20, p<.001) and univalent participants (M=6.60, p<.001) while the latter two did not differ 
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(p=.234). Regarding attitude correctness, anticipated ambivalent respondents (M=5.45) are as 
convinced as manifest ambivalent respondents (M=5.89) and univalent respondents (M=6.19) 
that their attitude is correct, valid or justified. Attitude clarity and correctness correlate positively 
(r=.573, p<.001). 
Attitude clarity mediates the difference in attitude certainty between manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent individuals. Independent regressions show that the dummy variable 
created for anticipated versus manifest ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 respectively) significantly 
affects both attitude certainty (β=.39, t(61)=3.26, p=.002) and attitude clarity (β=.58, t(61)=5.41, 
p<.001). Attitude clarity also significantly predicts attitude certainty (β=.65, t(61)=6.51, p<.001). 
In a simultaneous regression predicting attitude certainty, attitude clarity continues to be a 
significant predictor (β=.63, t(61)=5.16, p<.001), whereas the dummy variable does not (β=.03, 
t(61)=.22, p=.827). The mediating role of attitude clarity was further assessed by a bootstrapping 
test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Because the 95% confidence interval of 
the indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = .85, upper bound 95% CI = 
3.35), we can conclude that attitude clarity significantly mediates the effect of ambivalence type 
on attitude certainty. An alternative model (cf. attitude certainty as a mediator of the difference 
in attitude clarity between both ambivalence types) is not dicussed throughout this Chapter out of 
theoretical constraints. That is, attitude certainty consist out of two different dimensions; attitude 
clarity and attitude correctness (Petrocelli et al., 2007). A change in one of these two or both 
dimensions will lead to a change in ‘overall’ attitude certainty. However, a change in attitude 
certainty can lead to a change in both of these dimensions or only one of them as they are 
conceptually distinct. That is, the difference in attitude certainty between manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent consumers will therefore not affect attitude clarity per se. It can as well 
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only affect attitude correctness. So consistent with attitude certainty theory concerning attitude 
clarity and correctness (Petrocelli et al., 2007), we opted to only look at attitude clarity as a 
mediator of the difference in attitude certainty between our defined ambivalence types instead of 
discussing the alternative model.  
 
Discussion 
When people are well aware of both positive and negative reactions (cf. manifest 
ambivalence) toward an attitude object, they have sufficient information to hold an attitude with 
high certainty. However, when an ambivalent attitude is fed by anticipated conflicting reactions 
(cf. anticipated ambivalence), it seems harder to hold an attitude with high certainty. This 
difference in attitude certainty between anticipated and manifest ambivalent people is driven by a 
difference in attitude clarity rather than a difference in attitude correctness. Anticipated 
ambivalent consumers (compared to manifest ambivalent ones) do not really know any 
conflicting information about the product and hence are less likely to know their true attitude 
(i.e., attitude clarity). Hence, it is not really clear to them what to truly think about the product. In 
contrast, manifest ambivalent individuals are well aware of conflicting information. Therefore, 
they perceive their attitude to reflect what they truly think about the attitude object. With respect 
to attitude correctness, there are no differences between manifest and anticipated ambivalent 
individuals. Anticipated ambivalent individuals are as convinced as manifest ambivalent 
individuals that their attitude is the correct/valid one given the available information, that is, they 
believe that people confronted with the same information will have the same attitude as they 
have. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The question remains whether the difference in attitude certainty between these types of 
ambivalence could help explain the difference in attitude-behavior consistency between manifest 
and anticipated ambivalent attitudes. Experiment 2 was set up to investigate the influence of 
these two types of ambivalence on the attitude-behavioral intention relation and the mediating 
role of attitude certainty within this story. In the Pilot Study, we established that manifest 
ambivalent attitudes are more predictive of actual behaviour compared to anticipated ambivalent 
attitudes. Furthermore, attitude certainty may act as a crystallizing agent yielding greater 
attitude-behavioral intention consistency. That is, as anticipated ambivalent attitudes are held 
with less certainty (see Experiment 1) compared to manifest ambivalent and univalent attitudes, 
they are likely to be less predictive of subsequent behavioral intention. Hence, we expect attitude 
certainty to mediate the relation between ambivalence type and attitude-behavioral intention 
consistency.   
 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred forty-one respondents (76 female and 65 male), between the 
ages of 17 and 30 years (M = 20.65, SD = 2.44), participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 1, but some 
modifications were made to enhance the generalizability of the findings. First, we used a 
different product stimulus (digital camera) to generalize across products. Second, instead of 
instructing participants to consider the attributes as equally important (Priester & Petty, 1996; 
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Priester et al., 2007), we used six equally important attributes6 to compose our attribute pool (see 
Table 6). Similar to our Pilot Study, we randomly selected the attributes for our manipulations 
out of this pool. Finally, at the end of the questionnaire we assessed the likelihood of buying the 
digital camera using a single item 11-point scale. 
Attitude (α=.98), attitude certainty (α=.83), attitude clarity (α=.94), attitude correctness 
(α=.77), subjective ambivalence (α=.80), individual assessments of positive and negative 
reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, anticipated positive/negative reactions (αpos=.88, 
αneg=.90) were measured and transformed as in Experiment 1. 
Table 6: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 2 (digital camera) 
Positive traits Negative traits 
High resolution (pixels) Low resolution (pixels) 
Long range (optical zoom) Short range (optical zoom) 
Very qualitative lens Less qualitative lens 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
High memory capacity Low memory capacity 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
 
                                                          
6 To this end, we pretested 15 attributes in the context of digital cameras on their importance with 31 
respondents (15 female and 16 male), age ranging from 17 to 30 years (M = 25.48, SD = 4.11). We 
selected the six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,180)=1.48, p=.199). 
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Results  
Manipulation checks.  We examined the scores on subjective ambivalence 
(F(2,138)=4.75, p=.010), manifest conflicting reactions (F(2,138)=4.26, p=.016), and anticipated 
conflicting reactions (F(2,138)=8.79, p<.001) in each of the experimental conditions by a series 
of one-way ANOVA’s as in Experiment 1. Bonferroni post-hoc tests (summarized in Table 7) 
indicate that the manipulations were again successful.  
Table 7: Manipulation checks, Experiment 2, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 46 4.26a 2.18 5.17a 2.22 5.73a 2.64 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
50 5.41b 2.13 5.18a 2.76 7.08b 1.98 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
45 5.35b 1.73 6.69b 2.59 5.19a 2.16 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
 
Attitude Certainty, Clarity and Correctness.  Results of three one-way ANOVA’s 
revealed an effect of condition on attitude certainty (F(2,138)=5.63, p=.004) and attitude clarity 
(F(2,138)=5.73, p=.004) but not on attitude correctness (F(2,138)=2.23, p=.112). Identical to 
Experiment 1, Bonferonni post-hoc tests denote that anticipated ambivalent participants 
(M=6.76) are (marginally) less certain of their attitude compared to manifest ambivalent 
(M=7.87, p=.076) and univalent participants (M=8.35, p=.004) while the latter two did not differ 
(p=1.000). With respect to attitude clarity, anticipated ambivalent participants (M=5.05) are less 
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certain what their true attitude toward the MP3-player is compared to manifest ambivalent 
(M=6.21, p=.009) and univalent participants (M=6.12, p=.018) while the latter two did not differ 
(p=1.000). Regarding attitude correctness, anticipated ambivalent respondents (M=5.53) are as 
convinced as manifest ambivalent respondents (M=5.53) and univalent respondents (M=6.12) 
that their attitude is correct, valid or justified. Attitude clarity and correctness correlate positively 
(r=.694, p<.001). 
Similar to Experiment 1, attitude clarity mediates the differences in attitude certainty 
between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals. Independent regressions show that the 
dummy variable created for anticipated versus manifest ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 
respectively) significantly affects both attitude certainty (β=.22, t(95)=2.14, p=.035) and attitude 
clarity (β=.30, t(95)=3.00, p=.003). Attitude clarity also significantly predicts attitude certainty 
(β=.75, t(95)=10.76, p<.001). In a simultaneous regression predicting attitude certainty, attitude 
clarity continues to be a significant predictor (β=.75, t(95)=10.24, p<.001), whereas the dummy 
variable does not (β=-.01, t(95)=-.07, p=.941). The mediating role of attitude clarity was assessed 
by a bootstrapping test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Because the 95% 
confidence interval of the indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = .42, upper 
bound 95% CI = 2.00), attitude clarity significantly mediates the effect of ambivalence type on 
attitude certainty. 
Attitude-intention relationship.  In order to look at differences for attitude-intention 
relationship, the Pearson correlation coefficients between the attitude toward the digital camera 
and the intention to buy it were compared, similar to earlier research (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Tormala & Petty, 2002; Jonas et al., 1997; Sengupta & Johar, 2002), for the participants in the 
univalent, manifest ambivalent and anticipated ambivalent condition. To this end, the Pearson 
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correlation coefficients for each condition were first converted to a normally distributed variable 
by a Fisher’s z transformation. Comparing these values then indicates that the correlation was 
significantly lower in the anticipated ambivalent condition (r=.360, p=.010) than it was in either 
the manifest ambivalent condition (r=.876, p<.001; z=4.62, p<.001) or the univalent condition 
(r=.842, p<.001; z=4.03, p<.001). The manifest ambivalent condition and univalent condition did 
not differ from each other (z=.06, p=.548). Hence, although attitudes and behavioral intentions 
were highly correlated overall (r=.780, p<.001), this relationship is moderated by ambivalence 
type. 
To examine the degree to which the difference in attitude-behavioral intention 
correspondence between conditions is attributable to differences in attitude certainty, we 
conducted regression analyses in which attitude-behavioral intention correspondence7 was 
treated as the criterion and the different type of ambivalence as predictor. This enables us to 
scrutinize the extent to which our different ambivalence types predict intentions and whether this 
remained significant when controlling for attitude certainty. We began by looking at 
ambivalence type (2 dummy variables with anticipated ambivalent condition as reference 
category; anticipatedvsmanifest & anticipatedvsunivalent) predicting attitude-behavioral 
intention correspondence. The results replicated the simple correlation findings. That is, the 
‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ dummy variable (β=-.31, t(138)=-3.47, p=.001) as well as the 
‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variable (β=-.41, t(138)=-4.56, p<.001) predict attitude-
intention correspondence. That is, manifest ambivalent and univalent attitudes are more 
                                                          
7 Attitude-intention correspondence was calculated by the absolute difference between the score on the 
attitude toward the digital camera scale and the score on the intention to buy the digital camera scale (both 
on 11-point scales; cf. |Attitude-Intention|). Hence, higher values indicate less attitude-intention 
correspondence. 
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predictive of behavioral intention compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes. The next step 
was to demonstrate that attitude certainty also predicted attitude-behavioral intention 
correspondence, which should be the case if attitude certainty plays an important role in the 
attitude-behavioral intention effect. Therefore, another regression showed that attitude-
behavioral intention correspondence was predicted by attitude certainty (β=-.60, t(139)=-8.84, 
p<.001). This reveals that attitudes indeed become more predictive of behavioral intention when 
attitude certainty increases. Finally, in a third step of the same regression analysis, we added the 
original ‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ and ‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variables interaction and 
found that both still predicted attitude-behavioral intention correspondence but were reduced in 
absolute size (β=-.20, t(137)=-2.61, p=.010 & β=-.25, t(137)=-3.17, p=.002, respectively). In 
short, when we controlled for the attitude certainty, the ‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ and 
‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variables remained significant but reduced in absolute size, 
consistent with the notion that certainty plays a key role in determing attitude-behavioral 
consistency for our different types of ambivalence. 
Furthermore, this difference in attitude-behavioral intention correspondence between 
manifest and anticipated ambivalence seems to be partially mediated by attitude certainty. That 
is, independent regressions show that the dummy variable created for anticipated versus manifest 
ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 respectively) significantly affects both attitude-intention 
correspondence (β=-.31, t(95)=-3.18, p=.002) and attitude certainty (β=.22, t(95)=2.14, p=.035). 
Attitude certainty also significantly predicts attitude-intention correspondence (β=-.63, t(95)=-
7.71, p<.001). In a simultaneous regression predicting attitude-intention correspondence, attitude 
certainty continues to be a significant predictor (β=-.58, t(95)=-7.20, p<.001), whereas the 
dummy variable remains significant but is reduced in absolute size (β=-.19, t(95)=-2.30, p=.024). 
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The mediating role of attitude certainty was assessed by a bootstrapping test (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Because the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect does 
not contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = -1.00, upper bound 95% CI = -.04), we can conclude 
attitude certainty significantly mediates the effect of ambivalence type on attitude intention 
correspondence.          
 
Discussion 
This study replicates and extends the findings of our Pilot Study and Experiment 1. That 
is, manifest ambivalent individuals, compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals, are less 
certain of their attitude. Importantly, manifest ambivalent attitudes are more predictive of 
behavioral intention compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes, even to the extent that they are 
not different from univalent attitudes. This relation between ambivalence type and attitude-
behavioral intention correspondence is partially mediated by a difference in attitude certainty. 
Hence, it seems that the underlying type of conflicting reactions (manifest versus anticipated), 
which are at the heart of the experienced ambivalence, have an influence on the predictive ability 
of the accompanying ambivalent attitude on behavioral intention. On the one hand, when 
ambivalence is fed by conflicting reactions which one knows (cf. manifest conflicting reactions), 
one’s attitude toward the attitude object is more clear leading to a higher attitude certainty. As a 
consequence, consumers will base their behavioral intention upon this attitude because they 
believe it reflects what they truly think about the attitude object and they can be certain of it. On 
the other hand, when  feelings of ambivalence are fed by anticipated conflicting reactions, it is 
harder to know whether or not this is one’s true attitude toward the attitude object and hence 
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more difficult to hold an attitude with high certainty. One expects conflicting information about a 
product, but is not able to define or specify it. So, when stating an intention to buy this product, 
anticipated ambivalent consumers will rely less on their attitude as they are not sure whether this 
attitude reflects what they truly think.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The objective of Experiment 3 is to rule out an alternative explanation for the differential 
attitude-behavior(ial intention) correspondence between manifest and anticipated ambivalence, 
as found in the previous Experiments. Ambivalence is often experienced as aversive and 
unpleasant (Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), especially when both 
positive and negative components of the attitude object are simultaneously salient and accessible 
(Hass et al., 1992; Newby-Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002). Only in this case, the ambivalent 
attitude holder is aware of his or her conflicting reactions (de Liver, van der Pligt & Wigboldus, 
2007; van Harreveld et al., 2009b). This implies that, since only manifest ambivalent individuals 
are aware of both dominant and conflicting components, they could experience more intense 
ambivalence aversion as compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals, for whom conflicting 
information is anticipated but unknown at that time. This was verified in Chapter II of this 
dissertation in which was shown that manifest ambivalent individuals experience more intense 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals. 
 Because ambivalence is aversive, ambivalent people want to get rid of this feeling (Clark 
et al., 2008; Hass et al., 1992; Lau-Gesk, 2005; Nordgren et al., 2006; Nowlis, Kahn & Dhar, 
2002; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b), for example by scrutinizing thoroughly any 
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information that enables them to get rid of that discomfort (Jonas et al., 1997; Maio et al., 1996; 
Nordgren et al., 2006; Sengupta & Johar, 2002; Van Harreveld et al., 2009b) or by biased 
systematic processing (focusing on one side of the evaluative conflict. Hence, the aversive nature 
of ambivalence motivates individuals to get rid of that discomfort (Nordgren et al., 2006; van 
Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b). 
As manifest ambivalent individuals experience more discomfort from their ambivalence 
(cf. Chapter II), they could be more motivated to reduce their ambivalence. Chapters II & III 
showed that they indeed do so by spreading more negative WOM and by focussing on negative 
information. Because manifest ambivalent people are so eager to reduce their ambivalence, they 
could perhaps also spontaneously - that is, without an external trigger such as a conversation or 
additional information - deal with their ambivalence (cf. reduce it). If so, manifest ambivalent 
consumers may have already spontaneously reduced their ambivalence before they exert a 
behavior or indicate a behavioral intention, leading to an attitude which is no longer ambivalent 
in nature and, hence, less ambivalent than the attitude of anticipated ambivalent consumers who 
have not spontaneously reduced their ambivalence. At that moment, the attitude of manifest 
ambivalent consumers could approach ‘univalence’ and, hence, be more predictive of behavior. 
In that sense, it is maybe not the underlying type of conflicting reactions feeding the ambivalence 
and/or the difference in attitude certainty that drives the correspondence between the different 
ambivalent attitudes and behavior(al intentions), but rather a difference in ambivalence level 
between both types of ambivalence at the moment of expressing an intention or exerting a 
behavior.  
 
 178 
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and sixty-one respondents (112 female and 49 male), between 
the ages of 18 and 30 years (M = 21.80, SD = 2.83), participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation.  
Procedure.  The procedure was conceptually similar to Experiment 2, except for the 
following modifications. First, we used a different product (notebook) which was described in 
the different manipulations by randomly selecting six equally important attributes8 out of our 
attribute pool (see Table 8). Second, similar to the procedure of Nordgren et al. (2006), 
ambivalence aversion was assessed by asking respondents to what extent the words irritation, 
frustration, and discontentment described their negative feelings toward the notebook on five-
point scales. These three items (α=.88) were presented alongside positive and neutral emotions, 
so as not to arouse suspicion in our participants. Finally, immediately before assessing the 
intention to buy the described notebook, a second measure of subjective ambivalence (α=.83) 
was included to assess a possible spontaneous reduction in ambivalence.  
Attitude (α=.97), attitude certainty (α=.85), attitude clarity (α=.89), attitude correctness 
(α=.75), initial measure of subjective ambivalence (α=.79), individual assessments of positive 
and negative reactions, manifest positive/negative reactions, anticipated positive/negative 
reactions (αpos=.89, αneg=.89) were measured and transformed as in previous Experiments. 
 
                                                          
8 To this end, we pretested 20 attributes in the context of notebooks on their importance with 79 
respondents (49 female and 30 male), age ranging from 18 to 28 years (M = 22.43, SD = 2.08). We 
selected the six most important attributes which did not differ in importance (F(5,478)=1.19, p=.315). 
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Table 8: Attribute descriptions used in Experiment 3 (notebook) 
Positive traits Negative traits 
High display quality (resolution) Low display quality (resolution) 
Large storage capacity on hard drive Small storage capacity on hard drive 
Very light notebook Very heavy notebook 
Long battery autonomy Short battery autonomy 
Very compatible with all sorts of software Less compatible with all sorts of software 
Many USB ports Very few USB ports 
 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks.  In order to assess whether the manipulations were successful, we 
conducted a series of one-way ANOVA’s which revealed significant effects of condition on 
subjective ambivalence (F(2,158)=16.19, p<.001), manifest conflicting reactions 
(F(2,158)=19.46, p<.001), and anticipated conflicting reactions (F(2,158)=11.64, p<.001). Post-
hoc tests (summarized in Table 9) indicate that our manipulations were successful. 
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Table 9: Manipulation checks, Experiment 3, means as a function of condition 
Condition n 
Subjective 
Ambivalence 
Manifest Conflicting 
Reactions 
Anticipated 
Conflicting Reactions 
M SD M SD M SD 
Univalence 57 4.39a 2.14 4.56a 2.92 5.99a 2.47 
Anticipated 
Ambivalence 
53 6.41b 1.93 4.65a 2.40 7.79b 2.08 
Manifest 
Ambivalence 
51 6.04b 1.87 7.26b 2.23 5.84a 2.31 
* different letters for mean values of variables between conditions indicate significant differences at the p=.05 level 
          
Attitude Certainty, Clarity and Correctness.  Results of three one-way ANOVA’s 
revealed an effect of condition on attitude certainty (F(2,158)=12.51, p<.001) and attitude clarity 
(F(2,158)=7.12, p=.001) but not on attitude correctness (F(2,158)=1.96, p=.145). Similar to 
previous Experiments, post-hoc tests denote that anticipated ambivalent participants (M=6.40) 
are less certain of their attitude compared to manifest ambivalent (M=7.75, p=.003) and 
univalent participants (M=8.22, p<.001) while the latter two did not differ (p=.392). Furhermore, 
anticipated ambivalent participants (M=5.13) are less certain what their true attitude (cf. attitude 
clarity) toward the MP3-player is compared to manifest ambivalent (M=6.24, p=.002) and 
univalent participants (M=6.08, p=.008) while the latter two did not differ (p=1.000). With 
respect to attitude correctness, anticipated ambivalent respondents (M=5.21) are as convinced as 
manifest ambivalent respondents (M=5.25) and univalent respondents (M=5.68) that their 
attitude is correct, valid or justified. Attitude clarity and correctness correlate positively (r=.436, 
p<.001). 
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Similar to previous Experiments, attitude clarity mediates the differences in attitude 
certainty between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals. Independent regressions 
show that the dummy variable created for anticipated versus manifest ambivalence (coded 0 and 
1 respectively) significantly affects both attitude certainty (β=.33, t(104)=3.47, p=.001) and 
attitude clarity (β=.34, t(104)=3.62, p<.001). Attitude clarity also significantly predicts attitude 
certainty (β=.56, t(104)=6.81, p<.001). In a simultaneous regression predicting attitude certainty, 
attitude clarity continues to be a significant predictor (β=.51, t(104)=5.88, p<.001), whereas the 
dummy variable does not (β=.15, t(104)=1.78, p=.078). The mediating role of attitude clarity was 
assessed by a bootstrapping test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Because the 
95% confidence interval of the indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 95% CI = .31, 
upper bound 95% CI = 1.29), attitude clarity significantly mediates the effect of ambivalence 
type on attitude certainty. 
Attitude-intention relationship.  In order to look at differences for attitude-intention 
relationship, the Pearson correlation coefficients between the attitude toward the notebook and 
the intention to buy it were compared for the participants in the univalent, manifest ambivalent 
and anticipated ambivalent condition similar to Experiment 2. To this end, the Pearson 
correlation coefficients for each condition were first converted to a normally distributed variable 
by a Fisher’s z transformation. Comparing these values then indicates that the correlation was 
significantly lower in the anticipated ambivalent condition (r=.334, p=.017) than it was in either 
the manifest ambivalent condition (r=.678, p<.001; z=2.37, p=.018) or the univalent condition 
(r=.669, p<.001; z=2.33, p=.020). The manifest ambivalent condition and univalent condition did 
not differ from each other (z=-.08, p=.936). Hence, although attitudes and behavioral intentions 
 182 
were highly correlated overall (r=.662, p<.001), this relationship is moderated by ambivalence 
type. 
To examine the degree to which the difference in attitude-behavioral intention 
correspondence between conditions is attributable to differences in attitude certainty, we 
conducted regression analyses in which attitude-behavioral intention correspondence9 was 
treated as the criterion and the different type of ambivalence as predictor. This enables us to 
scrutinize the extent to which our different ambivalence types predict intentions and whether this 
remained significant when controlling for attitude certainty. We began by looking at 
ambivalence type (2 dummy variables with anticipated ambivalent condition as reference 
category; anticipatedvsmanifest & anticipatedvsunivalent) predicting attitude-behavioral 
intention correspondence. The results replicated the simple correlation findings. That is, the 
‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ dummy variable (β=-.22, t(158)=-2.55, p=.012) as well as the 
‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variable (β=-.39, t(158)=-4.43, p<.001) predict attitude-
intention correspondence. That is, manifest ambivalent and univalent attitudes are more 
predictive of behavioral intention compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes. The next step 
was to demonstrate that attitude certainty also predicted attitude-behavioral intention 
correspondence, which should be the case if attitude certainty plays an important role in the 
attitude-behavioral intention effect. Therefore, another regression showed that attitude-
behavioral intention correspondence was predicted by attitude certainty (β=-.34, t(159)=-4.57, 
p<.001). This reveals that attitudes indeed become more predictive of behavioral intention when 
                                                          
9 Similar to Experiment 2, attitude-intention correspondence was calculated by the absolute difference 
between the score on the attitude toward the notebook scale and the score on the intention to buy the 
notebook scale (both on 11-point scales; cf. |Attitude-Intention|). Hence, higher values indicate less 
attitude-intention correspondence. 
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attitude certainty increases. Finally, in a third step of the same regression analysis, we added the 
original ‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ and ‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variables interaction and 
found that the first no longer predicted behavioral intentions (β=-.15, t(157)=-1.65, p=.102) 
whereas the latter remained significant but is reduced in absolute size (β=-.28, t(157)=-3.09, 
p=.002). Hence, when we controlled for the attitude certainty, the ‘anticipatedvsmanifest’ and 
‘anticipatedvsunivalent’ dummy variables remained significant but reduced in absolute size, 
consistent with the notion that certainty plays a key role in determing attitude-behavioral 
consistency for our different types of ambivalence. 
Furthermore, this difference in attitude-behavioral intention correspondence between 
manifest and anticipated ambivalence seems to be mediated by attitude certainty. That is, 
independent regressions show that the dummy variable created for anticipated versus manifest 
ambivalence (coded 0 and 1 respectively) significantly affects both attitude-intention 
correspondence (β=-.22, t(104)=-2.24, p=.027) and attitude certainty (β=.33, t(104)=3.47, 
p=.001). Attitude certainty also significantly predicts attitude-intention correspondence (β=-.33, 
t(104)=-3.48, p=.001). In a simultaneous regression predicting attitude-intention correspondence, 
attitude certainty continues to be a significant predictor (β=-.29, t(104)=-2.30, p<.001), whereas 
the dummy variable does not (β=-.12, t(104)=-1.26, p=.212). The mediating role of attitude 
certainty was assessed by a bootstrapping test (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Because the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect does not contain zero (lower bound 
95% CI = -.80, upper bound 95% CI = -.10), attitude certainty significantly mediates the effect of 
ambivalence type on attitude-intention correspondence.  
Ambivalence-associated negative feelings.  Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed an 
effect of condition on ambivalence-associated negative feelings (F(2,158)=4.48, p=.013). 
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Dunnett T3 post-hoc tests confirmed our prediction that manifest ambivalent respondents report 
more intense negative feelings (M=2.45) compared to participants in the anticipated ambivalent 
(M=2.00, p=.037) and univalent condition (M=1.95, p=.033) while the latter two did not differ 
(p=.987). 
Ambivalence reduction.  A repeated measure analysis of variance indicated that there is 
no difference between initial and subsequent subjective ambivalence levels for our manipulations 
(F(2,158)=1.25, p=.290). In the univalent (Minitial=4.39 vs. Msubsequent=4.60, F(1,56)=1.09, 
p=.300), manifest ambivalent(Minitial=6.04 vs. Msubsequent=5.69, F(1,52)=1.30, p=.260), and 
anticipated ambivalent condition (Minitial=6.41 vs. Msubsequent=6.10, F(1,50)=.80, p=.374), 
subsequent subjective ambivalence did not differ from initial subjective ambivalence. Finally, a 
one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition on subsequent subjective 
ambivalence (F(2,158)=7.84, p=.001). Bonferonni post-hoc test show that univalent respondents 
experience less subsequent subjective ambivalence (M=4.60) compared to participants in the 
anticipated ambivalent (M=6.10, p=.001) and manifest ambivalent condition (M=5.69, p=.019) 
while the latter two still do not differ (p=.895). 
 
Discussion 
Results replicated the findings of our previous Experiments. That is, manifest ambivalent 
attitudes are more predictive of behavioral intention compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes 
which is driven by a difference in attitude certainty. However, we ruled out an alternative 
explanation that the subjective ambivalence level of manifest ambivalent attitudes would already 
be spontaneously reduced at the moment of expressing the behavioral intention. Although 
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manifest ambivalent consumers experience more intense ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings than anticipated ambivalent consumers, they do not spontaneously try to reduce their 
ambivalence level. That is, at the moment of expressing the intention to behave in a certain way, 
there is no difference in ambivalence level between manifest and anticipated ambivalent 
attitudes. So, it seems that it is the accompanying attitude certainty level and not a spontaneously 
reduced ambivalence level which drives the predictive ability of these different types of 
ambivalent attitudes.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Four studies underscore the relevance of distinguishing between two types of 
ambivalence based on the type of conflicting reactions underlying the ambivalence (knowing 
versus anticipating). In all Experiments, differences are found between manifest and anticipated 
ambivalent individuals, even though subjective ambivalence level did not differ. Taken together, 
our findings shed light on the difference of the underlying structure of feelings of ambivalence, 
its relationship with attitude behavior(al intention) consistency and attitude certainty 
(conceptualized by attitude clarity and attitude correctness). In this paper, it is demonstrated that 
manifest ambivalent individuals show a higher attitude-behavior(al intention) consistency than 
anticipated ambivalent individuals. Furthermore, support is provided for the notion that 
ambivalent attitude holders who are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions (i.e., manifest 
ambivalence) are more certain of their attitudes compared to individuals who merely anticipate 
on conflicting reactions (i.e., anticipated ambivalence), although experiencing the same 
subjective ambivalence level. This is driven by a difference in attitude clarity between conditions 
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rather than a difference in attitude correctness. That is, for anticipated ambivalent individuals, it 
is less clear what their true attitude (cf. attitude clarity) toward an attitude object is compared to 
manifest ambivalent individuals. However, both are as confident that their attitude is correct, 
valid or justified (cf. attitude correctness) given the available information. Moreover, this 
difference in attitude certainty between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals mediates 
the relationship between ambivalence type and behavior(al intention) consistency. Finally, we 
ruled out an alternative explanation possibly steering the latter. That is, although manifest 
ambivalence is associated with more intense negative feelings compared to anticipated 
ambivalence, it is not spontaneously reduced before or at the moment of forming the intention. 
This indicates that the type of conflicting reactions and the accompanying attitude certainty level, 
which are at the heart of the experience of ambivalence steer the predictive ability of the 
accompanying attitudes. 
 
Implications and Possibilities for Further Research 
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects.  First, based upon earlier work 
of Priester et al. (2007), we have defined two types of ambivalence based on the knowledge of 
conflicting reactions underlying the evaluative conflict. Although Priester et al. (2007) 
introduced the construct ‘anticipation of conflicting reactions’, this paper is the first to extend it 
to types of ambivalence and to link it with attitude certainty (conceptualized by attitude clarity 
and correctness), and the predictive nature of these attitudes. It is clearly shown that individuals 
can experience the same level of subjective ambivalence although their ambivalence is based 
upon different awareness levels of conflicting reactions. Moreover, past research (Priester et al., 
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2007) only looked at anticipated conflicting reactions as a function of the magnitude of dominant 
reactions. This paper and especially the way the types of ambivalence were operationalized, 
broadens anticipated conflicting reactions to a function of both the magnitude of dominant                   
reactions and interpersonal influence (it is the opinion of a friend that incites/inhibit the 
anticipation of conflicting reactions, cf. Priester & Petty, 2001). 
Second, this issue is of theoretical importance because of the opposing perspectives in the 
ambivalence literature on the predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes. We argue that the type of 
conflicting reactions underlying attitudinal ambivalence could help explain these different 
results. Previous ambivalence research possibly measured different types of ambivalence caused 
by the specific manipulations, attitude objects, research cover stories, etc.  For example, Jonas et 
al. (1997) as well as Sengupta and Johar (2002) potentially manipulated manifest rather than 
anticipated ambivalence by providing information of a consumers’ association which could be 
seen as accurate and complete (i.e., no anticipation of conflicting reactions). In contrast, 
Armitage and Conner (2000) as well as Costarelli and Colloca (2007) for example asked about 
evaluations of an out-group without providing information, this could evoke anticipated 
ambivalence, especially when the respondents have no experience with the out-group. 
Although our results may help understanding the conflicting findings regarding the 
predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes, they are not consistent with the amplification 
hypothesis of attitude certainty which challenges the crystallizing nature of attitude certainty by 
suggesting that certainty not inherently strengthens an attitude but that it amplifies the dominant 
effect of the attitude on, for example, behavior (Clakson et al., 2008; 2011). That is, increasing 
attitude certainty strengthens attitudes when they are univalent but weakens attitudes when they 
are ambivalent as the dominant effect of the latter is to attenuate attitude-behavior consistency 
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(Clarkson et al., 2008). However, there are some crucial differences between our research and 
amplification research which can explain these inconsistent results. First, they assessed 
ambivalence outlined by Priester & Petty (1996) which incorporates both indicators of objective 
and subjective ambivalence whereas in our research only subjective ambivalence is used. 
Second, in amplification research attitude certainty was manipulated by altering the credibility of 
the source which gives consistent or inconsistent information whereas the difference in attitude 
certainty, in our research, is more a consequence itself of the type of conflicting reactions which 
are at the heart of the experience of ambivalence. That is, in amplification research, individuals 
will still be able to define conflicting reactions as they are aware of them through the 
manipulations (cf. providing people with both positive and negative information). They only will 
differ in the extent to which they think this information is valid (cf. attitude certainty). In 
contrast, in our research, anticipated ambivalent individuals will not be able to define conflicting 
reactions, they just anticipate them. Moreover, altering source credibility is likely to influence 
both attitude clarity and attitude correctness. That is, when confronted with two-sided 
information of a less credible source, one will be less certain what his/her true attitude is (cf. 
attitude clarity) and will also doubt whether his/her attitude is correct, valid (cf. attitude 
correctness) compared to when being confronted with the same information of a credible source. 
In contrast, concerning the types of ambivalence, there is no difference between manifest and 
anticipated ambivalent attitudes with respect to attitude correctness. Although anticipated 
ambivalent individuals will be less certain whether their attitude reflects what they truly think 
(cf. attitude clarity) compared to manifest ambivalent, they will not differ in the extent to which 
they think their attitude is correct. In that sense, the difference between our findings and those of 
amplification research may lay in the similarity in attitude correctness between manifest and 
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anticipated ambivalence whereas in amplification research, a difference in attitude correctness 
between the high and low source credibility condition can be expected.   
Third, our results provide additional proof for the notion that attitude correctness and 
attitude clarity are conceptually distinct (Petrocelli et al., 2007). That is, manifest ambivalent 
attitudes are higher in attitude clarity than anticipated ambivalent attitudes. However, there is no 
difference regarding attitude correctness between conditions. It seems that the anticipation of 
conflicting reactions is an antecedent of attitude clarity rather than attitude correctness. By 
investigating the latter, we also partly meet the call for more research of Petrocelli et al. (2007) 
on other factors that may independently contribute to attitude clarity versus attitude correctness. 
Fourth, a lot of studies in ambivalence research seem to focus on behavioral intention 
(e.g. Armitage, 2003; Armitage & Conner, 2000; Clarkson et al., 2008; Costarelli & Colloca, 
2007; Jonas et al., 1997; Sengupta & Johar, 2002; Sparks et al., 2001) or self-reports of (past) 
behavior (e.g. Armitage, 2003; Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner et al., 2002), neglecting actual 
behavior. Although behavioral intention is seen as a proxy of overt behavior, it does not always 
instigate behavior (Kraus, 1995). When consumers, for example, indicate that they are willing to 
buy a certain organic coffee, this does not mean that they will effectively buy it when they are 
confronted with the brand in the supermarket. That is, saying something and doing something are 
two totally different things. This also reflects in many researchers finding low correlations 
between measured intentions and observed behaviour (e.g. Chandon, Morwitz & Reinartz, 2005; 
Fennis, Adriaanse, Stroebe & Pol, 2011; Morwitz, Johnson & Schmittlein, 1993; Orbell, 
Hodgkins & Sheeran, 1997; Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). A meta-analysis of meta-
analyses of the relation between intentions and behavior even indicated that intentions only 
explain 28% of the variance in behaviors (Sheeran, 2002). To our knowledge, this research is the 
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first to look at the predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes for actual behavior besides 
behavioral intention and shows that our results hold for both actual behavior as well as 
behavioral intention. 
Our findings raise several questions for future research. As ambivalent attitudes are 
generally seen as weak attitudes (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner & Sparks, 2002; 
Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Thompson et al., 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 
2007), future research may contribute by examining other attitude strength features like 
persistence, resistance to persuasion and information processing, for these different types of 
ambivalence. Our results show that the underlying conflicting reactions feeding the ambivalence 
may influence the strength (in terms of attitude-behavior correspondence) of the accompanying 
ambivalent attitude. Thus, manifest ambivalent attitudes could be stronger than anticipated 
ambivalent attitudes. In a similar vein, manifest (versus anticipated) ambivalent attitudes could 
be for example more resistant to persuasion and more stable as individuals are aware of their 
conflicting reactions. It could be that anticipated ambivalent consumers are easily persuaded by 
certain messages regardless of the strength of these messages in terms of for example argument 
strength and source credibility. On the other hand, manifest ambivalent consumers are more 
certain of their attitude and as a consequence are more reluctant to change their attitude. That is, 
they will not be easily persuaded by other message sources unless the message is really strong. 
This could be consistent with respect to the stability of the attitude. That is, manifest ambivalent 
attitudes could be more stable over time compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes.   
We suggest ambivalence researchers to always measure the underlying conflicting 
reactions, next to measuring subjective ambivalence to identify whether individuals hold 
manifest ambivalent versus anticipated ambivalent attitudes. Our results suggest that the 
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distinction between both types is substantial as both types of ambivalent attitudes can predict 
behavior differently. 
 192 
References 
Armitage, C.J. (2003). Beyond attitudinal ambivalence: effects of belief homogeneity on 
attitude-intention-behaviour relations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 551-63. 
Armitage, C.J., & Conner, M. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence: a test of three key hypotheses. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1421-32. 
Barber, A.E. (1998), ‘Recruiting employees: individual and organizational prespectives,’ 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Bargh, J.A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic 
attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 893-912.  
Bassili, J.N. (1996). Meta-judgmental verus operative indexes of psychological attributes: the 
case of measures of attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 637-
53. 
Bizer, G.Y., Tormala, Z.L., Rucker, D.D., & Petty R.E. (2006). Memory based versus on-line 
processing: Implications for attitude strength. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 
646-53.  
Chandon, P., Morwitz, V.G., & Reinartz, W.J. (2005). Do intentions really predict behavior? 
Self-generated validity effects in survey research. Journal of Marketing, 69, 1-14. 
Clark, J.K., Wegener, D.T., & Fabrigar, L.R. (2008). Attitudinal ambivalence and message-based 
persuasion: motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of 
counterattitudinal information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 565-77. 
 193 
Clarkson, J.J., Tormala, Z.L., & Rucker, D.D. (2008). A new look at the consequences of attitude 
certainty: The amplification hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 
810-25. 
Clarkson, J.J., Tormala, Z.L., & Rucker, D.D. (2011). Cognitive and affective matching effects 
in persuasion: an amplification perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 
1415-27.  
Conner, M., P. Sparks, R. Povey, R. James, R. Sheperd, & Armitage, C.J. (2002). Moderator 
effects of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-behavior relationships. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 32, 705-18. 
Conner, M., & Sparks, P. (2002). Ambivalence and attitudes. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 12, 37-70. 
Costarelli, S., & Colloca, P. (2007). The moderation of ambivalence on attitude-intention 
relations as mediated by attitude importance. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 
923-33. 
de Liver, Y., van der Pligt, J., & Wigboldus, D.H.J. (2007). Positive and negative associations 
underlying ambivalent attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 319-26. 
Fazio, R.H., & Zanna, M.P. (1978). Attitudinal qualities related to strength of attitude-behavior 
relationship. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 398-408. 
Fennis, B.M., Adriaanse, M.A., Stroebe, W., & Pol, B. (2011). Bridging  the intention-behavior 
gap : inducing implementation intentions through persuasive appeals. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 21, 302-11. 
 194 
Glasman, L.R., & Albarracín, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future behavior: A meta-
analysis of the attitude-behavior relation. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 778-822.  
Gross, S.R., Holtz, R., & Miller, N. (1995). Attitude certainty. In Attitude Strength: Antecedents 
and Consequences, ed. Petty, R.E., & Krosnick, J.A., Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 215-45.. 
Haugtvedt, C.P., & Petty, R.E. (1992). Personality and persuasion - Need for cognition 
moderates the persistence and resistance of attitude changes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 63, 308-19. 
Hass, R.G., Katz, I., Rizzo, N., Bailey, J., & Moore, L. (1992). When racial ambivalence evokes 
negative affect, using a disguised measure of mood. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 18, 786-97. 
Herr, P.M., Kardes, F.R., & Kim, J. (1991). Effects of word-of-mouth and product-attribute 
information on persuasion: An accessibility-diagnosticity perspective. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 17, 454-62. 
Highhouse, S., Lievens, F., & Sinar, E.F. (2003). Measuring attraction to organizations. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 63, 986-1001. 
Ito, T.A., Larsen, J.T., Smith, N.K., & Cacioppo, J.T. (1998). Negative information weighs more 
heavily on the brain: the negativity bias in evaluative categorizations. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75, 887-900. 
Jonas, K., Diehl, M., & Brömer, P. (1997). Effects of attitudinal ambivalence on information 
processing and attitude-intention consistency. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 
190-210. 
 195 
Kaplan, K.J. (1972). On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory and 
measurement: a suggested modification of the semantic differential technique. Psychological 
Bulletin, 77, 361-72. 
Kraus, S.J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior - A meta-analysis of the empirical 
literature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 58-75. 
Krosnick, J.A., & Petty, R.E. (1995). Attitude strength: an overview. In Attitude Strength: 
Antecedents and Consequences, ed. Petty, R.E., & Krosnick, J.A., Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1-
24. 
Lau-Gesk, L. (2005). Understanding consumer evaluations of mixed affective experiences. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 32, 23-28. 
Maio, G.R., Bell, D.W., & Esses, V.M. (1996). Ambivalence and persuasion: The processing of 
messages about immigrant groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 513-36. 
Maheswaran, D., & Chaiken, S (1991). Promoting systematic processing in low-involvement 
settings: Effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 13-25. 
Mizerski, R.W. (1982). An attribution explanation of the disproportionate influence of 
unfavorable information. Journal of Consumer Research, 9, 301-10. 
Moore, M. (1973). Ambivalence in attitude measurement. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 33, 481-83. 
 196 
Moore, M. (1980). Validation of the attitude toward any practice scale through the use of 
ambivalence as a moderator variable. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 40, 205-
08. 
Morwitz, V.G., Johnson, E., & Schmittlein, D. (1993). Does measuring intent change behavior. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 46-61. 
Newby-Clark, I.R., McGregor, I., & Zanna, M.P. (2002). Thinking and caring about cognitive 
inconsistency: when and for whom does attitudinal ambivalence feel uncomfortable? Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 157-66. 
Nordgren, L.F., van Harreveld, F., & van der Pligt, J. (2006). Ambivalence, discomfort and 
motivated information processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 252-58. 
Nowlis, S.M., Kahn, B.E., & Dhar, R. (2002). Coping with ambivalence: the effect of removing 
a neutral option on consumer attitude and preference judgments. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 29, 319-34. 
Orbell, S., Hodgkins, S., & Sheeran, P. (1997). Implementation intentions and the theory of 
planned behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 945-54. 
Otnes, C., Lowrey, T.M., & Shrum, L.J. (1997). Toward an understanding of consumer 
ambivalence. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 80-93. 
Petrocelli, J.V., Tormala, Z.L., & and Rucker, D.D. (2007). Unpacking attitude certainty: 
Attitude clarity and attitude correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 
30-41. 
 197 
Petty, R.E., Haugtvedt C.P., & Smith, S.M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude 
strength: creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. In Attitude 
Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, ed. Petty, R.E., & Krosnick, J.A., Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum, 93-130. 
Petty, R.E., Tormala, Z.L., Briñol, P., & Jarvis, W.B.G. (2006). Implicit ambivalence form 
attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 21-41. 
Preacher, K.J., & Hayes, A.F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects 
in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, and Computers, 36, 
717-31. 
Priester, J.R., & Petty, R.E. (1996). The gradual threshold model of ambivalence: relating the 
positive and negative bases of attitudes to subjective ambivalence. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 71, 431-49. 
Priester, J.R., & Petty, R.E. (2001). Extending the bases of subjective attitudinal ambivalence: 
interpersonal and intrapersonal antecedents of evaluative tension. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 80, 19-34. 
Priester, J.R., Petty, R.E., & Park, K. (2007). Whence univalent ambivalence? From the 
anticipation of conflicting reactions. Journal of Consumer Research, 34, 11-21. 
Rucker, D.D., & Petty, R.E. (2004). When resistance is futile: consequences of failed 
counterargung for attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 219-
35. 
 198 
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention-behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. In W. 
Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), European Review of Social Psychology, Chichester: Wiley, 1-
30. 
Sengupta, J., & Johar, G.V. (2002). The effects of inconsistent attribute information on the 
predictive value of product attitudes: toward a resolution of opposing perspectives. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 29, 39-56. 
Shrout, P.E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in Experimental and nonExperimental studies: 
New procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7, 422-45. 
Sparks, P., Conner, M., James, R., Shepherd, R., & Povey, R. (2001). Ambivalence about health-
related behaviours: An exploration in the domain of food choice. British Journal of Health 
Psychology, 6, 53-68.  
Srull, T.K., & Wyer, R.S. (1989). Person memory and judgment. Psychological Review, 96, 58-
83. 
Thompson, M.M., Zanna, M.P., & Griffin, D.W. (1995). Let’s not be indifferent about 
(attitudinal) ambivalence. In Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, ed. Petty, 
R.E., & Krosnick, J.A., Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 361-86. 
Tormala, Z.L., Clarkson, J.J., & Petty, R.E. (2006). Resisting persuasion by the skin of one’s 
teeth: the hidden success of resisted persuasive messages. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91, 423-35. 
 199 
Tormala, Z.L., & Petty, R.E. (2002). What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger: The effects of 
resisting persuasion on attitude certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 
1298-1313. 
Tormala, Z.L., & Petty, R.E. (2004a). Resistance to persuasion and attitude certainty: the 
moderating role of elaboration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1446-57. 
Tormala, Z.L., & Petty, R.E. (2004b). Source credibility and attitude certainty: a metacognitive 
analysis of resistance to persuasion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14, 427-42. 
Tormala, Z.L., & Rucker, D.D. (2007). Attitude certainty: a review of past findings and 
emerging perspectives. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 469-92. 
van Harreveld, F., Rutjens, B.T., Rotteveel, M.R., Nordgren, L.F., & van der Pligt, J. (2009a). 
Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: feeling tense 
before jumping off the fence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 167-73. 
van Harreveld, F., Schneider, I.K., Nohlen, H.U., & van der Pligt, J. (2012). The dynamics of 
ambivalence: Evaluative conflict in attitudes and decision making. In Cognitive consistency: 
A fundamental principle in social cognition, ed. Gawronski, B., & Strack, F., New York, NY: 
The Guilford Press, 267-84. 
van Harreveld, F., van der Pligt, J., & de Liver, Y.N. (2009b). The agony of ambivalence and 
ways to resolve it: introducing the MAID model. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
13, 45-61. 
 200 
Visser, P.S., & Mirabile, R.R. (2004). Attitudes in the social context: The impact of social 
network composition on individual-level attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 87, 779-95.  
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioural intentions engender behavior 
change? A meta-analysis of the Experimental evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 249-68. 
Zemborain, M.R., & Johar, G.V. (2007). Attitudinal ambivalence and openness to persuasion: A 
framework for interpersonal influence. Journal of Consumer Research, 33, 506-14. 
 
 201 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V:  
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS                          
& FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 202 
 
 203 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS & FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation improves our understanding of different types of ambivalence by 
focusing on how people cope with their ambivalence through information processing and 
spreading WOM to others as well as investigating the predictive ability of these different 
ambivalent attitudes. In what follows, we summarize and discuss the core findings of each 
chapter. Afterwards, implications of our research for consumer behavior and opportunities for 
future research are discussed. 
 
RECAPITULATION OF FINDINGS  
Chapter II focused on how people deal with their feelings of ambivalence by spreading 
WOM to others. Results show that manifest ambivalent individuals, who are knowledgeable of 
both positive and negative reactions (whether they are dominant or conflicting), spread more 
negative WOM and less positive WOM compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals who are 
not knowledgeable of but just anticipate on conflicting (negative) reactions (Pilot Study and 
Experiment 1), even though ambivalence intensity and the amount of experienced conflict did 
not differ. Although manifest ambivalent individuals have more knowledge on positive, 
compared to negative reactions, they still engage in a negativity bias and rather talk about 
negative instead of positive attributes. Moreover, spreading negative WOM, which is driven by 
the negative feelings accompanying manifest ambivalence, seems an effective way for manifest 
ambivalent individuals to reduce their subjective ambivalence and the accompanying negative 
feelings (Experiment 1). When negative reactions are made dominant and anticipated 
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ambivalence is fed by positive (conflicting) reactions (Experiment 2), there is no difference in 
negative WOM spread between manifest and anticipated ambivalent consumers. Nevertheless, 
manifest ambivalent people still reduce their ambivalence and the associated negative feelings by 
spreading negative WOM due to higher (initial) ambivalence-associated negative feelings 
compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals. The latter neither reduce their ambivalence after 
negative WOM nor do they experience less intense negative feelings afterwards. Initial mood 
people hold moderates this relationship (Experiment 3). On the one hand, when anticipated 
ambivalent people are in a negative (compared to a positive or neutral) mood, they experience 
more intense negative feelings accompanying ambivalence, spread more negative WOM which 
reduces their ambivalence and the associated negative feelings. On the other hand, manifest 
ambivalent people who are in a positive (compared to a negative or neutral) mood, experience 
less intense negative feelings accompanying ambivalence, hence, their WOM neither reduces 
their ambivalence nor does it reduce their associated negative feelings. These results indicate that 
spreading WOM to others is an effective way of dealing (cf. reducing) with ambivalence when 
the latter is associated with ambivalence-associated negative feelings. Hence, the negative 
feelings accompanying ambivalence seem to play a crucial role whether or not ambivalent 
individuals are motivated to deal with their discomfort.  
Chapter III focused on information processing as a potential coping mechanism for our 
defined types of ambivalence. Results are in line with those of Chapter II. That is, manifest 
ambivalent individuals process more negative and less positive information compared to 
anticipated ambivalent individuals, even though ambivalence intensity and the amount of 
experienced conflict did not differ. Similar to Chapter II, manifest ambivalent people seem to 
engage in a negativity bias as they process additional negative information rather than positive 
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information. For anticipated ambivalent people, it is less clear what type of information (cf. 
valence) they are going to process. When not being able to search for new information (Pilot 
Study & Experiment 1), anticipated ambivalent consumers generate more positive thoughts than 
negative thoughts. When confronting anticipated ambivalent individuals with (choosing) new 
information (Experiment 2 & 3), they do not have a real preference for processing additional 
positive or negative information. Moreover, it seems that manifest ambivalent consumers are 
more motivated to deal with their ambivalence which is shown by the fact that manifest 
ambivalent individuals reduce their subjective ambivalence whereas anticipated ambivalent 
consumers do not reduce their ambivalence. These findings show that biased information 
processing seems to be an effective coping mechanism for manifest ambivalent individuals. 
Chapter IV focused on the predictive strength of these different types of ambivalent 
attitudes for behavior(al intention). Four studies shed light on the difference of the underlying 
structure of feelings of ambivalence, its relationship with attitude behavior(al intention) 
consistency and attitude certainty (conceptualized by attitude clarity and attitude correctness). 
Results demonstrate that manifest ambivalent individuals show a higher attitude-behavior(al 
intention) consistency than anticipated ambivalent individuals (Pilot Study, Experiment 2 & 3). 
Furthermore, support is provided for the notion that manifest ambivalent attitude holders are 
more certain of their attitudes compared to anticipated ambivalent individuals which is driven by 
a difference in attitude clarity between conditions rather than a difference in attitude correctness 
(Experiment 1, 2 & 3). That is, for anticipated ambivalent individuals, it is less clear what their 
true attitude (cf. attitude clarity) toward an attitude object is compared to manifest ambivalent 
individuals. However, both are as confident that their attitude is correct, valid or justified (cf. 
attitude correctness) given the available information. Moreover, this difference in attitude 
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certainty between manifest and anticipated ambivalent individuals mediates the relationship 
between ambivalence type and behavior(al intention) consistency (Experiment 2 & 3). Finally, 
we ruled out an alternative explanation possibly steering these results (Experiment 3). That is, 
although manifest ambivalence is associated with more intense negative feelings compared to 
anticipated ambivalence, it is not spontaneously reduced at the moment of forming the intention. 
So, it does not lead to a lower ambivalence level and, hence, an attitude which should be more 
predictive of behavior. This indicates that the type of conflicting reactions and the accompanying 
attitude certainty level, which are at the heart of the experience of ambivalence, steer the 
predictive ability of the accompanying attitudes. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter II & III investigate spreading WOM and processing information, respectively, as 
potential coping mechanisms to deal with the agony of ambivalence. Results of these chapters fit 
with ambivalence research on motivated one-sided information processing to reduce 
ambivalence and are additional proof for the notion that it is specifically the ambivalence-
associated negative feelings accompanying the type of ambivalence that fosters ambivalence 
reduction (Clark, Wegener & Fabrigar, 2008; Nordgren, van Harreveld & van der Pligt, 2006; 
van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren & van der Pligt 2009a; van Harreveld, van der Pligt 
& de Liver, 2009b). The present findings can be viewed within the consistency seeking 
motivation of individuals and offers new insights into the process of resolving evaluative conflict 
which is an important aspect within the ambivalence literature (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren 
et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a). Our studies suggest that when an ambivalent attitude is 
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based upon both positive and negative reactions of which individuals are knowledgeable of (cf. 
manifest ambivalence), this ambivalent attitude may be resolved through spreading negative 
WOM and/or processing negative information. However, when an ambivalent attitude is based 
upon anticipated conflicting reactions (cf. anticipated ambivalence), it seems harder to comply 
with one side and to behave consistent with it (i.e., in terms of spreading WOM and information 
processing).  
Chapter IV scrutinizes the predictive ability for behavior(al intention) of these different 
types of ambivalence. This issue is of theoretical importance because of the opposing 
perspectives in the ambivalence literature on the predictive ability of ambivalent attitudes. 
Several studies have shown that attitudinal ambivalence results in lower attitude-behavior 
consistency (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; 
Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995). In contrast, Jonas, Diehl and Brömer (1997) and Sengupta 
and Johar (2002) found that ambivalent attitudes lead to higher attitude-behavior consistency. 
We argue that the type of conflicting reactions underlying attitudinal ambivalence could help 
explain these different results. Previous ambivalence research possibly measured different types 
of ambivalence caused by the specific manipulations, attitude objects, research cover stories, etc.  
For example, Jonas et al. (1997) as well as Sengupta and Johar (2002) potentially manipulated 
manifest rather than anticipated ambivalence by providing information of a consumers’ 
association which could be seen as accurate and complete (i.e., no anticipation of conflicting 
reactions). In contrast, Armitage and Conner (2000) as well as Costarelli and Colloca (2007) 
asked about evaluations of an out-group without providing information. This could evoke 
anticipated ambivalence, especially when the respondents have no experience with the out-
group. 
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This dissertation contributes to the literature in several aspects.  First, although Priester, 
Petty and Park (2007) made a distinction between manifest and anticipated conflicting reactions, 
we have defined two types of ambivalence based on the extent to which the conflicting reactions 
underlying the evaluative conflict are known. Throughout different studies, it is clearly shown 
that individuals can experience the same level of subjective ambivalence although their 
ambivalence is based upon different knowledge levels of conflicting reactions.  
Second, we show that the mere experience of ambivalence is not sufficient to experience 
discomfort. Although several studies (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey & Moore, 1992; Newby-Clark, 
McGregor & Zanna, 2002; Nordgren et al., 2006; van Harreveld et al., 2009a; 2009b) already 
indicated that conflict awareness plays a pivotal role in experiencing ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings, a direct test had not been provided yet. In this dissertation, we establish a more 
direct link between the knowledge of conflicting reactions and ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings. That is, ambivalent individuals who are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions 
(cf. manifest ambivalence), and hence their evaluative conflict, experience more intense 
ambivalence-associated negative feelings than their counterparts who are not knowledgeable of 
but anticipate conflicting information (cf. anticipated ambivalence). We further challenged the 
belief that the experience of ambivalence is sufficient for individuals to cope with it. It rather 
depends on the type of conflicting reactions, which are at the heart of the experience of 
ambivalence, and the accompanying ambivalence-associated negative feelings whether or not 
ambivalent individuals are able or motivated to cope with their ambivalence. 
Third, although spreading WOM has been proposed as a strategy to reduce dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957), it has never been directly tested as a potential mechanism to cope with the 
discomfort of ambivalence. This dissertation is the first to provide proof for spr
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potential coping mechanism by indicating that negative WOM can reduce subjective (manifest) 
ambivalence. Moreover, information processing as a coping mechanism to deal with the agony 
of ambivalence has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Maio, 
Bell & Esses, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006; Zhao & Cai, 2008). However, most studies have 
focussed on thought-listing (cf. Nordgren et al., 2006), self-reported measures (cf. Zhao & Cai, 
2008), or message elaboration (cf. Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996) as an indicator of 
information processing. In this dissertation, information processing is assessed in a more direct 
way through an eye-tracking study and a choice-study. Furthermore, in former research (e.g. 
Clark et al., 2008; Maio et al., 1996) ambivalent individuals are confronted with either positive 
or negative additional information to look at how people deal with their ambivalence. In contrast, 
our research provides ambivalent people simultaneously with positive and negative information. 
This enables us to give a better and more ‘realistic’ understanding of which type of additional 
information, in terms of valence, ambivalent people will prefer and also effectively process to 
deal with their ambivalence. However, these techniques may still be not completely satisfying to 
capture information processing as people may still think about positive (negative) information 
when writing down, looking at or choosing for negative (positive) information. 
Fourth, although several authors (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Nordgren et al., 2006) have 
looked at how people cope with the discomfort of ambivalence, most of them seem to focus on 
the reduction of their ambivalence while ignoring a possible reduction in ambivalence-associated 
negative feelings. In other words, they seem to leave out whether or not ambivalent people really 
are able to reduce the discomfort of their ambivalence. In Chapter II, we contribute to the 
‘ambivalence coping’ literature by showing that not only ambivalence can be reduced but also 
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the associated negative feelings which are the true motivator of whether or not ambivalent 
individuals will deal with their ambivalence.  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As already discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, ambivalence is prevalent in 
modern society (van Harreveld et al., 2009b; van Harreveld, Schneider, Nohlen & van der Pligt, 
2012). That is, a lot of product information from numerous sources often contains conflicting 
evaluative components (e.g. Sengupta & Johar, 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2012) leading to 
conflicted attitudes (cf.  (manifest) ambivalent attitudes). And even when people are confronted 
with one-sided information, they can experience conflicted attitudes as they are going to foresee 
on conflicting information (cf.  (anticipated) ambivalent attitudes; Priester et al., 2007). So 
understanding the consequences of both types of ambivalence provides valuable information for 
practitioners. 
 Chapter II & III of this dissertation indicate that when people are well aware of both 
positive and negative features of their ambivalent attitude (cf. manifest ambivalence) this creates 
an intense aversive feeling which people want to get rid of by engaging in negativity. That is, 
they will spread negative WOM to others and process negative information. Manifest ambivalent 
consumers will not only try to convince themselves but also influence other’s attitudes and 
preferences negatively by spreading negative WOM.  In that sense, it is important for 
practitioners to be able to make a distinction between anticipated ambivalent and manifest 
ambivalent consumers as the latter may harm you as an organization through that negativity bias. 
However, identification is one thing, changing ‘behavior’ another. As the goal of this dissertation 
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was to explore the consequences of these two types of ambivalence, changing them was not 
included here. However, in future research (see infra), practitioners may benefit from learning 
how to change these manifest ambivalent attitudes positively. If they are able to identify manifest 
ambivalent attitudes and they know how to possibly change their attitudes, this will enable them 
to target these individuals with the right messages. 
Chapter IV focused on the predictive strength of different type of ambivalent attitudes on 
behavior. This may provide valuable insights for practitioners because they often use attitudes 
toward their products as evaluations of their performance or as a proxy of buying behavior. 
However, a lot of research already indicated that not all attitudes predict behavior (for a review 
see Glasman & Albarracín, 2006; Kraus, 1995). Chapter IV contributes to this literature by 
indicating that the anticipation of conflicting reactions may lead to attitudes which are less 
predictive of behavior. Also for practitioners this finding is important in a sense that for example 
a positive attitude toward a certain product does not always predict buying behavior as 
consumers may expect there to be negatives about that product. When conducting market 
research about a certain product, it may be interesting to include measures tapping on this 
anticipation of conflicting information in order to make for example predictions for sales 
revenues. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our findings raise several questions for future research to further our understanding on 
the role of different types of ambivalence in consumer behavior. Researchers should continue to 
investigate the relationship between different types of ambivalence and other mechanisms to 
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cope with ambivalence. Moreover, there are two basic forms of dealing with the negative 
feelings associated with ambivalence-associated discomfort (van Harreveld et al., 2009b); 
emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping. Emotion-focused coping (e.g. postponing 
the decision, downplaying the importance) involves the effort to feel better about an ambivalent 
choice without solving the problem itself (cf. reducing the ambivalence), whereas problem-
focused coping (e.g. (biased) information processing, spreading WOM) involves eliminating the 
problem itself (cf. reducing the ambivalence). As we have focused in this dissertation on 
problem-focused coping mechanisms in Chapter II & III, another venue for future research may 
be to investigate the defined types of ambivalence in relation to these emotion-focused coping 
forms. For example, when and under which circumstances will postponing an ambivalent 
decision (avoidant behavior) be more suited for manifest ambivalent individuals compared to 
really resolving the problem itself by, for example, biased information processing? And does the 
fact that anticipated ambivalent individuals have less intense ambivalence-associated negative 
feelings instigate that they will never try to deal with their ambivalence?  
Although Chapter IV provides a first glimpse on the strength of manifest ambivalent and 
anticipated ambivalent attitudes, in terms of attitude-behavior correspondence, future research 
may also contribute by examining other attitude strength features. As ambivalent attitudes are 
generally seen as weak attitudes (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Conner & Sparks, 2002; 
Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Thompson et al., 1995; Zemborain & Johar, 
2007), it could be interesting to examine how persistent and resistant to persuasion these 
different types of ambivalence are. Our results show that the underlying conflicting reactions 
feeding the ambivalence may influence the strength (in terms of attitude-behavior 
correspondence) of the accompanying ambivalent attitude. Thus, manifest ambivalent attitudes 
 213 
could be stronger than anticipated ambivalent attitudes. In a similar vein, manifest (versus 
anticipated) ambivalent attitudes could, for example, be more resistant to persuasion and more 
stable as individuals are knowledgeable of their conflicting reactions. It could be that anticipated 
ambivalent consumers are easily persuaded by certain messages regardless of the strength of 
these messages in terms of for example argument strength and source credibility. On the other 
hand, manifest ambivalent consumers are more certain of their attitude and as a consequence are 
more reluctant to change their attitude. That is, they will not be easily persuaded by other 
message sources unless the message is really strong. This could be consistent with respect to the 
stability of the attitude. That is, manifest ambivalent attitudes could be more stable over time 
compared to anticipated ambivalent attitudes. This could be especially interesting for 
practitioners as they may want to know how to change these ambivalent attitudes into favorable 
attitudes. 
Finally, in this dissertation, a lot of attention was devoted to the aversive state of 
ambivalence, especially manifest ambivalence, and its consequences. However, future research 
may contribute to the literature by taking cultural differences as a moderator into account. In 
Western cultures, ambivalent attitudes are conceived as something unpleasant that individuals 
are motivated to eliminate. In contrast, East Asians endorse a dialectical worldview that tolerates 
or even appreciates contradicting information (e.g. Hui, Fok & Bond, 2009; Ng, Hynie & 
MacDonald, 2011; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams & Peng, 2010). In that 
sense, it could be that for individuals with dialectical lay beliefs manifest ambivalence is 
associated with less intense negative feelings. As a consequence, ambivalence could not be 
reduced by for example biased information processing or spreading WOM. That is, dialectical 
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thinkers could not feel the urge to cope with their ambivalence as they do not experience it as 
unpleasant.  
In sum, with this dissertation we expand the scope of ambivalence research by 
distinguishing between manifest ambivalence and anticipated ambivalence. The distinction 
between both types is substantial as both types of ambivalent individuals can feel differently, 
behave differently, predict behavior differently, and/or influence whether or not they will deal 
with their ambivalence (cf. reducing ambivalence) through several coping mechanisms. 
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